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Situated at the heart of Africa, the DRC has been transformed into a battlefield where 
several African states and national armed movements are simultaneously fighting 
various wars. In order to achieve peace, security, and stability in the DRC, SADC 
intervened with the international collaboration of the UN and AU. The aim of this 
dissertation is to investigate SADC’s role in the DRC conflict resolution process from 
1998 to 2003. A qualitative research method has been chosen and two theories, namely 
New Institutionalism theories and Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation were 
adopted. The research concludes that SADC military and diplomatic efforts to end the 
war have been positive. It is true that violence continues and peace remained fragile, but 
the conflict had ended. The weakness of the DRC government has allowed continued 
violence. As an organisation of states, SADC has not been able to do anything about 
this fragility.  
 
Key terms: conflict; conflict resolution; DRC; mediation; military intervention; New 











I wish to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people who in 
various ways assisted and supported me in the completion of this research: 
 
- To the Almighty God for whose love and protection sustained me through the 
entire period of this study. Also for giving me the strength and motivation to 
undertake and accomplish my dissertation. 
- Mr Teboho Molete, my supervisor, for his guidance, encouragement and support. 
- To the members of my family for their love, motivation and financial support: My 
parents – Kenabantu Kapinga, Honore Njibikila, Dimuangala Kabeya Gertrude, 
Mariame Malu, my uncle Willy Kalumbu, my brother Jimmy Jay, les Kenabantu, 
Luabeya and my pastor Dr Seraphin. 
- To Dr Eddy Mavungu, Dr Junior Kabange, Delphin Somwe, Koko Sadiki, Mr Solly 
Mudau, Pierre Eale Lokanga, Dieudonne Ntumba, PhillippeTunamsifu, Odette 
Bahati for their assistance and encouragement. 
- To Marcel Musangu, for his love, support and encouragement as he continued to 
stand by me through the highs and lows of this undertaking.  
- Lastly, Time will fail me to mention all who contributed in one way or the other, 











ADF  Allied Democratic Forces 
ADP People’s Democratic Alliance 
AEC   African Economic Community  
AFDL   Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo 
ALIR    Rwanda Liberation Army 
AMF    American Mineral Fields 
ANC    Congolese National Army 
APSA   Africa Peace and Security Architecture 
ASAS    Association of Southern African States 
ASEAN  Association of South-East Asian Nations  
ASF   African Standby Force 
AU    African Union 
CAR    Central African Republic 
CCR               Centre for Conflict Resolution 
CHOGM  Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting  
CNRD            National Council for Resistance and Democracy 
CNS               Sovereign National Conference 
COM   Council of Ministers  
CPP                 Comites de  Pouvoir Populaire /Popular 
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo  
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States  
ECOWAS         Economic Community of West African States 
EU                   European Union 
EWS               Early Warning System 
FAC               Congolese Armed Forces 
FAZ                Zairian Armed Forces 
FDD                 Forces for Defence of Democracy 
FDL                Forces for Defence Local 
FDLR               Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
FLS                 Frontline States 
v 
FNL                  National Liberation Forces 
FRELIMO     Front for the Liberation of Mozambique  
GPA      Global Political Agreement  
HI     Historical Institutionalism 
ICD     Inter-Congolese Dialogue  
ISDSC             Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
ISPDC    Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy  
JMC                 Joint Military Commission  
LCA                 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
LRA                 Lord’s Resistance Army 
MDP     Mutual Defence Pact 
MLC                  Movement for the Liberation of Congo 
MPLA                Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
MRLZ               Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire 
NATO               North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGOs      Non-Governmental Organisations  
NIT                    New Institutionalism Theories 
OAS      Organisation of American States  
OAU      Organisation of African Unity 
OPDSC    SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation  
OSCE     Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PLANELM        Planning Element 
PRP                 People’s for Revolutionary Party 
PSC                 Peace and Security Council  
PSC   Protracted Social Conflicts  
RCD                Congolese Rally for Democracy 
RCD-ML           RCD-Liberation Movement 
RCD-N            RCD-National 
RCI   Rational Choice Institutionalism 
RDF                 Rwandan Defence Forces 
REC’s   Regional Economic Communities 
RENAMO         Mozambican National Resistance  
vi 
RISDP              Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan  
RPTC               Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre 
SA                   South Africa  
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
SADC OPDS     Organ on Politics, Defence and Security  
SADC-AAF  SADC Allied Armed forces  
SADCBRIG      SADC Standby Brigade 
SADCC  Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
SADCPOL        SADC Police 
SI   Sociological Institutionalism 
SIPO    Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ  
SNC                SADC National Committees  
SPLA               Sudanese People’s Liberation Army 
SSF                 SADC Standby Force 
UDPS              Union for Democracy and Social Progress 
UN              United Nations  
UNITA              National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
UNSC              United Nations Security Council 
US                   United States 










DECLARATION ................................................................................................................. i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledgment ............................................................................................................. iii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Problem Statement ................................................................................................ 8 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study .......................................................................... 9 
1.4 Literature Review ................................................................................................... 9 
1.4.1 SADC’s military intervention................................................................ 10 
1.4.2 SADC’s diplomatic intervention ........................................................... 13 
1.4.3 Evaluation of SADC’s intervention ...................................................... 16 
1.5 Contribution to the existing Literature .................................................................. 18 
1.6 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................ 18 
1.7 Research Methodology ........................................................................................ 20 
1.7.1 Method ................................................................................................ 20 
1.7.2 Data Collection .................................................................................... 21 
1.8 Limitations and Delimitations ............................................................................... 22 
1.9 Chapter Outline .................................................................................................... 23 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................. 25 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 25 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................ 25 
2.2.1 Defining conflict ................................................................................... 25 
2.2.2 Conflict Resolution .............................................................................. 27 
2.2.2.1 Nature of conflicts ............................................................................... 29 
viii 
2.2.2.1.1 Types of conflict ................................................................................. 29 
2. 2.2.1.2 Causes of Conflicts ............................................................................ 31 
2.2.2.1.3 Actors in internal Conflicts .................................................................. 32 
2.2.2.2 Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution ..................................................... 33 
2.2.2.2.1 Peacemaking ...................................................................................... 33 
2.2.2.2. 2 Peacekeeping ..................................................................................... 35 
2. 2.2.2.3 Peace building .................................................................................... 36 
2.3 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................ 37 
2.3.1 Rupensighe’s Conflict Transformation Model ..................................... 38 
2.3.1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 38 
2.3.1.2 The Rupesinghe’s model and the DRC conflict situation .................... 42 
2.3.1.3 The weaknesses and strengths of the model of Rupesinghe .............. 44 
2.3.2 New Institutional Theories and SADC institution ................................. 45 
2.3.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 45 
2.3.2.2 The three branches of the New Institutionalisms ................................ 46 
2.3.2.2.1 Historical institutionalism (HI) ............................................................. 46 
2.3.2.2.2 SADC within the context of historical institutionalism ......................... 49 
2.3.2.2.3 Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) ................................................. 51 
2.3.2.2.4 The application of RCI in SADC institution ......................................... 51 
2.3.2.2.5 Sociological institutionalism (SI) ......................................................... 53 
2.3.2.2.6 Sociological institutionalism (SI) and SADC ....................................... 54 
2.3.2.3 The weaknesses and strengths of the New Institutionalisms .............. 56 
2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 57 
 
CHAPTER 3 
OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)
 ....................................................................................................................................... 59 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 59 
3.2 Formation, Principles, Objectives, Memberships and Institutions of SADC ......... 60 
3.2.1 Genesis of SADC ................................................................................ 61 
3.2.2 Principles and Objectives of SADC ..................................................... 62 
3.2.3 SADC Membership ............................................................................. 64 
ix 
3.2.4 SADC Institutional Structure ............................................................... 66 
3.2.4.1 The Summit of Heads of State and Government ................................ 66 
3.2.4.2 The Troika ........................................................................................... 67 
3.2.4.3 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation ................. 68 
3.2.4.4 The Council of Ministers (COM) .......................................................... 70 
3.2.4.5 The Integrated Committee of Ministers ............................................... 70 
3.2.4.6 The Standing Committee of officials ................................................... 71 
3.2.4.7 The Secretariat ................................................................................... 71 
3.2.4.8 The SADC Tribunal ............................................................................. 71 
3.2.4.9 SADC National Committees (SNC) ..................................................... 72 
3.3 SADC conflict resolution system .......................................................................... 73 
3.3.1 Evolution of SADC’s conflict resolution mechanisms .......................... 73 
3.3.2 Capacities of SADC in conflict resolution ............................................ 76 
3.3.2.1 SADC Early Warning System.............................................................. 77 
3.3.2.2 SADC Mediation Unit .......................................................................... 78 
3.3.2.3 SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) ................................................ 79 
3.4 Cooperation between SADC, the AU and the UN in conflict resolution ............... 82 
3.4.1 Cooperation between SADC and the UN ............................................ 83 
3.4.2 Cooperation between SADC and the AU ............................................ 84 
3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 86 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONFLICT, 1998-2003 ......................... 88 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 88 
4.2 Background to the conflict .................................................................................... 89 
4.2.1 The DRC Civil War .............................................................................. 92 
4.2.1.1 First Civil War, 1996-1997 .................................................................. 92 
4.2.1.2 Second Congo War, 1998-2003 .......................................................... 93 
4.3 Causes of the conflict .......................................................................................... 96 
4.4 Actors and their interests in the Congolese conflict ........................................... 100 
4.4.1 Internal Actors ................................................................................... 100 
4.4.1.1 Kinshasa government (Kabila regime) .............................................. 100 
x 
4.4.1.2 The RCD ........................................................................................... 102 
4.4.1.3 The MLC ........................................................................................... 104 
4.4.2 External Actors .................................................................................. 104 
4.4.2.1 Angola ............................................................................................... 105 
4.4.2.2 Zimbabwe ......................................................................................... 105 
4.4.2.3 Namibia ............................................................................................. 105 
4.4.2.4 Chad and Sudan ............................................................................... 106 
4.4.2.5 Rwanda ............................................................................................. 106 
4.4.2.6 Uganda ............................................................................................. 106 
4.4.2.7 Burundi ............................................................................................. 107 
4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 108 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 1998-2003 .............. 110 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 110 
5.2 SADC Military intervention ................................................................................. 111 
5.2.1 Regional collective security framework and mandate ....................... 112 
5.2.2 The question of legitimacy ................................................................ 113 
5.2.3 Media coverage ................................................................................ 115 
5.2.4 The Operational problem .................................................................. 115 
5.2.5 Financial constraints ......................................................................... 117 
5.3 SADC Mediation Process .................................................................................. 117 
5.3.1 Pre-negotiation Stage ....................................................................... 118 
5.3.2 Understanding Root Causes ............................................................. 119 
5.3.3 Ownership of the peace process ....................................................... 122 
5.3.4 Identifying all the actors .................................................................... 123 
5.3.5 Identifying facilitators ........................................................................ 124 
5.3.6 Setting a realistic timetable ............................................................... 126 
5.3.7 Sustaining the effort .......................................................................... 128 
5.3.7.1 The United Nations ........................................................................... 128 
5.3.7.2 The AU .............................................................................................. 129 
xi 
5.3.7.3 The European Union (EU) ................................................................ 129 
5.3.7.4 SADC ................................................................................................ 130 
5.3.8 Evaluating success and failure .......................................................... 130 
5.3.9 Strategic constituencies .................................................................... 132 
5.3.10 The Role of outside peacemakers .................................................... 134 
5.3.11 The Role of local peacemakers ......................................................... 134 
5.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 135 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 137 
6.1 Summary of the key points ................................................................................ 137 
6.2 Recommendations for future research ............................................................... 143 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 145 
7.1 Documents, books, periodicals and web links ................................................... 145 
7.2 Interview personal .............................................................................................. 162 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 164 
Appendix 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ............................................... 164 
Appendix 2: Letter to conduct research ........................................................................ 165 
Appendix 3: Informed consent form in English/ French ................................................ 166 










The Southern African Development Community (SADC) originally founded in 1980 as 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to promote 
regional integration and reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, was 
transformed into SADC in 1992 (Omeje 2008:84). SADC is a sub-regional integration 
organisation composed of 15 members1 that have great differences in cultural, ethnic 
and colonial backgrounds. They also differ in terms of their political structures and 
economic developments. The founding treaty signed in 1992 in Windhoek (Namibia) 
states in its article 5 that one of the objectives of SADC is to promote and defend peace 
and security in the sub-region (SADC treaty 1992).  
 
SADC is a subsidiary body of the African Union (AU), which derive a security mandate 
from chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN), which gives regional organisations the right 
to carry out activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
post-conflict reconstruction in terms of both Chapter VI and Chapter VII, including the 
right to utilise force in the resolution of conflicts, although only subject to mandate by the 
UN Security Council (Cawthra 2010:10).  
 
When Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then United Nations Secretary-General, presented his 
report, “An Agenda for Peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1992), he supported a greater role for 
regional organisations in preventing and resolving regional conflicts, partly on the 
assumption that regional states know their regions best and partly as a form of burden-
sharing. Cilliers (1999:27) also argues that “a greater role for sub regional organisations 
is that they are closer to a conflict and therefore more familiar with local conditions. An 
                                                            
1  The members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
2 
organisation such as SADC or ECOWAS should therefore have a comparative 
advantage to play the lead role in the termination of such conflict’’. 
 
In addition, Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:9) point out that “the Southern African 
region has extensive experience of external involvement in promoting violent conflict 
and other threats to its security. The region’s history speaks of colonialism and 
apartheid, liberation struggles, civil wars, secessionist wars, mutiny, election disputes, 
ideological and proxy wars. Indeed, the region has provided terrain for the superpowers 
to engage each other during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War period, it is clear 
that global actors have maintained a presence, pursuing mainly economic and donor 
interests. 
 
Baregu (2003:19) also states that SADC region is defined and structured by a history of 
conflicts. Therefore, SADC has not hesitated to play a conflict resolution role in the sub-
region. It has been partially active in conflict resolution, mainly through the appointment 
of mediators (either typically serving or by retired African presidents) and was active in 
attempting to resolve the crises in countries such as Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These interventions have been met with very 
mixed results at best (SADC intervention did not reach the expected results yet, but it 
has not failed) (Cawthra 2010:10). 
 
However, it is argued that Southern African peace and security have deteriorated rapidly 
(Solomon 1998:385). The region as a whole faced many violent conflicts in the period 
between 1995 and 2003, specifically in countries such as Angola, DRC, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006:611). Characterised 
by Kaldor (1999) as “new wars”, these conflicts have complex causes rooted in history, 
political, economic, domestic governance and international relations. They have a 
negative impact on the socio-economic development of the region.  
 
In this regard, SADC leadership realised that peace and security is the prerequisites for 
economic integration and development in the sub-region and agreed at the Summit held 
at Gaborone in June 1996 to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
3 
Security (OPDS). The Organ is responsible for promoting peace and security in the 
region. It has a co-operative mechanism for collective security and peace to deal with 
conflict at the regional and international levels. However, the Summit Communiqué did 
not explicitly specify whether the OPDS was a SADC body or not. It states that the 
mechanism operates at the summit, ministerial and technical levels and functions 
independently of other SADC structures and would incorporate the Inter-State Defence 
and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Frontline States (FLS) (SADC communiqué 
1996). This presupposed that SADC has two chairpersons, one for SADC as regional 
body and the other for the OPDS.  
 
This mechanism never became operational (Malan 1998:3) and a variety of problems 
erupted. The chairing of the Organ, the permanence of that position and its status vis-a- 
vis SADC became hotly contested issues. However, two years after its establishment, 
the OPDS militarily intervened in Lesotho and DRC in 1998. Furthermore, these 
interventions have shown a lack of co-operation between SADC and its OPDS in the 
matter of resolution of conflict. The matter was only resolved at Maputo Summit, in 
August 2001, with the adoption of a protocol in which it was made clear that the OPDS 
should function as a SADC substructure and report to the Summit. SADC OPDS was 
transformed into the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation 
(OPDSC) (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001:6).  
 
The DRC is a SADC’s member state and one of the organisation’s most resource-rich 
members. It is located in Central Africa and is one of the largest countries in Africa, with 
a population2 of nearly 77.4 million in 2014 and nine neighbouring states namely Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia. Since Congo gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 
1960, its history has been marked by instability. Mkandawire quoted in Mangu 
(2003:159) sums up the history of Congo in an alarming manner, “the political and 
constitutional history of the Congo has been repeating itself in a vicious cycle of coups 
                                                            
2 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. 
 
4 
and counter-coups, rebellions, mutinies, round-tables, unconstitutional regimes, all 
unfolding simultaneously as both tragedy and farce”.  
 
A military coup d’état in 1965 by colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu supported by the 
Western nations, specially Belgium, France and the United States(US) ushered in three 
decades of autocratic, corrupt rule and collapse of state institutions. Mobutu was ousted 
by an armed movement led by Laurent Desire Kabila with significant support from 
neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. From the assault on 
Mobutu’s regime, the DRC has witnessed three wars. The first Congo war started in 
1996, the second war began in August 1998 and finally, the third war exploded in 2004. 
 
The first Congo war started in 1996 and ended in 1997. During this period the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was engulfed in what was called “a war of liberation” 
which toppled the Mobutu regime. By 1996, the civil war in neighbouring Rwanda had 
spilled over into Zaire 3(now DRC). Rwandan Hutu militia forces, commonly known as 
Interahamwe, who fled Rwanda following the ascension of a Tutsi led government, had 
been using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as bases for incursion against Rwanda. 
These Hutu militia forces soon allied with the Zairian Armed Forces(FAZ) to launch a 
campaign against Congolese ethnic Tutsis in eastern Zaire(Turner 2007:124). 
 
In order to deal with this security threat, a coalition of Rwandan and Ugandan armies 
invaded Zaire under the cover of a small group of Tutsi militia which undertook to fight 
the Hutu militia, overthrow the government of Mobutu and ultimately control the mineral 
resources of Zaire. They were soon joined by various Zairean politicians, who had been 
unsuccessfully opposing the dictatorship of Mobutu for many years and now saw an 
                                                            
3 Zaire was named by the President Mobutu on 27 October 1971. The DRC is the name of the nation that was a 
Belgian Colony from 1885 to 1960. The country was formerly, called, the Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, the DRC 
and Zaire, then again DRC. Although these names indicate that the DRC has undergone many changes in terms of 
players and goals, change and continuity have coexisted, and both forces have simultaneously exerted their 
influence on the political landscape of Congo (Kisangani 2012:11).  
 
5 
opportunity for them in the invasion of Zaire by two of the region’s strongest military 
forces (Reyntjens 2010).  
 
This new expanded coalition of two foreign armies and some long time opposition 
figures, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, became known as the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo, AFDL). They were seeking the broader goal of ousting Mobutu and 
controlling his country’s wealth. However, the long dictatorship of Mobutu was finally 
overthrown in 1997 by AFDL. Laurent Kabila declared himself as president and renamed 
the country the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
The second war began in August 1998 and officially ended in July 2003. On 2 August 
1998, Laurent Kabila’s former Rwandan and Ugandan allies attacked his regime after he 
had requested them to return to their respective countries. Consequently, Rwandans 
and Banyamulenge4 leaders, who brought Laurent-desire Kabila to power after ousting 
Mobutu, launched a rebellion to topple him and supported a new rebel movement called 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)5, accusing Kabila of authoritarianism and 
corruption (Mangu 2003:159). The conflict involved a multiplicity of states and non-states 
actors.  Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan and Chad sent troops on the side of the 
Kinshasa government. Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda supported the rebel movements 
such as the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of 
Congo (MLC), the RCD-National (RCD-N), and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-
ML). A multiplicity of local defence militia groups known as “Mai Mai” militia also sprung 
throughout the territories that were affected by armed conflict.  
                                                            
4Banyamulenge group: Tutsi of Mulenge now Banyamulenge.The word ‘Banyamulenge’ emerged only in 1973 and 
in Kifulero means “people of Mulenge” or “inhabitants of hills of Mulenge”. Mulenge is a small Fulero village 
several kilometres from Lemera, in South-Kivu province. The Banyamulenge are a group of Banyarwanda migrants 
who have come from Rwanda at various points in history, found mostly in the Uvira territory where they live with 
the Fulero and Vira, as well as in Fizi and Mwenga territories. They were few in number and they were mostly Tutsi.  
The Banyarwanda include natives of North-Kivu (Banyabwisha), Rwandan subjects cut off from Rwanda in 1910 
when the boundaries in the Great Lakes region were redrawn by the colonial powers, and Rwandan immigrants 
during the colonial period(Kisangani 2012: 120). 
5RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy). The RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) split into RCD-N (RCD- National) 
and RCD-ML (RCD-Liberation Movement); MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) 
6 
This conflict thus assumed regional dimension. Many analysts described it as the 
“Africa’s world war” (Prunier 2009) and the deadliest after World War II with 5.4 million 
people dead (International Rescue Committee 2008). Millions more were displaced from 
their homes or sought asylum in neighbouring countries (International Rescue 
Committee 2008).  
 
Confronted with the rapidly deteriorating military situation and with his hold on power 
becoming very tenuous at the beginning of the second war, Laurent Kabila appealed to 
SADC for assistance. His request was addressed directly to SADC as an organization 
and not to a particular state. Although the DRC is part of Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the absence of dependable allies in the central African 
region propelled Kabila to consider SADC as an option for his request. However, 
Congo’s request for military assistance to SADC deepened a crisis that had been 
caused by a clash between member states over the relationship between SADC and its 
Organ, specifically, whether the organ should function in subordination to, or be 
independent of  the SADC summit (Matlosa 2007:116-117).  
 
At the time of the request, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation chaired by Zimbabwe, convened a meeting of the Inter-state Defence and 
Security Committee in Harare on 18 August 1998 and declared that SADC had come to 
a ‘unanimous’ decision to defend  Kabila’s regime. Three SADC members, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola, chose to intervene militarily and deployed the SADC Allied Armed 
forces (SADC-AAF) to defend the regime of Laurent Kabila on the basis of SADC’s 
security arrangements. This intervention was based on the Inter-state and Security 
Committee resolution held in Cape Town, South Africa in 1995 (Mbuende 2001:46).  
 
However, South Africa (the chair of SADC then) supported by Botswana, Mozambique 
and Tanzania adopted a different approach, advocating dialogue and negotiation, 
probably to limit division within SADC and to present a united front. The SADC Summit 
meeting in Mauritius in September 1998 endorsed the positions represented by both 
South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006:614). The Summit also “welcomed initiatives 
by SADC and its member states intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security 
7 
and stability in the DRC’’. The action by the three SADC member states namely Angola, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe was considered by the SADC Summit as a militaristic approach. 
Consequently, the SADC leaders “called for an immediate cease-fire and commended 
the government of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timeously   providing troops to 
assist the government and the people of the DRC’’ (SADC, Final Communiqué, 13-14 
September 1998). 
 
On 13 September 1998, the SADC leaders mandated the Zambian President Frederic 
Chiluba to lead the peace initiative for the DRC, assisted by the president of Tanzania 
and Mozambique. In July 1999, the heads of state of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, including the rebel 
groups (MLC and RCD) signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, in an attempt to end 
the Second Congo War. The Agreement called for the establishment of a Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) composed of representatives of the belligerents, and also provided 
for an all-inclusive process, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).  
 
Despite the signing of the Lusaka peace Agreement, fighting continued and peace was 
fragile. The UN was forced to intervene and deployed peacekeeping operations shortly 
after the Lusaka peace agreement had been signed. It is during this conflict that 
Laurent-desire Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 and was replaced as 
president by his son, Joseph Kabila.  
 
In October 2001, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, before 
relocating to Sun City, South Africa, in February 2002. The OAU mandated Sir Ketumile 
Masire, former president of Botswana, to facilitate the ICD. The Dialogue brought 
together armed factions, civil society and unarmed civilian opposition. However, Masire 
was confronted with a Congolese government that did not cooperate as he had 
expected. Laurent Kabila’s uncooperative behaviour was detrimental for the internal 
dialogue, (to peace process) especially his rejection of Masire’s collaboration as 
facilitator, his opposition to the UN deployment, as well as his precondition for the 
withdrawal of Rwanda and Uganda forces from Congo. His stalling tactics continually 
derailed the peace process (Kisangani 2012:151).  
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Following the assassination of President Laurent Desire Kabila on 18 January 2001, a 
multilateral peace talk to end the war was brokered between Joseph Kabila’s 
government and a number of rebel groups. After months of international pressure, the 
UN special envoy to the ICD, Moustapha Niasse and South African President Thabo 
Mbeki, were able to pressure the major parties to the ICD to sign a Global and Inclusive 
Agreement in which Joseph Kabila would share power with former rebels during the 
period of political transition (Kisangani 2012:152). The agreement was signed on 17 
December 2002, paving the way to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement or the Final 
Act on 2 April 2003. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
Despite SADC’s military and diplomatic intervention in the DRC, the violence continues 
in the east of the country. Besides, it is not clear what SADC really achieved in 
intervening in this conflict. The DRC conflict has been a crucial test of SADC’s conflict 
resolution capacity. As Ngoma (2005:141) suggests “the conflict in the DRC may have 
tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the SADC and has considerably 
darkened the future chances of this promising regional co-operation organisation’’.  
 
Cilliers (1999:28) also points out that “in the case of Southern Africa, the conflict in the 
DRC has balkanised SADC into two regional blocs. In addition, with the expansion of 
SADC to include the DRC, the community was significantly weakened and has probably 
ceased to have the potential to serve as either a vehicle for regional economic or 
security integration’’. Thus, it is important to study the role played by SADC in the 
resolution of the DRC conflict. 
 
Against this backdrop, this study seeks to address the following questions:  
-  What role did SADC play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?  
-  What mechanism(s) and methods did SADC make use of? What is the outcome?  




1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate SADC’s role in the DRC conflict resolution process 
from 1998 to 2003. The objectives of this study are as follows:  
 
- To understand the role that SADC played in the conflict resolution process in the 
DRC. 
-  To understand the mechanism and methods SADC made use of in order to 
resolve the DRC conflict. 
- To understand the basis of the relationship (cooperation) between UN, AU and 
SADC with regards to the conflict resolution process. 
- To draw lessons from SADC’s involvement in the long conflict resolution process.  
- To provide recommendations for future research.  
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This section analyses the literature on SADC intervention in the DRC. This intervention 
has been the subject of numerous studies including the following works: Malan (1998), 
Tsie (1998), Mbuende (1998, 2001), Tapfumaneyi (1999), Breytenbach (2000), Solomon 
(2001), Nest (2001), Stefaan and Wamu (2002), Turner (2002), Mwanasali (2002), 
Rupiya (2002), Adebajo and Landsberg (2003), Gambari (2003), Koyame and Clark 
(2003), Solomon and Ngubane (2003), Rubinstein (2005), Nathan (2006), Curtis (2007), 
Landsberg (2002, 2007), Essuman (2009) and Autesserre (2010). 
 
The following paragraphs discuss some of the most important issues stemming from this 
later body of literature such as: SADC’s military intervention; the question of legitimacy 
and mandate of the military intervention; SADC’s diplomatic intervention and the 





1.4.1 SADC’s military intervention 
 
Scholars who have written about the military intervention in the DRC by the three SADC 
members namely Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have argued that the intervention was 
meant to restore peace and stability in the DRC (Mbuende 1998; Zacarias 2003).  
 
According to the former SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Kaire Mbuende, the SADC 
military and political intervention in Lesotho and the DRC were aimed at ‘‘preventing the 
militarisation of politics in those countries and creating a conducive environment for 
political dialogue in both countries” (SADC information 1998).  
 
Zacarias (2003:31-51) provides a critical assessment of the evolution of the security 
debate within the SADC region. In his book chapter “Redefining Security”, Zacarias 
analyses the origins and challenges of regional security. He argues that “the main 
difficulty facing SADC in translating the OPDS vision into concrete policies derives from 
the fact that security planners are still captive to old mind-sets” (2003:31). Zacarias 
(2003) also states that the military intervention was meant to restore peace and security 
in the DRC. However, military interventions launched by SADC states into the DRC have 
been the source of much controversy in the literature.  
 
Several researchers have regarded the military intervention in the DRC as a way to 
pursue national and personal interests (Nest 2001; Turner 2002; Koyame and Clark 
2003).  Turner (2002:75-92) analyses ‘Angola’s role in the Congo War' and stated that 
Angola’s intervention in the Second World War was to protect its oil, to fight Savimbi and 
maintain a compliant regime in the DRC amenable to the interests of Angola. He further 
notes that Namibia’s participation in the DRC came in response to a request from 
Zimbabwe and Angola to support Laurent Kabila, a long-time friend of the then 
Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, and a close ally of both Harare and Luanda.  
 
Nest (2001:471-472) points out that “the Zimbabwe defence forces did not go to the 
DRC to make money”. Instead, Mugabe had lent Laurent Kabila several millions of 
dollars for his war effort against Mobutu. If Kabila lost power there would be no 
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possibility of those debts being repaid.” However, later on, Zimbabwe developed 
extensive business interests in the Congo. Nest (2001) concludes that DRC’s 
membership in SADC provided Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe with a plausible excuse 
for their intervention in the Congo War.  
 
Koyame and Clark agree with Turner on the reasons for Angola and Namibia’s 
intervention in the DRC and disagreed with Nest on the reasons for Zimbabwe’s 
intervention in the DRC. They argue that Zimbabwe’s motivations seem to be primarily 
economic. Since Zimbabwe has no border with the DRC from which rebels could cross 
into its territory, it cannot even use the pretext of security concerns to disguise its 
motivations. Moreover, there is no ideological reason or justification for Zimbabwe’s 
intervention, although it is able to use the international norm against unwanted 
intervention as a cover for its own ‘counter-intervention’ (2003:213). 
 
Koyame and Clark (2003:201-223) also analyse the economic consequences of the 
states that intervened in the DRC. They state that all states involved seem to have 
suffered economic losses as a result of the Congo War. Although the intervening states 
have certainly enjoyed some economic benefits from their interventions, the costs of 
their interventions are also considerable, even if they are less visible. In the case of 
Angola, the country’s government was willing to bear the costs in order to pursue the 
war against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and in the 
case of Zimbabwe President Mugabe was simply buying the support of his most 
important generals at the expense of the state treasury. Among the other interveners, 
only Uganda and Namibia may be realising a net economic gain from their participation 
in the war, but this is far from certain.  South Africa also has been affected by a loss of 
investment income. However, it is clear that the SADC military intervention was 
motivated by a variety of reasons. This study will interrogate all the points mentioned 
above in order to analyse SADC’s military intervention. 
 
The Question of legitimacy and mandate of the military intervention 
A number of scholars have questioned the mandate of the military intervention by three 
SADC member states, whether these three countries acted with or without the SADC 
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mandate remains shrouded in controversy. There are two schools of thought on the 
question of the mandate and legitimacy of the intervention. One group argues that this 
action was undertaken under the auspices of SADC (Mbuende 2001; Rupiya 2002).  
 
In a book chapter titled “A political and military review of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the 
second Congo war”, Rupiya (2002:93-105) points out that Zimbabwe’s intervention in 
the DRC was aimed at defending a victim of foreign aggression in the context of a 
broader SADC decision and argued for the legitimacy and legality of the intervention of 
the three states sanctioned by SADC. Rupiya (2003:96) also claims that the decision to 
intervene following the request made by DRC was brought up for consideration by 
member states in the meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC) held in 1998 in Harare. 
 
In addition, Mbuende (2001:45-49) analyses efforts undertaken by SADC on the conflict 
prevention and resolution in the sub-region. Mbuende (2001:45) emphasises the 
importance of the establishment of the OPDS as a new mechanism for maintenance and 
strengthening of regional peace and security. This is reflected in the collective response 
of SADC to the situation in the DRC. In this regards, Mbuende (2001:46) argues that the 
intervention in the DRC was, among other considerations, based on the Inter-State and 
Security Committee resolution adopted at a meeting held in Cape Town, South Africa in 
1995 where SADC countries agreed to take collective action in cases of attempts to 
remove governments by military or any other unconstitutional means. This is why the 
request for assistance by the government of President Laurent Kabila made to the 
meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, which was held in Harare 
on 18 August 1998, was positively responded to by SADC and SADC Allied Armed 
Forces.  
 
There is however a group of scholars who argue that this intervention was not 
undertaken under the auspices of SADC although it was conducted by some member 
states (Nathan 2006; Neethling 2006). Nathan (2006:605-622) describes and explains 
the SADC’s difficulty in establishing a common security regime. For Nathan, the reasons 
for this malaise are: The absence of common values among member states which 
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inhibits the development of trust, common policies, institutional cohesion and unified 
responses to crises, the reluctance of states to surrender sovereignty to a security 
regime that encompasses binding rules and decision making, the economic and 
administrative weakness of states.  These are challenges that can only be solved at 
national level (2006:605). Nathan (2006:612) notes that in both Lesotho and DRC 
cases, a small group of states embarked on military action in the name of SADC despite 
the absence of SADC decision’s authorising such action. Nathan (2006:605) concludes 
that the challenge of common security in Southern African is less regional than a 
national challenge. 
 
In addition, Neethling (2006:1-12) analyses the SADC military intervention in SADC 
regions in 1998, particularly in Lesotho. He (2006:6) states that SADC became the focus 
of international attention in August 1998 when Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe decided 
to take part in an intervention operation in the DRC. The decision was based on 
requests from President Laurent Kabila for military assistance against advancing rebel 
forces. Still, the undertaking was ad hoc and was not organised under SADC auspices, 
although it did receive retroactive endorsement from SADC. 
 
Any intervention claims the legitimacy, standing and mandate (Rubinstein 2005). In this 
view, the first camp has demonstrated that this action was undertaken under the 
auspices of SADC. This study adopts the view that although the military action by the 
three SADC member states was not initially sanctioned by the supreme organ of SADC, 
it nevertheless opened the way for peaceful resolution of the conflict which had been a 
key objective of SADC action on the DRC conflict.  
 
1.4.2 SADC’s diplomatic intervention 
 
Scholars and practitioners have been preoccupied with the question of why South 
Africa, Botswana and Tanzania sought to manage the conflict in the DRC through 
diplomatic means rather than through military operations as employed by Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola (Mbuende 1998; Kabemba 1999; Mwanasali 2002; Adebajo and 
Landsberg 2003; Landsberg 2003; 2007; Curtis 2007). 
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Gambari (2003:255-274) analyses the security challenges faced by the UN and the 
SADC with regard to peacekeeping and peacemaking in Southern Africa. He states that 
the conflicts in the DRC and Lesotho illustrate the limits of military solutions to the 
problem of peace and security in the sub-region (2003:257). Military actions need to be 
aligned with political, social and economic programs to improve the material conditions 
of the people in these countries. Gambari (2003:271) also suggests that the UN and the 
SADC can work together to promote peace and security in SADC states. 
 
Mwanasali (2002:53-71) examines the manifestations of both internal and external 
forces as they contribute to the chronic instability and violence that have overburdened 
humanitarian initiatives in the Great Lakes region. Mwanasali (2002) assesses the 
conflict management efforts and the prospects for the future of this region. In this regard, 
he agrees with Gambari and emphasises that military options can and will never bring a 
lasting settlement to problems that are essentially political. He concludes that the time 
has come to try another peace strategy in the Great Lakes region (2002: 68).  
 
According to Mbuende, SADC interventions were aimed at creating a conducive 
environment for political dialogue in both countries (DRC and Lesotho). As a result of 
these interventions, consultations were initiated for a cease-fire in the DRC and Lesotho 
and an agreement was reached for the organisation of elections within a reasonable 
timeframe (SADC information 1998). He said that SADC member states are committed 
to ensuring that policies in the region remain outside the realm of the military. Mbuende 
concludes that SADC has demonstrated to the world that it has the capacity to solve the 
region’s political and economic problems (SADC information 1998). 
 
Kabemba cited in Adebajo and Landsberg (2003:187) explains how South Africa’s 
neutrality was heavily questioned by other states because of its past role of supplying 
arms to Rwanda and Uganda. The Congolese leader, Laurent Kabila with Zimbabwe’s 
encouragement responded not only by openly defying the South African policy but also 
by trying to isolate Pretoria diplomatically. Three influential SADC members, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola were infuriated by South Africa’s decision not to intervene militarily 
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on their side in the DRC in 1998, accusing Pretoria of hypocrisy because it had 
intervened militarily in Lesotho while refusing to do the same in the DRC. 
 
Landsberg (2002:174) notes three things in SADC’s intervention in the DRC. Firstly, 
South Africa’s mistake was its failure to condemn the rebellion, and in particular the 
incursion into the DRC of Rwanda and Uganda. Secondly, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Angola intervened under the auspices of the SADC Organ and South Africa refused to 
get involved militarily. Thus, the conflict in the DRC even polarised SADC into two 
regional blocs. One group led by Zimbabwe comprised Angola, Namibia and the DRC 
itself. The other bloc led by South Africa comprised Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Botswana, but also relied on implicit support of Zambia, Swaziland and Malawi. The two 
camps in SADC were at loggerheads, both in terms of procedure and in terms of 
strategy. 
 
However, South Africa’s diplomatic intervention in the DRC was not only launched out of 
sheer altruism, but it was also motivated by self-interest.  As Solomon (2001:45) notes 
that external intervention is not based on altruism but includes on large measure self-
interest. Landsberg (2007:121-140) agrees with Solomon and stated that South Africa’s 
national interest was defined by its desire to create a stable environment in the DRC to 
allow its companies to trade easily and win lucrative contracts. Pretoria was also keen to 
affirm the then President Thabo Mbeki’s role as a peace broker and the country’s status 
as a regional hegemony. 
 
Curtis (2007: 257-273) also agrees with Solomon and states that South Africa has 
played a prominent role as intermediary, facilitator, and guarantor of the DRC’s peace 
process. Accordingly, Pretoria adopted a leading diplomatic role during a period of 
limited external involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives on the 
continent. South Africa’s approach to peacemaking in the DRC was guided by its 
preference for, and promotion of, certain constitutional, judicial, and electoral structures 
and processes that it had used in its transition from apartheid to democracy. Pretoria’s 
intervention was also guided by its key foreign policy goal of supporting peace and 
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security efforts in Africa in order to promote development and economic growth on the 
continent, Curtis (2007).  
 
In addition, South Africa’s attempts to export its peacemaking model to the DRC failed to 
address the Congo’s particular circumstances and context: the weak authority of the 
Congolese state; the disparity between the diverse interests of domestic, sub-regional, 
and external actors; and the overall political economy of the conflict in the Great Lakes 
region, Curtis (2007). This research will interrogate all the points mentioned above in 
order to analyse SADC’s diplomatic intervention. 
 
1.4.3 Evaluation of SADC’s intervention 
 
A number of authors have evaluated SADC’s intervention in the DRC conflict. There are 
two diametrically opposed views. On the one hand, scholars have concluded that SADC 
failed in its intervention in the DRC as the war is still continuing in Eastern Congo 
(Nathan 2006; Essuman 2009; Autesserre 2010).  
 
In this context Essuman (2009:409-422) examines the efforts of the two regional bodies 
namely ECOWAS and SADC to resolve the conflicts. He argued that “the SADC 
intervention in Lesotho was botched and its peacemaking efforts in the DRC failed. In 
his view, this was the only authentic SADC attempts to forestall conflict in its region’’ 
(2009:421).  ECOWAS’s diplomatic and military missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
were bold and innovative. In Liberia, ECOWAS prolonged the Liberian civil war causing 
more harm than good to displaced persons. However the ECOWAS’ intervention in 
Sierra Leone saved thousands of lives by providing a buffer between the combatants 
and hundreds of displaced persons. The reason for the failure is that both the ECOWAS 
and SADC were created to promote sub-regional economic integration, but they now 
see themselves forced by changing international relations, particularly at the end of the 
Cold War, which they were not properly set up to deal with the functions. They have had 
to deal with conflicts, which to some extent had been suppressed by the Cold War and 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which was still to be established.  
Essuman (2009:422) concludes that ‘‘intervention in conflicts succeeds or fails 
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depending on the level of regionness or the existence of structures for conflict resolution 
in the regional security complex”.  
 
Nathan (2006:605-622) describes and explains the SADC’s difficulty in establishing a 
common security regime. He states that SADC failed to play a useful peacemaking role 
in conflict situations. In most of the intra-state conflicts, it refrained from critical comment 
and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely 
domestic affairs (2006:611). He identifies the following factors in order to account for 
SADC’s failure: member states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might 
jeopardise trade and functional co-operation; governments that are not fully democratic 
are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that engage in 
undemocratic practices; and SADC states are determined to maintain a posture of unity 
and solidarity. Nathan (2006:621) also suggests that the SADC states need to work 
together (common purpose) to promote peace and security in Southern Africa. 
 
Autesserre (2010) assesses why violence has continued in the DRC. Based on field 
interviews conducted over one and a half years, Autesserre (2010:232) argues that the 
international intervention strategy in the DRC failed to address local causes of the 
conflict which have continued to destabilise the country. She states that instead 
international peace-builders have focused on national and international level dynamics, 
ignoring local roots of conflict such as land disputes and local insecurity. Local conflicts 
have been neglected because the dominant discourses in international peacebuilding do 
not allow for a consideration of these conflicts. Autesserre (2010) recommends that 
effective peace-building must address conflict at all levels. 
 
On the other hand, some authors conclude that SADC intervention in the DRC was a 
success (Smis and Oyatambwe 2002). Smis and Oyatambwe (2002:413-430) analyse 
the response of the international community to the crisis in the DRC. They argue that 
SADC played the primary role in proposing solutions to end the regional conflict in the 
absence of a clear response by the international community which has a responsibility 
for maintaining peace and security. Smis and Oyatambwe (2002:424) also point out that 
“regional diplomatic efforts in Congo began to bear fruit obliging the UN to react to 
18 
regional plans”. They conclude that the international response to the crisis in the DRC is 
clearly dominated by the concept of ‘African ownership’ and what is colloquially known 
as ’African solutions for African problems (2002:427)’. This research will interrogate 
further these two positions in order to account for the SADC role in the search for 
political solution in the Congo conflict resolution process.  
 
As we have demonstrated, there is a rich literature on the subject of our research. The 
results have shown similarities and differences depending on what the researcher sets 
out to achieve. A lot of the studies have focused on the motivations and strategies of the 
intervener country. Except for the work by Koyame and Clark (2003), little attention has 
been paid to the economic consequences of the military intervention on the intervener 
states. However, these studies have failed to demonstrate that the military intervention 
in the DRC by three members of SADC created a situation of power balance and 
opened the way to negotiation. This study will endeavour to fill that gap and by so doing 
make a contribution to the existing literature. 
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
The contribution of this study will consist in providing a new interpretation of the SADC’s 
military intervention and bringing new data from interviews which will support the 
research’s argument. As this study will show, the military action of three members of 
SADC opened the way to negotiation and peace accords because it created a situation 
of power balance between belligerents and rendered the conflict ripe for resolution. In 
evaluating SADC’s contribution to conflict resolution in the DRC, this study will contribute 
to existing body of literature and to improving SADC capacity for resolution of conflicts 
and stability of the sub-region.  
 
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study is guided by two theories, namely the New Institutionalism theories and 
Kumar Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation in its attempt to investigate the role 
of the SADC in the Congo’s conflict resolution process.   
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The New Institutionalism theories emphasises the relationship between institutions and 
action by associating institutions with ‘roles’ to which prescriptive ‘norms of behaviour 
were attached (Lane1995; Hall and Taylor 1996). In this view, individuals who have 
been socialized into particular institutional roles internalise the norms associated with 
these roles, and in this way institutions are said to affect behaviour.  
 
The New Institutionalism theories are useful for understanding SADC as an institution, 
the structure of SADC organisation and how these structures have functioned, the 
policies of SADC, the objectives, the goals and the mechanism or method that SADC 
used in conflict resolution in the SADC region and the impact of the role of individuals’ 
interests or preferences in deciding about the policies or the work of SADC. It will also 
help to examine the decisions taken by important actors in SADC and analyse their 
implications for the survival and future of SADC.  
 
This theory is pertinent for analysing SADC intervention in the DRC. The DRC conflict 
resolution process brought to the fore by the divisions within the SADC institution. On 
the one hand, a group of states made of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe pursued 
military action and on the other hand, South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique preferred 
political and diplomatic options, while other states opted for inactivity (neutrality).  
 
Rupesinghe’s model provides an important theoretical framework that helps guide the 
study to appraise SADC’s role in the Congo conflict resolution process from 1998 to 
2003 and to draw lessons from this process. His model will also help to analyse the role 
of other regional actors in this conflict. The model emphasises internal conflicts and 
multi-dimensionality of protracted social conflicts. Rupesinghe (1995:65) also proposes a 
multi-sectorial approach to the complexity of many existing and emerging conflicts.  
 
The model has several components that include: pre-negotiation stage; understanding 
root causes; ownership of the process; identifying all the actors; identifying facilitators; 
setting a realistic timetable; sustaining the effort; evaluating success and failure; 
strategic constituencies; the role of outside peacemakers; and the role of local 
peacemakers(1995: 80-85).  
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The study will pay attention to the eleven elements of conflict resolution mentioned 
above which Rupesinghe claims are necessary in order to achieve durable peace. With 
regards to ownership of the process, the researcher will examine the level of ownership 
of the peace process by various Congolese political parties or groups and evaluate 
success and failure based on empirical data. The study will evaluate SADC’s role and 
decide whether its involvement was a success or a failure based on existing literature 
and empirical qualitative data to be collected by the researcher. Chapter two goes 
further in the discussion of the theoretical framework which guides this study.  
 




Research methodology as described by Babbie and Mouton (2001: xxvii) refers to the 
various methods, techniques and procedures that are employed in the process of 
implementing a research project. Methodology in social sciences consists of choosing 
the most convenient theories, techniques, and explanatory models or paradigms which 
presents a clear understanding of a question and phenomenon. The objective is to 
provide an analytical explanation of facts, realities or a situation that has been initially 
considered as a problem requiring resolution or raising questions that necessitate 
answers.   
 
This study employs a qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln (1994:2) define 
qualitative research as follows: “qualitative research is the multi-method in focus, 
involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that 
qualitative researchers are studying phenomena in its natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or to interpret, these phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring 
to them”. In this study, qualitative research approach is most suitable as it will allow the 
researcher to understand the meaning and contextual dynamics of SADC’s actions.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998) note that the reason for choosing qualitative methods is the 
nature of the research problem and the preference of the researcher. Qualitative 
research approach is chosen in this study, because the research is not interested in 
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statistical account of the events, but on an in-depth understanding of the role of the 
SADC in the DRC conflict based on oral testimonies of actors and written materials. 
 
1.7.2 Data Collection 
 
The study relies mainly on primary and secondary data. For an exploratory study, the 
process of collecting information involves primarily in-depth interviews. Creswell 
(2012:161) points out that the importance of interviews is to describe the meaning of the 
phenomenon for a small number of individuals who have experienced it. Interviews play 
a central role in the collection of data. 
 
Therefore, the primary data in this study were collected through semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions, by conducting face-to-face interviews, telephone 
or email interviews with some participants in the peace negotiations and some SADC 
officials in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the problem. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in Botswana at the Headquarter of SADC. However, a few 
interviews took place in South Africa and DRC (Kinshasa). In total, ten persons from 
those countries were interviewed. The researcher also made use of telephone and email 
interviews when informants could not be reached otherwise. The questions were sent by 
email and the period of time for completing and sending it back to the researcher was 
four weeks. The interviews were conducted in a period of six months.  
 
Interviewees were selected from the following groups:   
(1)  The Congolese political parties; political practitioners; scholars; experts; policy-
makers (attached to governmental departments) and facilitators. The interview 
also probed the level of ownership of the peace process by various Congolese 
political parties or groups. 
(2)  SADC officials: a selected group of officials working at SADC headquarters or 
some foreign ministers. The aim of these interviews was, firstly, to understand the 
functions of the SADC as an institution and secondly, to understand SADC’s role 
in conflict resolution in the DRC.  
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These interviews were tape recorded and transcribed soon after the event. In case the 
interview could not be recorded, for lack of permission to do so, the researcher took 
notes during the interview. Potential interviewees had requested to indicate their 
consent prior to being interviewed. In addition, they were given guarantee of 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
This study also made use of secondary materials. Library-based research was 
conducted. This search of secondary materials has uncovered two types of sources. The 
first type consisted of the literature comprising books, journals and other classical 
scientific resources dealing with the subject matter. The second type includes 
newspapers, treaties, protocols, charters, brochures, publication, decisions, 
recommendations, official reports, statements, communiqués and official websites of 
SADC in order to get additional information on the role of SADC in the conflict resolution 
process in DRC.  
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
 
The scope of this study is limited to exploring the role that the SADC played in the DRC 
conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003 in terms of how it employed a two-pronged 
approach in resolving the DRC conflict making use of military intervention and mediation 
process. The study also considered the role of other regional actors in this conflict. 
During this period, SADC was involved in peacemaking actions and peacekeeping as 
opposed to peacebuilding. Peacemaking actions includes using mediation to persuade 
parties in a conflict to cease hostilities, to negotiate a peaceful settlement to their dispute 
and to operate with the consent of the parties to the dispute (United Nations 1995:4).  
 
Peacekeeping intervention involves some form of military intervention. It also involves 
military and civilian personnel, with the consent of the conflicting  parties in order to 
implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of 
conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or 
comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief (United 
Nations 1995:4-5).  
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Peace-building includes the identification and support of measures and structures, which 
promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict (United Nations 1995:5). However, these concepts peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace building constitute different state of shifting from conflict to a 
state of peace. Hence, peace building actions are not the focus of this study. Besides, 
while the research would have benefited from interviews with protagonists (groups) in 
the eastern Congo, financial limitation can only allow me to select interviewees in 
Kinshasa. These limitations have not jeopardised the attainment of the research 
objectives.  
 
1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The study consists of six chapters: 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter which serves as the introduction to the study, presents the 
problem statement, the study’s aim and objectives, the theoretical framework and 
discusses the existing literature on this topic, research methodology, limitations and 
delimitations and outlines the study’s methodology.     
 
Chapter 2: It will provide an overview of the theoretical framework of the New 
Institutionalism theories and Kumar Rupesigne’s model of conflict transformation in 
order to appraise the role of SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC, and explains the 
conceptual foundations of the analysis. 
 
Chapter 3:  It will present an overview of SADC and its institutions regarding the New 
Institutionalism theories. This chapter will also discuss the capacities of SADC to keep 
peace and security in the areas of conflict and analyse the cooperation between the UN, 
the AU and SADC in conflict resolution. 
 
Chapter 4: It will analyse the conflict in the DRC. This chapter will provide a background 
of the conflict, the causes of the conflict and the actors involved.  
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Chapter 5: The chapter assesses the role of SADC in conflict resolution in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is based on the model of Rupesinghe. This 
chapter evaluates the military intervention, mediation process and also analyses the role 
of other regional actors in the DRC conflict.   
 
Chapter 6: This chapter provides a conclusion to the study and makes 









The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a broad overview of the concepts 
that this research uses. It defines, describes and analyses the key concepts of conflict 
and conflict resolution. Concepts that relate to the idea of peace are also discussed 
such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.  
 
Second, this chapter develops a theoretical framework which this study uses in the 
appraisal of the role of SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC from 1998 to 2003. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, this study is guided by two theories, namely the New 
Institutionalism theories and Kumar Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation.  This 
chapter therefore presents an overview of these two theories and states how they are 
used in understanding the role of SADC in the Congo conflict resolution process.  
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.2.1 Defining conflict 
 
SADC is an intergovernmental organisation that focuses on economic and political 
matters based in Southern African region and is one of the continent’s most prominent 
regional co-operation bodies. The organisation played an important role in the area of 
conflict resolution both in the Southern African region and in Central Africa, particularly 
in the DRC conflict. At that time, the DRC was a member of both the Economic 
Community of Central Africa (ECCAS) and SADC. ECCAS was inactive for several 
years until 1999 due to, among others, the non-payment of dues by member states. In 
contrast to ECCAS, SADC played the primary role in proposing solutions to end the 
regional conflict in the absence of a clear response by the international community 
which has a responsibility for maintaining peace and security (Smis and Oyatambwe 
2002:413). This role is defined and analysed from a conflict resolution perspective.   
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Conceptualising conflict is a necessary first step to analysing conflict resolution. 
Scholars define ‘conflict’ in many ways. Generally, the term conflict6 refers to clash of 
interests, ideologies, values, and struggle between individuals within states (civil wars) 
and between states, competition over scarce resources, incompatible goals by different 
groups etc (Effendi 2010:84). Wallensteen (2002:16) defines conflict “as a social 
situation in which a minimum of two parties strive at the same moment in time to acquire 
the same set of scarce resources”.  According to Ross (1967 cited by Mitchell 1981:15) 
conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they 
perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both. 
 
Galtung describes conflict in terms of the following necessary components: first, 
incompatibility of interests or a contradiction or what Mitchell (1981) calls “a miss-match” 
between social values and social structure; second, negative attitudes in the form of 
perceptions or stereotypes about others; and third, behaviours of coercion and gestures 
of hostility and threats (Kotze 2002: 78-79).  All three components of the triangle have to 
be present to constitute a conflict. If one or more of them are absent, there is a latent or 
structural conflict. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which the three factors 
are constantly changing and influencing each other. 
 
Conflicts arise for a myriad of reasons that are often a combination of politics, 
economics and social factors. The conflicts that have taken place in SADC region have 
been classified as political, economic and social. However political conflicts appear to be 
the dominant form of conflict in the region. The focus in this chapter is on political 
conflicts that arise due to power rivalries that affect political stability and peace in the 
SADC countries. 
 
Political conflict occurs when the nature of the incompatibility is political. Politics by 
definition functions in a context of scarcity, such as the  scarcity of resources, scarcity of 
power, scarcity of identity and scarcity of status (Kotze 2002:78). Political scientists 
describe conflict as a political phenomenon that emerges when states harbor 
                                                            
6 The term conflict and war are used interchangeable in this study. 
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dissimilarities of interests, ideologies or values systems. According to Faget (2011:3), 
political conflicts occur in all forms of political organisations since confrontation between 
political and social groups for the control of power is a common feature in democracies. 
A conflict escalates when violence becomes part of the conflict expression.  
 
After reviewing a number of definitions of conflict, the study concludes that a common 
element found in all definitions is the divergent goals and interests of two factors or 
parties, who resort to various means in pursuit of their objectives and their common 
denominator, being violence. This tells us that conflicts can manifest themselves in 
different levels such as intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-nation and international, but 
whichever shape they take, there remain conflicts. Conflict is an inevitable phenomenon 
but violence is a choice. In this study a broader definition of conflict is preferred, 
following the work of Galtung, as I have discussed above because this definition can be 
applied to several types (levels) of conflict. Therefore, conflict is an inevitable fact of 
human life and where conflict erupts there is a need for a resolution. 
 
2.2.2 Conflict Resolution 
 
SADC has adopted the language of conflict resolution, but what exactly does it mean? 
According to Burton (1990:2-3) the resolution of conflict means the transformation of 
relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems which led to the 
conflicted behaviour in the first place. Such a transformation does not necessarily 
eliminate future problems in the relationship, or remove residual antagonisms. In this 
regard, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) point out that the aim of conflict 
resolution is to transform conflict. For them, conflict transformation is a further 
development of conflict resolution. Furthermore, these authors conclude that the terms 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation are used relatively interchangeably in 
terms of their meaning and application.  
 
According to Miall (2004:15), conflict resolution means a "change in the situation which 
removes the underlying source of conflict. If a conflict is settled by the military victory of 
one side and the other does not accept the outcome and begins organising another 
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fight, the underlying conflict has clearly not been removed and such a conflict would not 
be considered resolved".  
 
Consequently, the fundamental principles of conflict resolution are two. Firstly, the 
parties should be satisfied with the outcome which meets their felt needs and interests, 
and secondly there should not be use of any coercion to achieve such an outcome. 
According to Wallensteen (2002:8), conflict resolution refers to the resolution of the 
underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party’s 
existence. Groom (1990:94) declares that a complete satisfaction of parties comes only 
if "they have and do actually have, full knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the 
dispute and the aspirations of other parties". He also maintains that conflict resolution is 
a goal rarely realised in practice. 
 
However, Zartman (2000) introduced the notion of ‘ripeness’ in conflict resolution and 
defends the concept of a mutually hurtful stalemate. According to Zartman (2000:51), a 
conflict may be resolved only when each protagonist acknowledges the fact that they will 
not be able to reach a solution on their own or when they feel that escalation will lead to 
a catastrophe and that the costs are unbearable. Ripeness depends on internal political 
changes within conflicting groups, such as the emergence of new leaders or the break-
up of a government.  
 
Therefore, conflict resolution is a political process that requires a combination of factors 
and institutions from the grassroots to the international level. In this study, SADC’s role 
is in a conflict resolution as a third party intervener, which is classified as a peacemaker 
(mediator), peacekeeper and peace builder. The term peacemaking is often equated 
with conflict resolution, while peacekeeping with conflict management and the term 
peace-building is equated with conflict transformation. Conflict resolution is used as a 
term encompassing all three dimensions noted above and refers both to the process of 
bringing about  change in the situation which removes the underlying source of conflict 
and to the completion of this process. The definition adopted assists in the classification 
and clarification of SADC activities in the SADC region. The processes of conflict 
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resolution are characterised by three dimensions which include the nature of conflict, 
conflict resolution mechanisms and the outcomes of such mechanisms.  
 
2.2.2.1 Nature of conflicts 
 
It is crucial to understand the nature of conflict in SADC region for its effective resolution. 
To comprehend the nature of a conflict, the study identifies and examines the 
parameters such as the type of the conflict, its causes, the actors involved in the 
resolution of the conflict faced by SADC in the region.  
 
2.2.2.1.1 Types of conflict 
 
There are many different typologies of conflict (Singer 1996:43-47; Holsti 1996:21; 
Wallensteen 2002). From these typologies, two main types of conflict are discernible, 
namely inter-state and intra-state7 conflict that SADC has been involved with. However, 
for the purpose of this study the focus will be on the intra-state conflict. 
 
In recent years a new type of conflict described by Kaldor (2002:2) as the “new war’’ has 
increasingly come to the fore. This type of conflict takes place within and across states, 
in the form of civil war, armed insurrection, violent secessionist movement and other 
domestic warfare. Civil war is one of the most explosive of intra-state conflicts and 
occurs between the armed forces of the government and an opposing civil organised 
group, within the state borders. Intra-state conflicts are the dominant form of conflict in 
the post-Cold War era. This conflict may occur between two or more groups of power 
contenders within a state, each seeking access to political power in order to advance its 
interests and goals. For example, most of the intra-state conflicts within the SADC 
region have centered on the fight for political power between 1995 and 2010. These 
intra-state conflicts were recorded in countries such as Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Malawi, Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006:611). 
 
                                                            
7 In this study, the term intrastate conflict and internal conflict are used interchangeable. 
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The key characteristics of internal war include the fragmentation of societies, the 
militarisation of the conflict, increased flows of refugees and the internal displacement of 
people, the stereotyping and/or demonisation of others, internationalisation of the 
conflict, and massive violations of human rights and severe breaches of humanitarian 
law, particularly against civilians (Rupensighe 1996:157).  
 
When internal conflicts become regional conflicts due to the involvement of the 
neighbouring states, the likelihood that the interests of distant powers will be engaged   
increases and sometimes these factors destabilise the region. Cawthra and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2004:9) point out that “the Southern African region has extensive experience 
of external involvement promoting violent conflict and other threats to its security. In 
post-Cold War period, it is clear that global actors have maintained a presence in SADC 
region, pursuing mainly economic and donor interests’’. Some excellent examples 
include the wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and the DRC. 
 
Many of the internal conflicts also take on an international dimension. According to 
Jackson (2002:30), internal conflict may be transformed into wider international conflict 
because they can become a threat to international peace and security when the fighting 
spills over into the neighbouring states or ‘flows of refugees’ upset regional stability. 
External states may directly or indirectly be drawn into the conflict through support links 
to various sides of the conflict, supplying weapons, training, or other materials. An 
internal conflict may also assume an international dimension when sub-state factors 
such as rebel movements, militias and warlords, often receive financial and political 
support from Diaspora communities or ethnic kin separated by international borders.  
Finally, the international community may decide to send in a peacekeeping force, or take 
such an active interest in the fighting, that it becomes a matter of international concern 
as it is the case in the DRC.   
 
According to SADC Treaty, the SADC Organ is mandated to resolve intra-state conflict 
within the territory of a state and inter-state conflict between a state and another state 
(SADC 2001: article 2).  While SADC has had its share of inter- and intra-state conflicts, 
the majority of its conflicts were internal and these internal conflicts appear to be 
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increasing, as elsewhere. Therefore, it is important to analyse the underlying causes of 
internal conflict. 
 
2. 2.2.1.2 Causes of Conflicts 
 
It is important to note that the causes of internal conflicts are complex and multi-
dimensional. This section looks at the theories that have been advanced by many 
scholars in order to fully understand the underlying causes and contributory factors of 
conflicts. 
 
Some scholars explain the cause of internal conflict in terms of grievance (Azar 1990; 
Burton 1996). In his work, ‘The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and 
Cases’ , Azar (1990:7-12)  explains that  the precondition and sources of protracted 
social conflicts (PSC)  are the communal context of a society (this refers to the colonial 
period, where community groups are marked by historical rivalries and/or colonial legacy 
of divide and rule), the denial of access to basic human needs, identity and security, as 
well as through the roles played by the state(the monopolisation of power by the 
dominant social groups limits the state’s ability to meet the needs of all social groups), 
international political and economic linkages and the military in politics. This can explain 
the cause of conflict in the DRC and Angola. 
 
Another way of understanding causes of internal conflict is through greed. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002b) argue that conflict may be explained either by grievance or by greed. 
For a better understanding of the causes of contemporary civil wars, explanations based 
on grievances should be ignored and a focus be given to greed (natural resources) of 
rebel groups and especially on their trade in natural resources. The natural resources 
can also increase the probability and duration of violent conflict like in the case of the 
DRC conflict, where some actors seek to enrich themselves through illicit means. 
Resource scarcity and lack of access to resource are all potential sources of conflict.  
 
In conclusion, the grievance theory and the greed theory can explain the causes of the 
internal conflict and factors contributing to conflict. For the purpose of this study, a 
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combination of both is needed in order to understand the causes and factors 
contributing to political conflict in the SADC region, particularly in the DRC. 
 
2.2.2.1.3 Actors in internal Conflicts 
 
Actors refer to individuals or groups who are involved in a conflict. The actors differ in 
their goals and interests, their positions, capacities to realise their interests and 
relationships, with other actors. In most cases, the key actors in internal conflicts are the 
governments, rebel groups, the military, militias, foreign governments and multinationals. 
However, the various actors employ an array of methods for promoting their agendas, 
especially the articulation of their claims to state power.  Some use the mobilisation of 
grassroots support. Others use methods such as the organisation of demonstrations and 
the formation of militias (Kieh 2002:38). Besides, the various groups are supported by 
external factors who have a stake in the outcome of the conflict. 
 
Foreign governments and multinationals will have a strong interest in supporting one 
side (the governments) or the other (rebel groups, the military and militias) and their own 
reasons for seeing the stabilisation or destabilisation of the state in conflict. As Solomon 
(2006:222) noted, that external intervention or support is not based on altruism but 
includes a large measure of self-interest. For example in Angolan conflict, Cuba and the 
Soviet Union supported the MPLA, and the USA, Zaire (now DRC) and South Africa 
supported UNITA. In Mozambique, South Africa supported the Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO), and China and the Soviet Union supported Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). 
 
When it comes to the SADC region, the nature of the conflict can be determined at two 
levels. First, there is the violent domestic political conflict within states. In this case, 
conflict is mostly about democracy, self-determination, exploitation and ethnic rivalry. 
Second, there are external interventions and the issue of the strategic interests of the 
West in the sub-region. That is, intervention is all about preserving access to strategic 
material resources, protecting its investments and illegal exploitation of resources. 
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2.2.2.2 Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution 
 
In cases where conflicts cannot be prevented or managed, there are commonly used 
mechanisms to resolve them. Conflicts can be resolved through several ways. The 
following are some of the most significant methods used by different institutions, as well 





Peacemaking is an important mechanism of conflict resolution. It refers “to the use of 
diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement of their dispute” (UN Department 2000:72). It involves negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, good offices applied after 
a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. According to Conteh-Morgan 
(2004:282), peacemaking has been defined as the proactive intervention to encourage 
warring factions to settle their dispute. This study adopts the general definition of 
peacemaking that is provided by the UN Department of Public Information in 2000 as 
mentioned above. 
 
Peacemaking is one of the methods used by SADC in dealing with emerging crisis 
situations, as well as conflicts that have erupted. SADC has made progress in its 
capacity to respond to political conflicts in the Southern African region through 
mediation. It has been actively involved in three mediation missions to Zimbabwe, 
Madagascar and Lesotho, Hartmann (2013:3). It has also facilitated various 
peacemaking initiatives, which included the negotiation and signing of the ceasefire 
Agreement in Lesotho, DRC, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Mediation, according to Murithi (2009:72), is the process of bringing parties to the 
negotiation table to seek a peaceful settlement of their conflicts. It is the third party 
facilitation of resolution of conflicts through dialogue, premised on win-win or positive-
sum. In Africa, age, personality and political position determine the choice of a 
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peacemaker. Smith (1994:148) contends that the intervening third party needs power in 
order to bring the disputants to the point where they will accept mediation. As 
Rugumamu (2002:186) states, the key to third party intervention is the creation of 
condition of ‘ripeness’ in the conflict. In the context of SADC, for example, South Africa 
created the condition of ripeness in the Lesotho and DRC conflicts. The SADC AAF 
opened the way for peaceful resolution of the conflict which had been a key objective of 
SADC action in the DRC conflict.  
 
SADC has yet to establish a mediation unit to strengthen its peacemaking capacity. The 
SADC practice has been to use former heads of states for mediation. For example, in 
Zimbabwe, SADC deployed the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki, to mediate 
the resolution of the post-election crisis, leading to the signing of the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. Kotze (2002:80) argues that the use of elderly 
statesmen is sometimes contemplated as a valuable source for mediation. However, 
most of them cannot guarantee success. They have experience in negotiation as 
political leaders but not necessarily in mediation, and they seldom have the 
infrastructural support to sustain a settlement process. Therefore, irrespective of how 
attractive and idealistic it appears to be, it is likely that the success is relatively low. Sir 
Ketumile Masire, deployed to mediate in the DRC conflict on behalf of SADC, faced the 
same predicament. 
 
Some analysts argue that SADC has had meager successes on peacemaking in the 
Southern African region (Cawthra and Nieuwkerk 2004:11; Nathan 2010:7-8). Cawthra 
and Nieuwkerk (2004:11) state that SADC has had few successes, and its efforts have 
almost always contributed to stability and security. In practice, the community has 
seldom been able to resolve matters as a collective body and has tended to devolve 
diplomatic processes and negotiations to one or more member states. For example, 
South Africa (and before it Botswana) brokered the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and South 




2.2.2.2. 2 Peacekeeping  
 
The majority of interventions fall in the category of peacekeeping as opposed to 
peacemaking. Peacekeeping is another important mechanism of conflict resolution. 
Conteh-Morgan (2004:282) defined peacekeeping as the use of military intervention to 
maintain peace and prevent an increase in confrontation. Boutros-Ghali (1992) identified 
peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or 
police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity which 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace”. 
For the purpose of this study, peacekeeping is defined as the act of maintaining peace 
through the use of military intervention forces. 
 
Moreover, peacekeeping operations require a clear and precise mandate for operations, 
which can be unambiguously translated into effective action on the ground in the pursuit 
of clear objectives. Mandates should take into account the need for peacekeeping 
operations to remain impartial in implementing their mission and to operate with the 
consent of all parties to the conflict. They also need to be framed with a view to the 
quality and quantity of resources which the international community would be ready to 
commit (Rugumamu 2002:187).  
 
The major determinant of success is the capacity of the peacekeeping force to create an 
atmosphere conducive to peacemaking. In essence, the main function of peacekeeping 
is to keep different armed groups apart and to facilitate the transition from a state of 
conflict to a state of peace.  Peacekeeping is also one of the methods used by SADC in 
order to bring peace and stability in conflicting states. In addition to its roles in 
peacemaking in some countries, SADC has through OPDS initiated the deployment of 
peacekeeping missions as an instrument for conflict management and resolution. Under 
its authority, SADC deployed missions to Lesotho and DRC. 
 
Clearly, peace support operations have become an important tool in SADC efforts for 
managing and resolving conflicts. These operations can also be credited for playing a 
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role in stabilising the areas affected by violent conflicts. In the case of Lesotho, SADC 
‘ Operation Boleas’ is credited for creating a conducive environment for political dialogue 
and the restoration of democracy. In the case of the DRC, even if it was accused of 
attacks on civilians, the SADC AAF however, prevented Rwanda and Uganda from 
occupying the DRC, creating the conditions that facilitated the resolution of conflict and 
the deployment of a UN mission, which would not have been possible in its absence.   
 
Notwithstanding these achievements, many studies have shown that these interventions 
in both cases have been ad-hoc measures undertaken by a small number of member 
states, with questionable legal mandates due to disagreement regarding whether they 
constituted SADC peacekeeping operations or military intervention by coalition forces 
made up of SADC states (Francis 2006; Nathan 2006; Neethling 2006). Neither were 
they formally authorised by the SADC Summit, but rather unofficially approved by the 
ISDSC and made up of the Defence ministers from the SADC Member states (Francis 
2006; Nathan 2006; Neethling 2006). In conclusion, these interventions have been 
constrained by its limited peacekeeping experience.  
2. 2.2.2.3 Peace building 
 
In contrast with peacekeeping, the concept of peace-building was used by the UN to 
describe activities in the post-war context. According to UN, peace-building refers to “all 
external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, and 
includes all activities and programmes designed to support and strengthen these 
transitions (UN Department 2000:72)”. Boutros-Ghali (1992:11) defines peace-building 
as an “action to identify and to support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. This study adopts the general 
definition of peace-building that is provided by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 as mentioned 
above. 
 
Peace-building is used to describe various activities including capacity-building, 
economic development, diplomacy, transitional justice, and democratization efforts that 
seek to address the core problems that underlie a conflict, with the aim of establishing 
durable peace. Today, the concept of peace-building is used to refer to the building of 
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structures for peace in all phases of a conflict, not merely after a violent phase has been 
replaced by a fragile peace. 
 
SADC has attempted to make a meaningful contribution to combating socio-economic 
deterioration of some countries in the region. It has recognised the need to establish 
institutional structures to engage in a robust approach to peacebuilding and 
reconstruction in the SADC countries. In 2003, SADC adopted a Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) to promote socio-economic development in 
Southern Africa (SADC Communiqué 2003).  
 
SADC’s potential to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe 
and Lesotho is limited by the nature of conflicts in the SADC region and the lack of 
financial resources. For example, in the case of DRC, SADC has recognised the need to 
establish institutional structures to engage in a robust approach to peacebuilding and 
reconstruction in the Congo. In particular, it has established a joint peacebuilding office 
with African Union in Kinshasa to help implement Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) in the DRC in consultation with the Congolese government, the UN 
and other external partners in the process. 
 
From the above analysis of the mechanism of conflict resolution, it is possible to 
conclude that various conflict resolution mechanisms noted above have been employed 
in order to bring peace and stability in conflicting states. Compared to other Regional 
Economic Communities (REC’s), SADC is more hesitant in seeking military solution to 
conflict in its member states. Peacemaking (mediation) seems to be a method of conflict 
resolution that is more acceptable to SADC. Clearly, SADC has made progress in its 
capacity to respond to political conflicts in the Southern Africa region. 
 
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The objective of this section is to discuss a theoretical framework for the appraisal of the 
role of SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC. As mentioned in the first chapter, this 
study is guided by two theories, namely the new institutionalism theories and 
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Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation in its attempt to investigate the role of 
SADC in the Congo conflict resolution process. Furthermore, the strengths and 
weaknesses of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation and the new 
institutionalism theories will be discussed. 
 




It is an undeniable fact that a study of conflict resolution efforts in the DRC will be of little 
interest unless this was placed within a broader theoretical framework. By doing so, it 
will in a large measure assist us in determining the strengths and weaknesses of SADC 
intervention effort in the Congo conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003 and to 
draw lessons from this process. 
 
Resolving an intra-state conflict can be a difficult task. Rupesinghe is a theorist within 
the field of conflict transformation who argues for a comprehensive, eclectic approach to 
conflict transformation that embraces multi-track interventions. He suggests building 
peace constituencies at the grassroots level and across the parties at the civil society 
level, and also creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about change, 
such as business groups, the media and the military. He sees conflict transformation  as 
a broad approach incorporating conflict resolution training and Track I interventions 
including diplomatic interventions and peacekeeping( Miall 2004:5).  
 
There are several reasons why Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation is adopted 
in this study. First, due to the increasing processes of globalisation, contemporary 
conflicts have been significantly influenced by the changing nature of the international 
system. This international system witnessed changes in the second half of the 20th 
century. The conflicts plaguing the SADC region and the most current internal conflicts 
like DRC conflict have an external component such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia’s 
support of the Kabila Government, as well as Rwanda and Uganda’s support of the 
rebel’s movements.  
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The model of Rupesinghe (1995:65) emphasises internal conflicts which are more 
appropriate in the SADC region where intra-state conflicts are extensive.  
 
The second reason why Rupensighe’s model has been chosen is because it focuses on 
intra-state wars, which is applicable to the DRC conflict. 
 
Third, Rupesinghe (1995:65) argues that in multi-dimensionality of protracted social 
conflicts, the rationalistic approach to conflict resolution or transformation must out of 
necessity, be complemented by an understanding of non-linear peacebuilding 
processes. In this regard, Rupesinghe (1995:65) suggests a double level approaches 
which consist in dealing with the complexity of either emerging or existing conflicts, for 
an efficient prevention.  
 
Fourth, Rupesinghe’s multi-sectoral approach also stresses that the number of actors 
involved in the peaceful transformation of a conflict needs to be increased to reflect all 
constituencies of broader society. In other words, there should be the development of 
engaged, visible and varied constituencies that are linked to the political elites of all 
sides and also to external supporters of peacemaking (1996:167). This is a very crucial 
point in the case of the DRC for various reasons:  
 
Firstly, all constituencies of society must have a stake in peace as well as the peace 
process. 
 
Secondly, it is the constituencies, which will be playing a key role in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Rupesinghe (1995:77) is of the view that a mere transfer of power does 
not amount to a meaningful conflict transformation. He asserts that meaningful 
transformation of conflict involves sustainable structural and attitudinal changes within 




 Lastly, the involvement of non-state actors is also crucial, especially in situations of 
internal conflicts where the state cannot play the role of non-partisan mediator because 
in most cases, the state is a party to the conflict. 
 
In summary, the Rupesinghe model of conflict transformation (1995:76) suggests that “a 
more promising approach for deep-seated internal conflicts could be a predominantly 
transformative process, where coming to an agreement on outstanding issues is of 
secondary importance to addressing the overall conflict process and coming to terms 
with the temporal aspects of conflict.” 
 
Rupesighe’s conflict transformation model has the following as the framework for 
sustainable peace (Rupesinghe 1995: 80-85; 1996:166-168), which is applicable to the 
DRC conflict resolution: 
 
1. The pre-negotiation stage: The purpose of this stage is to bring the warring 
parties into the negotiation process. In the DRC context many meetings and 
summits were convened in preparation for the ultimate negotiation process. 
2. Understanding root causes: there is a need for a clear conceptual and 
theoretical understanding of the root causes and the sources of intractability of a 
given conflict. The causes of the DRC conflict are both internal and external. 
Internal causes included the authoritarian nature of the Kabila regime, inequitable 
distribution of scarce resources, exclusion, lack of recognition, identity problems 
with regards to the Banyamulenge population. The invasion by neighbouring 
countries such as Rwanda and Uganda for a variety of motives including the 
control of Congo’s natural resources constituted external causes. 
3. Ownership of the process: it is vital to involve “local actors so that they become 
the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in the peace process”. 
The study will examine the level of ownership of the peace process by various 
Congolese political parties or groups. 
4. Identifying all the actors: accurate identification is necessary of all significant 
actors – the visible and articulate elites as well as the less visible, less articulate, 
but still influential opinion shapers and leaders. The DRC conflict involved a 
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multiplicity of state and non-state actors including countries such as Uganda, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad and rebel movements such 
as RCD, MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML and the Mai Mai militia.  
5. Identifying facilitators: it is crucial to make accurate identification of people who 
have the background knowledge as well as the analytical and mediation skills so 
that a positive contribution in the design of a particular peace process can be 
made. In the DRC context, SADC mandated Zambian President Frederic Chiluba 
to lead the peace initiative for the DRC. The OAU mandated Sir Ketumile Masire, 
former president of Botswana, to facilitate the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). 
6.  Setting a realistic timetable: the need for realistic timetables for accomplishing 
phases such as the identification of roots, causes and significant actors, through 
cease-fires, to the elaboration of mechanisms of political and social 
accommodation.The Lusaka cease-fire provided for the timetable of the 
implementation of the agreement. However, implementation was left to the 
belligerents. Hence, there was little progress in this regard. 
7.  Sustaining the effort: a comprehensive approach requires an adequate 
investment of financial resources and patience, and a sustained commitment from 
sponsors. Efforts to settle the conflict in the DRC by the United Nations (UN), the 
African Union (AU) and SADC culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
signed on 10 July 1999, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) held from 15 October 
2001 to 2 April 2003, the Global and Inclusive Agreement (17 December 2002) 
and the Final Act (2 April 2003). The mediation process was funded by European 
Union (EU) and South Africa. 
8.  Evaluating success and failure:  “another key element of any peace-building 
design should be a process of evaluation which indicates whether the main 
interests of the parties are being addressed, the precedents and principles used 
in searching for a solution and their usefulness, the obstacles encountered, 
factors that led to progress, alternatives and missed opportunities, coordination 
with other peacemaking activities and lessons which could be learned from the 
process” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). At this stage, the study will evaluate SADC’s 
role and decide whether its involvement was a success or a failure based on 
empirical data. 
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9.  Strategic constituencies: strategic constituencies must be identified to sustain 
peace processes over time; and these should include relevant non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the media, human rights and humanitarian institutions, 
peace institutions, religious institutions, independent scholars, former members of 
the military, members of the business community, intergovernmental and 
governmental officials and donors.In the DRC mediation process, civil society 
participated and was made of NGOs, churches, business organisations and 
media organisations.  
10.  The role of outside peacemakers: “traditional diplomacy and outside non-
governmental peacemakers have important roles to play in the mitigation or 
resolution of violent internal conflict” (Rupesinghe 1995:84). In the DRC context, 
SADC and the AU played the role of mediators. 
11.  The role of local peacemakers: It is important that local peacemakers are 
involved in the peace process.  In the DRC, local peacemakers have not offered 
to mediate the parties except Tshisekedi leader of UDPS (Union for Democracy 
and Social Progress), however, he was rejected. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Rupesinghe’s model and the DRC conflict situation 
 
The conflict in the DRC dates back to the rebellion of 1996, which led to the ousting of 
President Mobutu from his 32 year authoritarian regime. In August 1998, Banyamulenge 
leaders, who brought Kabila to power, launched a rebellion against him. They accused 
him of authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism and tribalism. These developments led to 
an unprecedented inter-state and intra-state conflict involving a multiplicity of states 
including countries such as Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Libya,  Chad and rebel movements such as RCD, MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML and the Mai 
Mai militia (Mangu 2003:160). The conflict in the DRC was composed of the Kinshasa 
government, its Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean allies as well as various 
paramilitary forces on the one hand, and a divided set of rebel groups notably RCD and 
MLC and their Rwandan and Uganda sponsors on the other. 
Moreover, the DRC war has already seen approximately twenty three recorded peace 
initiatives fail since 1997. Rupensinghe (1996:164) suggests that in a multi-dimensional, 
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protracted social conflict, where peacekeeping and peacemaking have consistently 
failed to bring peace, an alternative to deadlock is a multi-sectoral approach to conflict 
transformation that emphasises creating sustainable frameworks for citizen-based 
peacebuilding initiatives. This suggestion is relevant to the DRC conflict. 
 
The international community attempted numerous mediations in an effort to stop the civil 
war in the DRC and to bring about sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region. The 
UN, OAU and SADC organised a series of meetings and consultations aimed at 
resolving the DRC conflict; this culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed 
on 10 July 1999, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) held from 15 October 2001 to 2 
April 2003, the Global and Inclusive Agreement (17 December 2002) and the Final Act 
(2 April 2003). 
 
However, these peace agreements, for example the Lusaka Peace Agreement (LCA) 
did not lead to the desired result of ending the conflict, and the people of the DRC have 
continued to endure violence. One of the problems with the DRC process was that the 
focus was on having the leaders of the warring factions sign some form of agreement. 
The LCA was far from being comprehensive as there were some factions that were not 
signatories to it. Most importantly, no adequate attention was paid to the high level of 
humanitarian destruction the conflict had continued to cause (Prunier 2009: 223-226). 
Hence, extensive dialogue and peacebuilding efforts, not only at the level of the various 
actors to the conflict but also at the grassroots level, should have been given due 
attention to resolve the conflict.   
 
Despite, the LCA failed to pave the way to a lasting solution to the Congolese Conflict 
and peace was fragile. On the basis of the LCA a national dialogue was initiated to take 
into consideration concerns of all parties. This led to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) 
held at Sun City, in South Africa. This brought all parties together including the Kinshasa 
government, the rebel movements, the non-armed opposition and civil society, which 
adopted the Global Agreement and interim constitution for the DRC. In this regard, the 
model of Rupensinghe is relevant as it helps to appraise SADC’s role in the Congo 
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conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003 and to draw lessons for future peace 
actions.   
 
2.3.1.3 The weaknesses and strengths of the model of Rupesinghe 
 
Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation, like any theory or model orientation, has 
its strengths and weaknesses which are related to the research. The strength of the 
model is that it takes up several elements which Rupesinghe claims are necessary in 
order to achieve a durable peace. All third-parties, such as SADC need to take up these 
elements in consideration to achieve an effective peace process in the DRC.  
 
The weakness of Rupesinghe’s model is that it does not describe some of the elements 
very clearly. The elements of “identifying all the actors” and “strategic constituencies” are 
similar and it is difficult to understand the complete differences between them. 
Identifying all the actors necessitates for example, elites, leaders, opinion-shapers and 
non-violent actors to get identified and brought into the peace process. This does not 
differ a lot from the strategic constituencies’ element which for example includes the 
media (which can also be classified as opinion-shapers), government officials (classified 
as elites or leaders) and the churches and NGOs (classified as non-violent actors). 
Hence, Rupesinghe should have developed what these elements involve more 
thoroughly so as to avoid ambiguities.  
 
One crucial aspect lacking in the model of Rupesinghe was the role played by culture. 
For example, there are different groups of people living in the DRC and most likely they 
have different cultural backgrounds, which need to be taken into account during the 
peace process. This element should be considered and for that reason, Rupesinghe’s 
model should be developed in order to include an element of culture. This could be done 
in future study of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation. 
 
In the fifth chapter, an attempt is made to use each component of this model to appraise 
SADC’s role in the Congo conflict resolution process and to draw lessons for the future. 
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A theoretical approach which seems suitable for analysing SADC as an institution or 
organisation is that of New Institutionalism theories. In this regard, the aim of using the 
New Institutionalism theories is to understand how institutions in general and SADC in 
particular, are run and transformed. To put this theory into practice, a clear 
understanding of SADC as an institution is needed with regard to its historical evolution, 
goals, structure, functionality, policies and mechanisms that SADC uses in conflict 
resolution in the SADC region, and the impact of the role of individuals’ interest, 
preference or motivation in deciding about the policies or the work of SADC. In addition, 
it will also help to examine the decisions taken by important actors in SADC and analyse 
their implications for the survival and future of SADC.  
 
New Institutionalism developed as a response to behaviouralism which became popular 
in the 1950s and 1960s (Immergut 1998; Peters 1999). In general, new institutionalism 
theories seek to identify the rules, norms, and symbols that influence social behaviour, 
how formal the institutions affect political outcomes, and how institutions have 
developed over time to both enable and constrain policy making (Scharpf 2000:762-
790). On the other hand, the New Institutionalism theories emphasises the relationship 
between institutions and action by associating institutions with ‘roles’ to which 
prescriptive ‘norms of behaviour were attached (Lane 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996). In 
this view, individuals who have been socialised into particular institutional roles 
internalise the norms associated with these roles and in this way institutions are said to 
affect behaviour.  
 
The New Institutionalism theories are not a single or a coherent body of theories. They 
are used in many different disciplinary contexts such as political sciences, economics, or 
organisational theory in order to understand institutions8 (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:8). 
                                                            
8 The term institution and organisation are used relatively interchangeably in terms of their meaning and 
application in this study. 
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However, New Institutionalism recognises that institutions operate in an environment 
that consists of other institutions, called the institutional environment. Every institution is 
influenced by the broader environment and institutions are central to political science 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991:8). 
 
New Institutionalism theorists argue that institutions are important for determining 
decision-making outcomes and policy development. One can argue that the essence of 
institutionalism is that institutions matter in the study of politics. According to Meyer et al. 
(2007), institutions influence the choices of political actors. Institutions are generally 
defined quite broadly and their exact definition differs according to the respective 
theoretical branch. They can range from formal decision and organisational rules and 
procedures to informal practices, norms, values and conventions. 
 
In line with the classification made by Hall and Taylor, three branches of New 
Institutionalism have been identified, namely, Historical Institutionalism (HI), Rational 
Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI). All of them stress 
different kinds of interactions between institutions and actors within decision-making 
processes, and consequently “paint quite different pictures of the political world” (Hall 
and Taylor 1996:936-957).  
 
2.3.2.2 The three branches of the New Institutionalisms 
 
In the following sub-headings, the three branches will be discussed in brief, with 
particular attention being paid to the interactions between institutions and political 
factors, and the way in which institutional change can occur. This will also be related to 
SADC as an institution. 
 
2.3.2.2.1 Historical institutionalism (HI) 
 
The historical institutionalism was developed in response to the group theories of politics 
and structural-functionalism prominent in politics during the 60s and 70s. The group 
theories argue that conflict among rival groups is caused by rivalry over scarce 
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resources, which is one of the bases of politics (Hall and Taylor 1996:937). In addition, 
the group theories seek to better explain the distinctiveness of national political 
outcomes and the inequalities that mark these outcomes. Finally, it finds such 
explanations in the way the institutional organisation of the polity and economy 
structures conflict so as to privilege some interests while demobilising others (Hall and 
Taylor 1996:937).  
 
On the other hand, the structural functionalists argue that the polity is to be viewed as an 
overall system of interacting parts. However, HI rejected the tendency of many 
structural-functionalists to view the social, psychological, or cultural traits of individuals 
as the parameters deriving much from the system’s operation. Instead, HI saw the 
institutional organisation of the polity or political-economic as the principal factor 
structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes (Hall and Taylor 
1996:937-938). 
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) is set out from an approach which shares certain features 
of RCI. In general, both agree on the broad definition of formal and informal sets of 
institutions. HI treats institution as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and 
standard operating procedures that structure conflict or structure and shape behaviour 
and outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996)”.  
 
Furthermore, Historical institutionalism conceptualises the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms. Also, it puts an emphasis 
on the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of 
institutions and tends to have a view of institutional development that emphasises path 
dependence and unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor 1996). The concept of path 
dependence refers to a process where contingent events or decisions result in 
institutions being established that tend to persist over long periods of time and constrain 
the range of options available to actors in the future, including those that may be more 
efficient or effective in the long run (Pierson 2000). 
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Finally, Historical institutionalism is concerned with integrating institutional analysis 
within the contribution that other kinds of facts, such as ideas, can make to political 
outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996:938; Steinmo 2001). In order to specify the relationship 
between institutions and actors, historical institutionalism for example uses both calculus 
and culture approach, which focuses on the uneven distribution of power, and 
subsequent impact on both actor behaviour and promulgation of the institution itself (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). 
 
However, there is a debate whether institutions can change or not. Some analysts 
recognised that institutions typically do not change rapidly–they are sticky, resistant to 
change, and generally only change in path dependent ways. Peters (1999) argues that 
institutional change follows the historically contingent institutional evolution, which is a 
way of adjusting institutions in the face of some dysfunctions or unanswered questions. 
For example, if SADC Summit is trying to change the direction of certain policy, it can 
undermine institutional stability. A policy should be considered as part of a policy 
package and a modification of one policy will affect the whole package. This was 
demonstrated in 2001 when the Summit decided to amend the 1992 SADC Treaty 
following the end of Cold War and the collapse of apartheid. In 2001, an extraordinary 
SADC Summit decided on a radical reform for far-reaching changes in SADC’s 
institutional framework and its structure for executing the 1992 mandate. These included 
changes in SADC’s governing structures, but most importantly a plan for the abolition of 
the 21 sector coordinating units and commissions located in 12 of its member countries 
at the Secretariat, Botswana, which will be brought together in four clusters, the 
repositioning of the Organ as an integral part of SADC, and the strengthening of the 
Secretariat (Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk 2004:7). One could argue that all these 
institutional changes could be seen as an attempt to complete the architecture of an 
REC by establishing the pillars of a development community and repositioning the 
organisation to respond to emerging economic development and integration imperatives 




2.3.2.2.2 SADC within the context of historical institutionalism 
 
The application of HI in SADC can be explained by considering the historical evolution of 
institutions through informal (the way things are generally done) and formal (laws, rule 
sets) interaction and by examining their establishment, performance and change over 
time. This perspective seems to be an important tool for the analysis. A key concept of 
Historical Institutionalism is path dependence. It explains the persistence rather than the 
change of institutional arrangement.  
 
Historical institutions offer a long-term perspective that focuses on path dependency and 
lock-in. Both path dependency and lock-in are crucial to understanding the development 
of SADC policy. Pierson (1996:131-142) analysed the conditions under which path 
dependence occurs in institutions in general, particularly in the European Union. 
However, this also applies to SADC, especially in the case of integration as a process 
that unfolds over time. For example, when SADC Summit decided to integrate SADC 
OPDS into SADC body, and transformed it into the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, 
Security and Cooperation.  
 
There are three factors that account for the persistence of institutions or policies over 
time. Firstly, the resistance of supranational actors to institutional change such as 
policies in favour of more member state control. Secondly, Pierson (1996:143) observes 
that institutions are often ‘sticky’ and therefore ‘specifically designed to hinder the 
process of institutional and policy reform’. Thirdly, Pierson (1996:144) points to the role 
of sunk costs and the rising price of exit, stating that “individual and organisational 
adaptations to previous decisions may also generate massive sunk costs that make 
policy reversal unattractive”. Therefore, these factors make an institution path 
dependent. These factors play a role with regard to SADC policy. In 1996, the 
Zimbabwean President Mugabe argued for an autonomous Organ with its own 
chairperson separated from the SADC Summit. This was premised on suspicion of 
South Africa’s regional dominance agenda, fear of South African continued control of the 
country’s security establishment and the need to separate sensitive security matters 
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from an array of other donor-supported SADC programs (International Crisis Group 
2012:9).  
 
On the other hand, South African President Mandela argued that the Organ needed to 
fall under the direction of the Summit, which it chaired at that time. SA also highlighted 
that there was no provision in the SADC Treaty to create a distinct body, under a 
separate and autonomous chairpersonship and maintained that the Treaty recognised 
the Summit as the supreme policy-making body. In 1997, during his tenure as the SADC 
Chair, Mandela became so exasperated with Mugabe’s rival authority as the Chair of the 
Organ that he threatened to resign if the Organ were not made accountable to the 
Summit (Nathan 2006:610). At the 2001 Summit, after intense negotiations and 
pressure, it was decided to bring the Organ firmly under SADC control. 
 
HI examines the development of SADC by focusing on its path dependence. This path 
dependence plays an important role in HI where past decisions lock the decision-makers 
into a path and consequently limit their future decisions. For example, in the context of 
SADC, colonial legacy and historical heritage are the path dependence in the 
development of the structure of SADC. SADC was inherited from SADCC structure and 
the FLS. Over the years, new organs have been created, while others have been 
abolished. As the liberation movement legacy is a potential risk for the political 
development within the member states, it also constitutes an asset for influence and 
mediation. The FLS credibility and respect for liberation elders still carry a lot of weight. 
The fact that SADC structures are built on the legacy of the FLS, also influences the 
organisation negatively as it places potential constraints on the political maneuvering in 
the region (Hull and Derblon 2009:12). 
 
Therefore, it is clear that in terms of policy, SADC is not totally locked in. However, given 
the presence of some conditions for path dependence, changes to SADC are possible 
when the preference of actors have  changed and it is a product of external shocks to 




2.3.2.2.3 Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) 
 
The rational choice institutionalism emerged from the study of American congressional 
behaviour. The RCI emphasizes how the rules of Congress committee influence the 
behaviour of legislators and why they arise (Hall and Taylor 1996:942). In recent years, 
rational choice institutionalisms have also turned their attention to a variety of other 
phenomena, including cross-national coalition behaviour, the development of political 
institutions and the intensity of ethnic conflict (Hall and Taylor 1996:942).  
 
Hall and Taylor (1996:938) define institutions as “the formal and informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity 
or political, be it a ‘constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a 
bureaucracy or the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank-firm relations”. 
The RCI employs a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions, positing that the 
relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences and behave entirely instrumentally so as 
to maximisze the attainment of these preferences in a highly strategic action (Hall and 
Taylor 1996:942).  
 
Besides, it tends to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas, as instances 
when individuals acting to maximise the attainment of their own preferences are likely to 
produce an outcome that is collectively sub-optimal (Hall and Taylor 1996:942). RCI has 
made a major contribution in explaining politics. One of the great contributions of RCI is 
that, it focuses on the role of strategic interaction in the determination of political 
outcomes, while it has a distinctive approach to the problem of explaining how 
institutions originate (institutions created through voluntary agreements by relevant 
actors seeking to create an institution which will serve their required function) (Hall and 
Taylor 1996:944-945). 
 
2.3.2.2.4 The application of RCI in SADC institution  
 
As noted above, RCI is based on the assumption that institutions constrain political 
actors in the rational pursuit of their preferences. Therefore, political actors are in a way 
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‘bounded rational’ and act according to a ‘logic of consequence’. 
 
RCI assumes that institutions emerge as a result of their interdependence, strategic 
interaction and collective action or contracting dilemmas. Institutions emerge and 
survive, because they fulfil important functions for the individual factors affected by these 
institutions (Jonsson and Tallberg 2010). In this sense, SADC institutional creation is 
seen as an explicit and purposeful choice by rational, self-interest maximising actors. In 
this context, Lieberman (1997:91) argued that SADC persists not just because its 
members think they can benefit from it, but because it has developed into a recognised 
organisation that has gained credibility and legitimacy among its members and other 
international actors.  
 
RCI focuses on the decisions taken which have created the long term policy preferences 
or objectives. For conflict resolution within SADC region, the RCI will help the researcher 
to understand why all actors (member states) are involved in decision-making process 
through the heads of state meeting at the same time to investigate on how individual 
behaviour of SADC’s actors attempts to influence SADC policy for their personal benefit. 
However, by using strategic calculation, each actor tries to benefit from policy making 
process in order to have a control of SADC political outcome. This would mean that 
every political actor concerned in decision-making processes wants to maximise its 
individual benefits from the policy and engages in strategic behaviour in order to achieve 
this goal.  
 
RCI views institutional equilibrium as the norm (Steinmo 2001:3). The institutional setting 
is essential to policy making. Scharpf (1997) gives three aspects of the institutional 
setting. Firstly, the actors’ preferences which have developed through time as decisions 
are made. Secondly, there is the constellation of actors, some will have similar 
preferences and can create alliances, while others will be marginalised as their 
preferences are not compatible. Finally, the mode of interaction is determined by the 
rules. These three factors determine the policy outcome. In the SADC context, these 
factors are evident in the DRC conflict resolution process. The DRC conflict resolution 
process brought to the fore of the divisions within the SADC institution. On the one 
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hand, a group of states made of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe pursued military action 
and on the other hand, South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique preferred political and 
diplomatic options, while other states are aligned to either group or have opted for 
inactivity (neutrality).  
 
Finally, writers such as Hall and Taylor (1996) and Peters (1999), indicate that RCI does 
not pay much attention to accurately theorizing institutional change and the conditions 
under which it occurs. They are of the view that change comes when an institution fails, 
precisely when it does not succeed anymore in fulfilling its purpose in an efficient way. If 
this is recognised, institutional change becomes a conscious rather than a continuous 
process (Peters 1999). Hall and Taylor (1996:945) also suggest that institutions are 
subject to change by the individuals who follow and/or challenge existing rules (Hall and 
Taylor 1996:945). In the context of SADC, this means that its institutions change from 
time to time, depending on actors like in the case of the suspension of the SADC 
Tribunal in 2010. The suspension of the Tribunal as a result of a member state’s 
dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Tribunal casts doubt on the acceptability of 
decisions of supranational institution by SADC member states. For example, the issues 
surrounding Zimbabwe’s refusal to accept the decision of the Tribunal ruling in relation 
to rights violated during its controversial land reform program in 2008. The Zimbabwean 
government rejected this ruling, challenging its legality and lobbied the Summit to 
suspend the Tribunal. SADC Summit suspended the power of the tribunal in August 
2010 and commissioned a review of its mandate and jurisdiction (Saurombe 2012:459). 
In line with this, SADC is determined by the ‘logic of consequences’, which informs the 
preferences and strategies of political actors. 
 
2.3.2.2.5 Sociological institutionalism (SI) 
 
Sociological institutionalism arose primarily within the subfield of organisation theory. 
The New Institutionalists in  Sociology began to argue that many of the institutional 
forms and procedures used by modern organisations were not adopted simply because 
they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent rationality. 
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Instead, they argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as 
culturally specific practices (Hall and Taylor 1996:946). 
 
SI tends to define institutions much more clearly and broadly than political scientists do 
to include, not just formal rules, procedures and norms, but the symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the frames of meaning, guiding 
human action, collapses the distinction between institutional explanations and cultural 
ones and redefines culture itself as institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). Furthermore, 
it has a distinctive understanding of the relationship between institutions and individual 
action, which follows the cultural approach, but also adds in a normative dimension of 
institutional impact (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). 
 
Finally, it states that organisations embrace specific institutional forms or practices 
because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment (Hall and 
Taylor 1996:947). SI does well to explain the persistence of institutions as they bound 
the choices available for actors within them and also sees the emergent properties of 
institutions beyond the aggregation of individual choice (Hall and Taylor 1996:950).  
 
In the Sociological institutionalism perspective, institutional change occurs when there is 
a perceived need to adjust policy (Peters 1999:33). This means that institutional 
adaptation and change can take place through processes of learning. SI argues that 
such institutions constitute actors, shaping the way the latter view the world. In the case 
of SADC, Sociological institutionalism scholars examined the process by which SADC is 
diffused and shapes the preferences and behaviour of actors in domestic and 
international politics. 
 
2.3.2.2.6 Sociological institutionalism (SI) and SADC 
 
The application of SI to SADC indicates a process in which participation in SADC policy-
making provides actors with conceptions of their own identities and of how to act. SADC 
can be seen to emerge as a result of actor behaviour which is learnt from being 
identified as a particular actor in SADC system. Therefore, actors can be seen to behave 
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in a manner they perceive to be socially appropriate in accordance with their roles, 
leading to the dispersal of authority away from the central state. In this sense, SADC 
does not only emerge, but also becomes self-reinforcing whereby actors learn to 
function according to the behavioural rules of the SADC.  
 
Institutions are the rules and the guides to human interaction. SADC have the norms, 
rules and principles that member states should adhere to and follow.  Members of an 
institution are expected to obey and be the guardians of its constitutive principles and 
standards (March and Olsen 1989, 2006). In the case of SADC, officials or members 
enter the organisation, and are confronted from the onset with its social structure and 
rules. For example, in Article 4 of SADC Treaty (1992), SADC and its member states 
shall act in accordance with the following principles: Sovereign equality of all member 
states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; 
equity, balance and mutual benefit and peaceful settlement of disputes. This means that 
it does not matter who SADC officials were or what their interests were since SADC had 
established a system of norms in 1992 and regardless of their status and interests they 
are obliged to accept and follow the rules established within the organisation.  
 
SI holds that a ‘logic of appropriateness’ guides the behaviour of actors within an 
institution. The norms and formal rules of institutions will shape the actions of those 
acting within them. According to March (2005: 8) the logic of appropriateness means 
that actions are ‘matched to situations by means of rules organised into identities’. In 
SADC context, if one takes the provision of the Mutual Defence Pact into account; for 
example when Rwanda invading the DRC in 1998, this conflict could result in a war 
between SADC member states and Rwanda and its allies. This means that the positions 
of the political actors are informed by the institutional values of the SADC, most likely 
those of ‘solidarity’ which commits them to act accordingly. In line with this, SADC is 





2.3.2.3 The weaknesses and strengths of the New Institutionalisms 
 
The New Institutionalism theories like any other theory have its strengths and 
weaknesses which are related to its essential research. However, the theories have 
strength because they are not a single or coherent body of theory. They are used in 
many different disciplinary contexts such as political sciences, economics, or 
organisational theory in order to understand institutions (Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  
 
Although the New Institutionalisms theories have made great progress some 
weaknesses have been identified. One of the weaknesses of the New Institutionalism 
theories is much observed when trying to explain the genesis and transformation of 
institutions. According to O’Riordan and Jordan (1999:84), the problem with the three 
branches of the New Institutionalism theories to date is unclear on vital questions (e.g. 
how do institutions develop and how do they change?), is replete with ambiguities and is 
too discipline bound. Additionally it has been criticised for not providing a unified theory 
of institutional behaviour.  
 
In sum, as noted above, institutions are central to political science. Today, political 
science is confronted with not one but the three branches of the New Institutionalism 
theories. All of them devote much attention to how actors (member states) create, 
maintain and change institutions and in turn, how actors or member states are 
influenced and constrained by institutions over time. Institutions need some consistency 
over time and they continue to exist even if the members change, they create 
predictable and regulate behaviour and they are necessary for a stable and efficient 
political system (Peters 2008:5-8). This is relevant to SADC in order to understand the 
institution. Institutions are not the only explanation to political behaviour, but they do 
affect the political outcome, therefore they need to be considered when trying to 
understand politics. 
 
Historical Institutionalism is useful for understanding how SADC institutions and policies 
develop, yet it lacks the ability to explain and analyse events that change the path taken. 
RCI, on the other hand, is concerned with assessing the impacts of structure on 
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behaviour and policy and finally, SI is used to understand the importance of informal and 
cultural institutional features, such as the norms and values diffused by an institution. 
This theory is pertinent for analysing SADC as an institution and its impact on behaviour 
and outcomes. As discussed above, it will also help to examine the decisions taken by 





Appraising the role of SADC in conflict resolution process in the DRC from 1998 to 2003 
is the focus of this study. It is important to note that conflict is an inevitable fact of human 
life. When conflict erupts, it needs to be managed and resolved. In cases where the 
conflict cannot be prevented or managed, there are commonly used mechanisms to 
resolve it. How conflicts are resolved will have a significant impact on the success or 
failure of the conflict resolution mechanisms. SADC conflict resolution mechanism is the 
SADC OPDS. The ultimate goal is to resolve conflicts. However, understanding the 
nature of the conflict is important and necessary in order to determine the most 
appropriate approaches and mechanisms of conflict resolution. This is because the 
understanding of the types of conflict, causes of conflict and actors involved in the 
conflict will be a very useful tool for the purpose of resolving it.  
 
Therefore, there are two main dimensions to SADC OPDS intervention in conflict. 
Intervention could imply peacemaking efforts (mediation) in the conflict or it could be in 
the realm of peacekeeping (military intervention). Both could be waged independently 
depending on the nature and character of the conflict. However, SADC’s involvement in 
the post-conflict peace building has been weak and less systematic.  
 
This chapter has also discussed two theories namely the New Institutionalism theory 
and Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation which will guide this study’s 
investigation of the role of SADC in the Congo conflict resolution process.  Using 
Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation, the study would pay attention to the 
eleven elements of conflict resolution mentioned above which Rupesinghe claims are 
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necessary in order to achieve durable peace. The New Institutionalism theories are 
















Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed the growth of regional 
organisations with both economic and political security interests. These include among 
others the following: the Organisation of American States (OAS) in America; the 
European Union (EU) and The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in Europe; the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia and 
the African Union (AU) in Africa. At the sub-regional level, there are myriad of sub-
regional organisations on the African continent in different domains like economy, 
politics and security. These sub-regional organisations are established to regulate inter-
state relations and to manage and resolve conflicts. 
 
However, some have progressed tremendously while others have been stalling for 
decades. ECOWAS and SADC are the most advanced sub-regional organisations. They 
are dominated by two powerful members who are Nigeria and South Africa respectively. 
According to Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:4), SADC differs from these regional 
organisations in some respects. First, it has a unique history, including the history of civil 
war and liberation from colonial and apartheid domination. Second, it does not have 
external security guarantees in the form of the US or any other major Western power.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss an overview of SADC in terms of its formation, 
principles, objectives, memberships and Institutions. This will be discussed in relation to 
the New Institutionalism theories. A particular attention will be paid to the interactions 
between SADC institutions and political actors, and the way in which institutional change 
occurs. There are three important concepts that will be addressed in the discussion of 
SADC’s overview. These are ‘path dependence’, ‘logic of consequences’ and ‘logic of 
appropriateness’.  
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Firstly, under HI, SADC decision emerges through a process of path dependency in 
which initial policy choices structure and restrict development. Previous SADC decisions 
and the institutions around which they are built are expected to have an impact on the 
range of positions available to political actors.  
 
Secondly, there is a rational calculation which is derived from the Rational Choice 
Institutionalist’s ‘logic of consequences’. It means that the political factors base their 
positions on calculations directed at maximising their individual benefit from SADC 
policy, thereby taking into account formal institutional constraints such as consensus 
voting.  
 
Thirdly, commitment, duties, obligations are derived from the Sociological 
Institutionalist’s ‘logic of appropriateness’. This means that the positions of the political 
factors are informed by the institutional values of the SADC, especially those of solidarity 
which commits them to act accordingly. The interaction of the actor positions with the 
institutional factors is then reflected in the SADC policy outcome. The main argument 
presented is that SADC policy has largely followed the dictates of the member states.  
In addition, the chapter analyses SADC conflict resolution system and the cooperation 
and relationship between SADC, the AU and the UN in conflict resolution. This 
cooperation and relationship presents challenges of coordination and opportunities for 
collective action. 
 
3.2 FORMATION, PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES, MEMBERSHIPS AND 
INSTITUTIONS OF SADC 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the historical roots of the SADC predecessor 
and how these impacted on the establishment of the SADC, its organisational 
structures, goals and potential for conflict resolution. The section also explores the 
manner in which the SADC has applied its principles, norms, values, powers and 
functional modalities to explain its decision-making processes during real-time conflicts. 
A particular focus will therefore be on the genesis, principles, objectives, memberships 
and institutions of SADC. 
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3.2.1 Genesis of SADC 
 
The development of SADC, like that of ECOWAS, has been shaped by the changes in 
the international system and the political dynamics of the region. SADC was established 
in 1992 through a merger of the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The FLS and the SADCC were 
established in the 1970s and 1980s respectively to deal with security cooperation and 
socio-economic development (Hull and Derblon 2009:7). As an informal political 
grouping, the FLS was established by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia while Zimbabwe joined them in 1980. The main motive for this formation was the 
political liberation of the Southern African region, including the need to oppose the 
increasing regional dependence on the South Africa’s minority white rule at that time 
(Hull and Derblon 2009:7).  
 
By 1980, the SADCC was established by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe as a development aid 
coordination mechanism. This mechanism was part of the FLS’s strategy to economic 
liberation of the Southern African region. The main goals of SADCC at inception were to 
reduce economic dependence, particularly but not only on apartheid South Africa; foster 
regional integration and to promote resource mobilisation. However, none of these goals 
was the SADCC particularly successful (Bawer and Taylor 2011:357). 
 
However, the independence of Namibia in the early 1990s and the end of apartheid in 
South Africa in 1994 put an end to the struggle against colonialism in the region. At the 
continental level, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action9 was reaffirmed in 1991 in Abuja when 
the African Economic Community (AEC) was established. Therefore, the FLS was 
disbanded and the SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992 by the Treaty in 
Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August 1992 (Burgess 2009:2). SADC was established as an 
international organisation with a legal personality, capacity and power to enter into 
                                                            
9 The Lagos Plan of Action officially the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000 was an 
Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) backed plan to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency. 
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contracts, acquire, own or dispose of movable or immovable property and to sue and be 
sued (SADC 1992: article 3).  
 
Unlike its predecessor, SADC was aimed at forging deeper economic cooperation and 
integration to respond to the new socio-economic, political and security imperatives. In 
line with this, it has adopted two strategic plans to achieve its mission: Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003 and Strategic Indicative Plan of 
the Organ (SIPO) in 2004. In contrast to the ECOWAS, SADC has clearly stated its 
economic and security objectives. 
 
Since its establishment, SADC has made efforts to achieve development and integration 
in political, economic, social and security areas.  The formation of the SADC OPDS in 
1996 is among its achievement.  However, the SADC OPDS was more or less dormant 
due to among others, the political tension between Mandela Chair of the SADC body 
and Mugabe Chair of the SADC Organ, up until 2001, all member state’s leaders made 
an effort to renew and improve the Organ (Francis 2006:193). 
 
In 2001, the 1992 SADC Treaty was amended due to the end of Cold War and the 
collapse of apartheid. The amendment heralded the overhaul of the structures, policies 
and procedures of SADC, a process that is still ongoing. One of the changes of SADC 
institutional structure was that political and security cooperation was institutionalised in 
the Organ on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation (OPDSC) (Isaksen and 
Tjonneland 2001:6). Therefore, the SADC Treaty was amended to take into account 
these institutional changes. SADC has become a more coherent organisation than it 
was before, yet it still suffers from a lack of human capital and financial resources, which 
exacerbates problems of implementation (Van der Vleuten and Hulse 2013:9). 
 
3.2.2 Principles and Objectives of SADC 
 
The Treaty endows SADC with objectives, principles, structure, functions and power of 
execution. The principles and objectives of SADC are very ambitious and 
comprehensive than those of its predecessors. For example, Article 4 of SADC Treaty 
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(1992) enumerates principles, which SADC and its member states must act in 
accordance with. The following are SADC principles:  
 
- Sovereign equality of all member states; 
- solidarity, peace and security; 
- human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 
- equity, balance and mutual benefit; and 
- peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC Treaty 1992: Article 4). 
 
In addition, SADC members have agreed to cooperate in a number of areas including 
politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security (Cilliers 1999:11). 
However, this cooperation is affected by both the lack of political will among member 
and common values.   
 
According to Ndlovu (2013:54), SADC’s ultimate objective is to build a developed, 
prosperous and peaceful community through regional integration, guided by a vision of a 
common future. The specific objectives of SADC, as stated in Article 5(I) of the SADC 
treaty are to:  
 
- Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration; 
- evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
- promote and defend peace and security; 
- promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and 
the interdependence of member states; 
- achieve complementarily between national and regional strategies and 
programmes; 
- promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the 
region; 
- achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment; and 
64 
- strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the people of the region.  
 
These objectives are to be achieved through increased regional integration built on the 
principles as noted above. Thus, it is clear that SADC has economic, political and 
security objectives, but there is more emphasis today on the political and security 
objectives than on the economic objectives. 
 
3.2.3 SADC Membership 
 
When the SADC Treaty of 1992 was signed, SADC had ten member states. The five 
subsequent members joined between 1994 and 2005. Today, SADC is a sub-regional 
integration organisation composed of fifteen member states that have great differences 
in cultural, ethnic and colonial backgrounds. They also differ in terms of their political 
structures and economic developments, but share a strong post-colonial legacy. The 
particularity of SADC is that it consists of member states in and outside of the Southern 
African region. This includes the DRC10, which might be termed an ‘outsider’ state in 
terms of SADC’s categorisation. The DRC became a member of SADC in 1998. Some 
argue that the admission of the DRC at the insistence of South Africa into SADC was an 
error because the DRC is a nation that presents a number of problems for SADC 
(Cilliers 1998:28; Ngoma 2005:141; Oosthuizen 2006:81).  
 
According to Oosthuizen (2006:81), the DRC’s admission into SADC in mid-1998 was 
not destined to be as problematic as it turned out to be. The SADC Summit noted that it 
‘has major strategic significance to the region because the country shares borders with 
several SADC countries and has great potential to cooperate with SADC in key sectors 
such as energy, water, tourism, transport and communication’. For these reasons, it is 
clear that the admission of the DRC into SADC was based on economic and 
geostrategic interests. However, shortly after its accession, the DRC slid back into war 
                                                            
10Angola, Madagascar and Tanzania also lie outside of the AU’s regional definition of Southern Africa. 
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and soon divided SADC between members preferring negotiations and those for a 
military solution for the resolution of conflict.   
 
Laurent Kabila appealed to the SADC for assistance, in the early stages of the Second 
War. A meeting of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee in Harare on 18 
August 1998, declared a decision to defend Kabila’s regime. Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Angola, chose to intervene with the military and deployed the SADC Allied Armed forces 
(SADC-AAF). However, South Africa (the chair of SADC then) supported by Botswana, 
Mozambique and Tanzania adopted a different approach, advocating dialogue and 
negotiation. This was probably to limit division within SADC in pursuit for a united front. 
The SADC Summit meeting in Mauritius in September 1998 endorsed the positions 
represented by both South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006:614).  
 
The deployment in the DRC of SADC AAF leads to the question of interests and 
preferences of member states. The question is which interests came first in SADC 
decision-making processes, the institutions or its individual member states interests? 
Whose interests are the most important: the collective interest of SADC member states 
or the individual interests or preferences?  
 
Differences in preferences can be found between democratic states and non-democratic 
states, between pacifists and militarists and between old and the new member states. 
Isaksen and Tjonneland (2001:43) note that the reality is that not more than half of the 
regional states can be said to have their democratic credentials intact. SA together with 
Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles could be said to be the most 
democratic of the SADC states. Zimbabwe together with Angola, Namibia and the DRC 
may be viewed as least democratic (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001:43).The outcomes on 
SADC policy seem to present compromises between these positions, with considerable 
exceptions to the actual SADC rules. SADC states participate in military interventions for 
reasons of national and personal interests rather than humanitarian reasons or out of a 
primary interest in preserving regional stability. It is clear that national and personal 
interests come first in SADC decision-making processes. This was also the case in 
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Lesotho in 1998. In line with this, SADC is determined by the ‘logic of consequences’, 
which informs the preferences and strategies of political actors. 
 
3.2.4 SADC Institutional Structure 
 
When SADC was formed in 1992, its member states decided to create an institutional 
framework in order to execute the new mandate of the new organisation. As mentioned 
earlier, the 1992 SADC structure was amended. Under the new framework SADC now 
consists of the following structures: The Summit of Heads of State and Government; The 
Troika; the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; the Council of 
Ministers; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Standing Committee of Officials; 
the Secretariat; the Tribunal (currently suspended) and the SADC National Committees 
(SADC 2001: Article 9). 
 
3.2.4.1 The Summit of Heads of State and Government 
 
The Summit is the top hierarchical structure of SADC which consists of the heads of 
State and government of the member countries. As a supreme institution, the Summit is 
responsible for the general direction and control of the functions of SADC and the 
achievement of its objectives (SADC 1992: article 10). The Summit meets twice a year 
in August and September within member states, where a new Chairperson and Deputy 
are elected. 
 
The decisions of the Summit are adopted by consensus and are binding. However, the 
use of consensus by the Summit has compromised its functions, for example, the issues 
surrounding Zimbabwe’s refusal to accept the decision of the Tribunal ruling in relation 
to rights violated during its controversial land reform program. The Zimbabwean 
government rejected this ruling, challenging its legality and lobbied the Summit to 
suspend the Tribunal. The Summit sided with Zimbabwe and suspended the Tribunal 
(Saurombe 2012:459). It is clear that for the decision to be endorsed by the Summit, 
Zimbabwe will have to support it.  
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In addition, President Mugabe clung on to power by means of fraudulent elections 
(Cawthra 2010:29). SADC Summit remained silent on issues of human rights abuses 
and failed to exercise any criticism of electoral processes, congratulating President 
Mugabe after the election. SADC also sought to protect President Mugabe from any 
external action as a result of his actions. For example, following the Commonwealth 
decision to suspend Zimbabwe in March 2002, SADC through Lesotho as Chair of the 
SADC Organ issued the following statement:  
 
“we wish to voice our strong disagreement with the decision not to allow 
Zimbabwe back into the Councils of the Commonwealth as reflected in the Abuja 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) Statement on 
Zimbabwe. We are concerned that the matter of Zimbabwe’s participation seems 
to have been prejudged, considering the pronouncements made by some 
members prior to the finalisation of this matter” (Africa News Service 2003).  
 
This leads to the question of what common values are shared by SADC states. 
Solidarity became the dominant ‘logic of appropriateness’ in SADC. It is clear that SADC 
is determined by the ‘logic of appropriateness’.  
 
Despite these developments, Zimbabwe continued to participate in SADC activities. On 
the contrary, in the case of Madagascar, SADC Summit took a clearer stance, where it 
refused to recognise the leaders of the coup in 2009 and therefore the country was 
suspended from all SADC institutions. It is clear that the Summit decisions have given 
rise to serious concerns about the rule of law in the organisation. 
 
3.2.4.2 The Troika 
 
The Troika system consists of the Chair, the Incoming Chair and the Outgoing Chair of 
SADC. It has been effective since its establishment by the Summit during its meeting 
held in Maputo (Mozambique) in August 1999. According to Article 9(1), the Troika 
system operates at the level of the Summit, the Organ on Politics, the Defence and 
Security, Council and Standing Committee of Senior Officials. Other member states may 
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be co-opted into the Troika when necessary. This system has enabled the organization 
to execute tasks and implement decisions expeditiously, as well as provide policy 
direction to SADC Institutions.  
 
3.2.4.3 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
 
The OPDSC or the Organ is the body of SADC responsible for the maintenance of 
peace and security. It was formally established in its present form by the SADC Treaty, 
and is now clearly an institution of SADC (Oosthuizen 2006: 213). Interestingly, this 
Organ has been endowed with objectives, principles, the structure and functions in its 
Protocol adopted in 2001.  
 
According to Article 2 of the Protocol, the general objective of the Organ is to promote 
peace and security in the region. Its specific objectives are to:  
 
- Protect the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, 
intra- and inter-state conflict and aggression; 
- promote political co-operation among state parties and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions; 
- develop regional coordination and co-operation on matters related to security and 
defence, and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end; 
- prevent, contain and resolve intra - and inter-state conflict by peaceful means; 
- consider enforcement action in accordance with international law as a matter of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed; 
- consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact to respond to external military threats; and  
- develop peacemaking capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the 
participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping 
operations (Ndlovu 2013: 62). 
 
These objectives can be further placed into five broad categories: military and defence 
cooperation, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights (Malan and 
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Cilliers 1997).The SADC Organ is consistent with the principle of the SADC 
organisation. To execute its mandate, the SADC Organ needs to get consent of member 
states. 
 
The Protocol also provides an elaborate structure and functions of the Organ. It 
comprises a Chairperson of the Organ; The Troika; a Ministerial Committee; an Inter-
State Politics and Diplomacy (ISPDC); an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC); and sub-structures established by any of the ministerial committees. 
 
The SADC Summit elects the Chairperson of the Organ for a term of one year. The 
Chairperson is responsible for the overall policy direction and achievement of the 
objectives of the Organ (SADC 2001: article 4.4). Decisions are taken in consultation 
with the Troika of the Organ and the SADC Summit. This means that the OPDSC has 
lost its erstwhile independence (Solomom 2004). The OPDSC operates on a Troika 
chairing system. This is the same as the overall SADC.  
 
The ISPDC comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs from SADC member 
states and is mandated to perform such functions as may be necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC (which is a former 
FLS structure) consists of the ministers responsible for defence, public security and 
state security and performs the functions necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Organ relating to defence and security. The ISDSC meets at a ministerial level and have 
three sub-committees, namely, defence sub-committee, public security sub-committee 
and state security sub-committee. The Ministerial Committee responsible for the co-
ordination of the work of the Organ and its structure consists of all the above ministers. It 
reports to the Chair of the Organ. The ISPDC and ISDSC also report directly to the 
Chairperson of the Organ. 
 
Compared to the OPDS that was based on the strength of a Summit Communiqué, there 
are now legal documents. The legal documents governing activities of the Organ are the 
SADC Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, SIPO and the 
Mutual Defence Pact. SIPO adopted in 2004 and revised in 2010, is a broad five year 
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plan setting out strategies and activities for the implementation of the objectives set out 
in the Protocol. Finally, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2004 guides the 
implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. 
 
In addition, the OPDSC is based on a combined structure of the FLS and the OSCE’s 
Troika system, with a very broad mandate covering two areas of cooperation in politics, 
and peace and security (Osei-Hwedie 2002:158).  This is a positive development within 
the structure because it reinforces notions of a holistic, expanded and integrated 
security and prevents abuse (Solomon 2004:26).  
 
Therefore, SADC OPDSC functions like a Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the 
Africa Union and the Troika as the executive arm. The Summit, OPDSC and Secretariat 
played the role in prevention, management and resolution of conflict in SADC region. 
Even the OPDSC, whose mandate is to promote peace and security in the region, does 
not seem to have the capacity to take binding decisions (Oosthuizen 2006). 
 
3.2.4.4 The Council of Ministers (COM) 
 
The Council of Ministers consists of at least one minister from each of the member 
states; normally the one responsible for foreign affairs and economic planning or 
finance. It is responsible for overseeing the functioning of SADC and implementation of 
the policies and execution of programmes. It advises the Summit on matters of overall 
policy and the development of SADC, approves policies, strategies and work 
programmes of SADC (SADC1992: article 11). The Council meets four times a year in 
January and before summit in August or September and is chaired by the same country 
that currently chairs SADC. 
 
3.2.4.5 The Integrated Committee of Ministers  
 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers is a new institution aimed at ensuring policy 
guidance, coordination and harmonisation of cross-sectorial activities. The Committee 
consists of at least two ministers from each of the Member States with a mandate to 
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meet, at least, once a year and is responsible to the Council. It oversees the activities of 
the four core areas of integration according to Article 13 of the SADC Treaty (1992). 
 
3.2.4.6 The Standing Committee of officials  
 
The real functioning units of SADC are the Standing Committee of officials. According to 
Article 13 of the SADC Treaty of 2001, the Standing Committee of officials consists of 
one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member states, 
preferably from a ministry responsible for economic planning or finance. The Standing 
Committee makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers and the Council in turn 
makes recommendations to the Summit. They function as a technical advisory 
committee to the Council of Ministers. 
 
3.2.4.7 The Secretariat 
 
The SADC Secretariat, located in Gaborone, Botswana, is the principal administrative 
and executive institution responsible for the general servicing of and liaison with SADC 
institutions and coordination of the execution of the tasks of SADC (SADC Treaty 1992: 
Art 14). It is headed by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the Summit for a 
once renewable four year term. There are two Deputy Executive Secretaries under the 
Executive Secretary who function at the level of regional integration and finance and 
administration.  
 
3.2.4.8 The SADC Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal is the judicial arm of SADC established in 1992 by Article 16 of the SADC 
Treaty. Among its tasks, is to ensure adherence to, and proper interpretation of the 
provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate upon 
disputes, referred to it (SADC Treaty 1992: Article 16). The “Summit and Tribunal are 
the only institutions whose decisions are expressly described by the SADC Treaty as 
binding, though it does not say on whom” (Oosthuizen 2006:168). However, the Summit 
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suspended the power of the Tribunal in August 2010 and commissioned a review of its 
mandate and jurisdiction.  
 
3.2.4.9 SADC National Committees (SNC) 
 
These Committees are composed of key stakeholders notably from government, private 
sector and civil society in member states. Their main purpose is to “ensure broad and 
effective participation” by key stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation 
(SADC Secretariat 2001). SADC National Committees are also responsible for the 
initiation, implementation and monitoring of projects. The Committees meet at least four 
times a year (SADC 2001: article 16). 
 
The institutional structure of SADC has gradually been formalised, to some extent 
inspired by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Troika 
system) and the European Union (EU). In contrast to the EU, the SADC institutional 
structure is not supranational because it is not independent of the influence of the 
member states. Clearly, SADC is an intergovernmental organisation primarily 
responsible to its member states, while at the same time, it struggles to achieve its 
norms within the framework of its missions and objectives. It operates on the basis of 
highly decentralised structure, for example, each member states continues to have the 
responsibility for coordinating one or more sectors. Decision making is centralised within 
the Summit Heads of State and government, whose decisions the secretariat is 
expected to implement, though it has no enforcement or monitoring capacity.  
 
However, the current reality within the organisation is that some of the residual attitudes 
inherited from the SADC’s predecessor are still prevalent within the structures of the 
institution. Hull and Derblon (2009:11) state that the legacy from the FLS is still affecting 
decisions as internal member state relations renders SADC institutions inefficient 
sometimes. Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:11) also note that SADC is effectively a 
‘club of states’ and functions on the basis of ‘sovereign equality’ and on the principle of 
‘non-interference in internal affairs’. This is illustrated in SADC Security area, the fact 
that the SADC’s predecessor, the SADCC deliberately excluded political and security 
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issues from its agenda, concentrating on economic development; and security issues 
were the preserve of the FLS. This functional division initially continued with the 
foundation of SADC, and consequently the SADC Organ was affected until 2001. For 
example when SADC Summit decided to integrate SADC OPDS into SADC body, and 
transformed it into the SADC OPDSC. In line with this, SADC’s development policy is 
determined by path dependence. In the next part, I analyse the SADC as actor in conflict 
resolution. 
 
3.3 SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The SADC plays a conflict resolution role in the sub-region, whereby the Southern 
African region’s history was dominated by apartheid, civil wars, colonialism ideological 
and proxy wars, including secessionist wars, mutiny and election disputes (Baregu 2003; 
Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk 2004). However, it is argued that Southern African peace 
and security have deteriorated rapidly (Solomon 1998:385). The region as a whole faced 
many violent conflicts in the period between 1995 and 2003, specifically in countries 
such as Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
(Nathan 2006:611). 
 
In this regard, the SADC leaders established the OPDS or the Organ as a cooperative 
mechanism for collective security and peace in the region. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
SADC through its OPDSC plays an important role in the area of conflict resolution within 
both the Southern African region and in Central Africa. The purpose of this section is to 
analyse the SADC conflict resolution system by addressing its evolution and capabilities 
as a viable conflict resolution actor. 
 
3.3.1 Evolution of SADC’s conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
The role of SADC’s Organ in conflict resolution evolved in response to the changes in 
the international system, the SADC’s own internal political dynamics and its capacity and 
willingness to play a major role in conflicts (Ndlovu 2013:60). Cooperation in politics, 
defence and security in the region can be traced back to the creation of the FLS in 1975. 
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The FLS was politically responding to PW Botha’s apartheid government in South Africa. 
The FLS played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle and an ending of apartheid and 
racial regimes in the Southern African region (Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk 2004:4).  
 
In addition, the FLS functioned as a quasi-collective regime. As Cawthra (2010:2) noted, 
the FLS had operated much as a ‘club of presidents’ and there was some resistance to 
any institutionalisation. At least, to institutionalise their defence and security cooperation, 
the FLS established the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) to serve 
as a mechanism for defence and security (Ndlovu 2013:60). At the time the ISDSC was 
chaired by Zimbabwe and the FLS by Tanzania. 
 
The ISDSC became institutionalised, but remained informal forum bringing together 
ministers responsible for state security, defence, home affairs and internal security to 
address issues relating to national and collective security and defence (Francis 
2006:188). However, the independence of South Africa in 1994 signalled the end of the 
FLS as it had accomplished its mission but its ISDSC was retained (Osei-Hwedie 
2002:157). This is due to the fact that the ISDSC has shown success in its functional 
area of cooperation, defence and security (Van Nieuwkerk 2001:7). In 2001, the ISDSC 
and its sub-committees were incorporated into the SADC Organ. 
 
With the end of the FLS, members felt the need for another security framework to make 
policy and to coordinate their efforts to tackle problems of peace and security. Hence, 
they proposed the creation of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as a 
successor to the FLS. At a meeting held in Harare in March 3, 1995, the SADC Foreign 
Ministers agreed that ASAS be established as the political arm of SADC that will focus 
on conflict prevention, management and resolution. It was to be a new-look FLS with 
informal and flexible modus operandi, operating independently outside of the SADC 
secretariat, and would report directly to the SADC Summit (Francis 2006:191).  
 
It was also envisaged that ASAS would incorporate two specialised SADC sectors, one 
dealing with political affairs and the other with military security. As with its predecessor, 
the FLS, the foreign ministry of the country that would chair it would assume the 
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responsibility of servicing the ASAS. However, the ASAS proposal was rejected at the 
SADC Summit meeting in August 1995 in Johannesburg. One of the reasons for its 
rejection was that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs needed more time to consult their 
Ministers of Defence and Security (SADC Communiqué 1995:3). 
 
Having moved away from the ASAS, SADC leadership agreed at Gaborone in June 
1996 to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), which by 
inheritance was chaired by Zimbabwe, while South Africa chaired the SADC body. It was 
declared that ‘the OPDS is the appropriate institutional framework by which SADC 
countries would coordinate their policies and activities in the area of policy, defence and 
security (SADC 1996:2). The Organ is a security mechanism similar to that of the 
Security Council within the UN, or the AU’s Peace and Security Council. It has a 
cooperative mechanism for collective security and peace to deal with conflict at the 
regional and international levels. 
 
However, the SADC Summit Communiqué did not explicitly specify whether the OPDS 
was a SADC body or not. It states that the mechanism operates at the summit, 
ministerial and technical levels and functions independently of other SADC structures, 
and would incorporate the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the 
Frontline States (FLS) (SADC Communiqué 1996). This presupposed that SADC has 
two chairpersons, one for SADC as regional body and the other for the OPDS.  No 
institutional mechanism was established to harmonise or to coordinate the work between 
the SADC and the OPDS. 
 
In the five years between 1996 and 2001, this mechanism never became operational 
(Malan 1998:3) and a variety of problems erupted. First, there was the issue of the 
permanency of the chair of the OPDS. Zimbabwe’s President was appointed the first 
chair of the Organ. Despite the fact that the chair was to rotate annually, he managed to 
secure himself as chair for an additional four years until 2001 when SADC Summit 
forced him to give up the position. Second, there was the problem that the OPDS 
functioned independently of the SADC. Indeed, President Mugabe wanted the Organ to 
have its own Summit, while President Mandela of South Africa wanted it to be integrated 
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within only one Summit for the whole of SADC. The third set of problems confronting the 
SADC OPDS revolved around a weak organisational structure incapacitated by a 
shortage of financial resources, poor political direction and a dearth of skilled 
professionals (Solomon 2004:184). 
 
During this period, the military interventions in Lesotho and in the DRC in 1998 have 
caused controversy among the member states (Zacarias 2003: 43). Furthermore, in the 
matter of the resolution of conflict, the lack of cooperation between SADC Chair, South 
Africa, and its OPDS Chair, Zimbabwe, was exposed in these interventions. Since both 
have their own strategic and national interests and political objectives, they obviously 
orientated the OPDS’s discussions to achieve their goals. Finally, these interventions 
clearly showed how national and personal interests became intertwined. 
 
The matter was only resolved in  Maputo Summit in August 2001 with the adoption of a 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in which it was made clear that 
the OPDS functions as a SADC substructure and report to the Summit. The SADC 
OPDS was transformed into the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, Security and 
Cooperation (OPDSC) (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001:6). 
 
3.3.2 Capacities of SADC in conflict resolution 
 
Much has been written on the capacity of SADC as a viable conflict resolution actor in 
the sub-region (Nathan 2006; Essuman 2009; Hull and Derblon 2009).  The elements of 
capacity in this context include organisational capacity, resource capacity, and 
operational experience. Organisational capacity refers to the mandate and organic 
structure; resource capacity is related to the financial and human assets; and 
operational experience encapsulates the procedural ability of SADC to undertake action 
in conflict resolution.  
 
As shown in Chapter 2, SADC through SADC OPDSC has made progress in its capacity 
to respond to political conflicts in the region despite its limitations. A two-fold approach 
has been used by the SADC OPDSC to deal with problems of peace and security such 
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as peacekeeping (military action) and peacemaking (mediation). The commitment is that 
SADC OPDSC will continue to play a prominent role in promoting peace and security in 
the region. To strengthen its capacity effectively, the SADC OPDSC has created several 
units, most notably the SADC Early Warning System, the SADC Mediation and SADC 
Standby Brigade. 
 
3.3.2.1 SADC Early Warning System  
 
According to Zacarias (2003:31), the SADC OPDSC has placed particular emphasis on 
the issue of conflict prevention and the anticipation of conflicts at an early stage.  
However, this has failed to prevent conflict in the sub-region. The reason is that the 
SADC OPDSC did not have a clear strategic vision to address the insecurity facing the 
region. To this effect, SADC established the Early Warning System (EWS) in 2010 with 
the tasks of providing for the collection and analysis of information on any real or 
potential crisis to inform response strategies. The SADC EWS consists of an analysis 
room and monitoring centre located at the Secretariat in Gaborone, which is also known 
as ‘the Situation Room’. It operates through a network of in-country centres that feed a 
central system in Gaborone, International Crisis Group (2012:12). 
 
The EWS, which is intended to assist the SADC OPDSC, is still crippled by various 
weaknesses. First, the slow establishment of national centres has hindered effective 
implementation of the regional EWS. Second, the exclusion of civil society groups 
suggests that the EWS has adopted a state-centric approach to conflict resolution. 
Third, the lack of political will by SADC member states to make the EWS more effective 
because they have different interests and agenda. Fourth, lack of adequate finances 
and resources (human and material) is impeding the development of the system and 
finally, the lack of coordination from early warning to early action, International Crisis 
Group (2012:12).  
 
Because of these weaknesses, the SADC EWS has not yet functioned as an operational 
pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Despite the SADC OPDSC 
set up, criticisms have been made that the EWS has failed to detect and raise alarm 
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about new conflict in the region. For example, it could not prevent the social protest and 
heavy-handedness by security forces in Malawi and Swaziland in 2011. This was a 
result of weak preventive diplomacy, International Crisis Group (2012:13). Therefore, it 
is clear that the principle of sovereignty, non-intervention and the lack of coordination 
continue to impose constraints on the ability of SADC to intervene at an early stage. 
 
3.3.2.2 SADC Mediation Unit 
 
In 2010 the SADC OPDSC established a mediation unit to strengthen its peacemaking 
capacity to deal with conflicts within and among member states, which had first been 
mooted in 2004. Over the years, this Organ has been on an ad hoc basis with eminent 
leaders of Southern Africa being called upon to intervene in troubled countries. 
 
After a six year lag, leaders of SADC have come to realise that the mediation unit is an 
important tool for politics and diplomacy in the region.  It established the structure of the 
SADC Mediation unit, consisting of Panel of Elders to provide leadership in mediation 
missions which is tasked with using its expert knowledge and moral authority to 
persuade various actors to resolve their conflicts peacefully. The Panel is supported by a 
Mediation Reference Group to deliver expertise in conflict resolution and is administered 
by a Mediation Support Unit for logistical support and technical issues (Hartmann 
2013:8). This provides an opportunity for the involvement of civil society to participate as 
technical team. As a technical team, it ideally comprises experts and not exclusively 
politicians and their appointees. As mentioned earlier, mediation is a strategic diplomatic 
tool.  However, the SADC refuses external support in areas that are designated as 
strategic, as it believes members should only own and fund such areas. One of the 
interviewees noted that SADC’s budget was inadequate to cover planned peace and 
security activities (interview with SADC official). 
 
Finally, the SADC’s mediation structure is based on core principles that guide SADC-led 
mediation missions in line with the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (Hartmann 
2013:8). These include the ownership of agreements with the conflict parties, the 
ultimate goal of a restoration of relationships, flexibility and adaptability of interventions, 
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impartiality in engagement with the parties, inclusiveness of presenting both conflict 
issues and root causes and acceptability of the mediator to all parties (Hartmann 
2013:8). 
 
Despite this structure, a range of challenges confronts the SADC mediation. Among 
these challenges is the slow pace in the implementation and operationalisation of the 
SADC mediation’s unit.  This is due to lack of adequate finances and resources. Clearly, 
the SADC Mediation unit appears to have had a slow start due to a delay in its 
operationalisation and its capacity.  
 
3.3.2.3 SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) 
 
Since its intervention in the conflicts that occurred in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998, the 
SADC region has not experienced new military interventions. These interventions have 
been constrained by its limited peacekeeping experience. In this regard, the leaders of 
the region launched the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) in 2007. It was later 
renamed the SADC Standby Force (SSF) in accordance with Article 13 of the Protocol, 
July 2002 establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (Hull and Derblon 2009:10).  
 
This brigade comprises of a civilian and police component (SADCPOL), as part of the 
AU African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed. The aims of the brigade are to deploy 
peacekeeping operations in the SADC region, including enforcement tasks and to carry 
out complex multifunctional peace support operations. All member states have made 
specific pledges of troops contribution to the brigade (Cawthra 2010:11).  
 
Additionally, the brigade is firstly supported by the Regional Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (RPTC) located in Harare (Zimbabwe) which offers training and research for 
peace support operations. Various training exercises have been carried out to test the 
brigade’s effectiveness. Most recently, Exercise Golfino11, a joint exercise with 7,000 
                                                            
11 Exercise Golfino is a multinational peacekeeping operation with over 7000 participants from different security 
forces and support elements of Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, SA, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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troops from twelve countries, was held in South Africa in September 2009. Secondly, a 
Planning Element (PLANELM) has been established at the SADC secretariat in 
Gaborone and the command, control and logistics arrangements were also put in place 
to provide logistical, planning, assessment and operational support to the Standby 
Force. Despite these efforts, the lack of coordination with other components of the 
Organ contributes to strained political-military relations within SADC, International Crisis 
Group (2012:18-19). 
 
SADC has created the SADCBRIG (SADC Standby Brigade) as a tool to intervene 
rapidly in a SADC member state in order to restore peace and security under UN or AU 
mandate. However, it should be noted that the planning and preparations of the 
SADCBRIG do cater for deployment under the mandating authority of SADC Summit, 
Baker and Maeresera (2009:107). For example, in 2008 an extra-ordinary SADC 
Summit decided that SADC would immediately deploy a team of military experts to 
assess the situation and would dispatch the SADC Monitoring Commission to monitor 
the border between DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda (SADC Secretariat 2008). This 
intervention was not designed as a peace enforcement mission, but rather as monitoring 
mission. As Boshoff12 (2008:1) explains, SADC did not sent peacekeeping troops in 
Eastern DRC despite continued fighting because “it did not have the military capacity as 
yet for robust action and it was difficult to see where the troops would come from within 
such a short notice”. 
 
Despite some progress, SADC Standby Brigade is confronted by a range of challenges 
including issues of availability of pledged forces, interoperability, lack of logistics, the 
slow progress in the development of civilian capacities and lack of adequate resources 
(interview with SADC official). Clearly, the Standby Force has not yet been adequately 
prepared for engaging in complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions. Multi-
dimensional peacekeeping is usually undertaken when the conflict has degenerated to 
the point where it can be described as experiencing grave circumstances or war crimes, 
human rights abuses and crimes against humanity.  
                                                            
12IRIN interview, Military analyst at the South African-based Think-Tank, ISS, 11 November 2008 
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However, it is clear that the SADC OPDSC unit faces several political, technical, 
administrative and implementation challenges. Some of these challenges are 
symptomatic of the SADC system. For Nathan (2006:605), the main challenge of the 
SADC system is the absence of common political values among member states which 
inhibits the development of trust, common policies, institutional cohesion and unified 
responses to crises. Therefore, these challenges vary from inadequate human and 
financial resources to technical issues and the SADC’s institutional’s mandate. Although, 
in reality these problems are neither exhaustive nor permanent, the failure to address 
them could significantly constrain the effectiveness of the SADC Organ.  
 
The performance of SADC OPDSC and its effective participation in conflict resolution in 
SADC region depends on several factors that can be summarised as follows:  
- The coherence of the SADC as an actor: the division of labour between SADC 
Summit and OPDSC often makes the actions of SADC uncoordinated;  
- the perception of the SADC by the different parties in a conflict: the SADC’s 
strength depends on its image as perceived by the parties in the conflict. Another 
important factor is the way the membership is seen by the various actors as a 
means to achieve their own goals; 
- the viability of the membership perspective: the SADC’s viability depends on its 
image as perceived by its members. The divergence of SADC member states is 
that some countries regard SADC as an economic grouping and others as a 
Security and Defence forum. This has led to the perception of two rival blocs 
within the organization, the pacifist bloc and militarist bloc; 
- the range of instruments or mechanism applied: the effectiveness of the SADC 
OPDSC depends on the combination of instruments for conflict resolution such as 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building; and 
- the cooperation with other factors and their role in the conflict: the future success 
of the SADC OPDSC depends on how well it is able to develop relationships with 
the UN and the AU, as well as on how well it develops political cooperation in the 
Organ (Coppieters et al. 2005). 
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From the above analysis of the capacities of SADC in conflict resolution, it is possible to 
conclude that in terms of the organisational capacity, the SADC OPDSC functions like a 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the Africa Union and has a coherent mandate. In 
terms of resource capacity, the SADC members have not yet provided it with adequate 
resources in the form of finance, personnel or peacekeeping because all SADC 
countries depend on external support at different levels.  
 
Finally in terms of operational experience or interventions in conflict situations, SADC 
track record is mixed. This means that SADC’s intervention did not reach the expected 
results yet, but it has not failed. For instance, SADC’s intervention in Lesotho was led by 
Botswana and SA which proved to be successful because it restored constitutional order 
and compelled the military to stay out of political processes. In the DRC, SADC initially 
struggled to preserve its internal cohesion and this division undermined its actions. 
However, SADC was able to resolve internal disagreements later on and became a 
major role player in the DRC peace process. Compared to the OPDC before it, the 
OPDSC can be described as productive, efficient and cooperate institution. The next 
section will analyse the cooperation between SADC, the AU and the UN in conflict 
resolution in the SADC region. 
 
3.4 COOPERATION BETWEEN SADC, THE AU AND THE UN IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
 
The UN, the AU and the SADC are actively engaged in promoting peace, security and 
stability in the SADC region. However, the cooperation between these bodies in conflict 
resolution presents challenges of coordination. It is important to note that the UNSC has 
been conferred with the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security in the world (UN Charter 1945: Article 51) and SADC recognizes the primacy of 
the UN and the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security in Southern 
Africa and Africa in general. The objective of this section is to analyse the cooperation 
and relationship between SADC, the AU and the UN in conflict resolution. 
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3.4.1 Cooperation between SADC and the UN 
 
The UN and SADC may cooperate to prevent, manage and resolve conflict in SADC 
region. Article 53(1) of the UN charter confers the UN Security Council with the ultimate 
responsibility to order military intervention in a member state to maintain international 
peace and security. Consequently, the SADC military interventions in conflicts have to 
receive prior authorisation from the UN to secure legitimacy.  
 
Most importantly, the legal basis for such cooperation is enshrined in Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter that recognises the possibility of regional organisations such as SADC to 
take appropriate action over matters relating to international peace and security because 
such activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN (Gambari 2003). 
The forms that cooperation is taking in the context of maintaining peace and security 
are: 
- Consultation and Diplomatic Support: all peace agreements relating to recent 
conflicts in the SADC region have been negotiated under the coordinated and 
collaborative action of SADC, the AU and the UN, for example, in Angola, DRC, 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe;  
- Operational Support: the very important DDR components of peace support 
operations, as well as capacity-building and post-conflict elections, have always 
been conducted under the auspices of the UN but in consultation with SADC.  
Angola and DRC are practical examples; and  
- Co-deployment and Joint Operations: SADC has intervened in conflicts in SADC 
region to create the necessary conditions for the deployment of UN peacekeeping 
missions. A case in point is the SADC AAF mission in the DRC (Boutros-Ghali 
1995). 
 
These initiatives have helped to forge a reasonable working relationship between the 
UN and SADC in the peace and security sector. It is, however, important to note that in 
spite of these positive developments of cooperation in conflict resolution, there is a lack 
of clarity on the authorisation for intervention and engagement between the SADC 
Mutual Defence Pact and the UN Charter, which leads to questions of prioritisation. For 
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example, Article 6(4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) states that the AU and 
the UN Security Council need to be notified soon after a military response by member 
states. A case in point is the SADC AAF mission in DRC. This intervention has failed to 
obtain prior authorisation from the UN Security Council as required by Chapter VIII of the 
Charter, but it has a mandate from SADC. This contradiction is seen as a legal tension 
that may impede the future rapid deployment of the SADCBRIG. 
 
Clearly, SADC has been progressively developing collaborative action with the UN 
system in the area of conflict resolution. Although both face similar challenges in 
promoting peace, security, and development, there are also particular challenges for 
each organisation.  Despite these differences, both bodies are bound to work together to 
address the challenges on the SADC region. The SADC and the UN have 
complementary roles to play in promoting development, peace and security for the 
benefit of the peoples of Southern Africa (Gambari 2003:271). 
 
3.4.2 Cooperation between SADC and the AU 
 
The AU and SADC share the goal of a peaceful and socially and economically advanced 
Africa. The framework guiding the relationship between the AU and Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) is the Protocol on relations between the AU and RECs adopted in 
July 2007 in Accra, Ghana. Collaboration and coordination of peace and security 
policies are articulated in Chapter 2, Article 7, paragraph 2(b) and Article 30 of the 
Protocol. These provisions offer the legal basis for a possible working partnership 
between AU and SADC.  
 
SADC is one of eight regional economic communities (REC’s) formally recognised by 
the AU as building blocks of an African Economic Community (AEC) and it complements 
the role of the AU (Burgess 2005:2).  Compared to other REC’s in Africa, SADC is one 
of the prominent regional cooperation bodies, particularly in the economic sphere. 
Furthermore, SADC has one main regional institution for defence and security 
cooperation, the OPDSC (Krapohl 2008: 17). 
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In addition, SADC is a subsidiary body of the AU, which gives it the right to carry out 
activities such as peacemaking and peacekeeping in terms of both Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Cawthra 2010:10). SADC forms part of the AU’s African 
Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA), and in this capacity it has established one of 
the five proposed regional brigades, SADCBRIG.    
 
The AU and SADC signed some Protocols and Treaties. For example, the AU and 
SADC support norms and principles that reject attempts on unconstitutional changes of 
government and election-related disputes or conflicts (Cawthra 2010:11). The reaction 
and responses from the AU and SADC to the conflict in the DRC (1998-2003) 
demonstrated some elements of coherence, particularly due to the fact that the two 
organisations responded on the basis of their existing norms and protocols. This is 
important because in such circumstances it is vital for key stakeholders such as the AU 
and SADC to articulate a common position, otherwise the target country can easily play 
one organisation off against the other (interview with SADC official).  
 
In addition, both the AU and SADC took a clearer stance in Madagascar’s conflict, 
where they refused to recognise the leaders of the coup in 2009, and therefore the 
country was suspended from all AU activities and in all SADC institutions. However, 
there was tension and competition in this approach pertaining to who would lead the 
mediation process because the UN, the AU and SADC all had mandates to mediate. All 
three organisations had a legitimate claim to lead the Madagascar peace process. It is 
important to note that SADC’s focus on the region gives it the natural advantage of 
having a greater understanding of issues and of being able to take the initiative. The 
most obvious example of SADC-AU tension came over the SADC’s decision to lead 
mediation in the second phase of the negotiations in 2009. Despite SADC appointing 
former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano as mediator, the AU remained formally 
in charge of the negotiation. As Vines (2013:104) pointed out, there needs to be a clear 
division of labour between AU and SADC. Ancas (2011:131) notes that the tension and 
competition between the UN, AU and SADC have limited the success of conflict 
resolution effort in establishing lasting peace. This is illustrated in the peacemaking 
action in the DRC, Madagascar and Zimbabwean cases.  
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It is clear that the relationship between the AU and SADC is evolving progressively. This 
relationship is supposed to be a hierarchical one wherein the AU harmonises and 
coordinates the activities of the SADC in the peace and security area. The principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention continues to impose constraints on the ability of the AU 
and SADC to intervene at an early stage.  
 
Therefore, in order for the SADC, the UN and the AU’s cooperation in conflict resolution 
in SADC region to function properly, it is essential for them to work together. However, 
concrete cooperation begins with information sharing and building a common 
understanding of a certain crisis. In the final analysis, it is clear that the SADC OPDSC 
has developed good working relationships with a range of relevant institutions. 
Nevertheless, there is certainly scope for these to be enhanced and some important 
details remain as work in progress. These relationships will also continue to evolve as 




This chapter presented an overview of the SADC in relation to the New Institutionalism 
theories. A particular attention was also paid to the interactions between institutions and 
political actors, and the way in which institutional change occurs. Three arguments have 
been formulated, following the three main theoretical strands of NIT.  
 
Under HI, it has been argued that the development of SADC policy can be explained by 
path dependence. The institutional factors responsible would be member states control 
of the decision-making process and consensus as the voting rule. The RCI however, has 
argued that SADC policy is determined by a ‘logic of consequences’, that is, the rational 
calculations of the political actors on how to maximise their utility from the policy. 
Consensus as the voting rule in the SADC Summit is considered the institutional factor 
that leads to a compromise which provides benefits to every member state. Under the 
SI, it has been argued that the ‘logic of appropriateness’ has the biggest impact on 
SADC policy. A commitment, duty, or obligation towards solidarity within the developed 
SADC regions would be the major institutional factor, and would inform actor positions 
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as well as the policy outcome. The main argument presented here is that SADC policy 
has largely followed the dictates of the member states. 
 
From the discussion above, it is possible to conclude that the establishment of SADC 
was an evolutionary process, which the FLS and the SADCC have undergone. 
Therefore, the formation of SADC was a culmination of a long process of 
institutionalisation. SADC is an intergovernmental organisation structured in line with 
other intergovernmental organisations such as the EU in that its membership consists of 
states represented by their governments. This chapter also discussed the SADC’s 
objectives, principles, structure, functions and powers of execution in its Treaty in order 
to understand the SADC as an institution. However, it is not independent of the influence 
of member states, its success depends largely on what individual member states 
collectively want it to achieve.  
 
Due to security challenges faced by SADC region from the 1960s to the early 1990s the 
SADC OPDSC was created within SADC framework to promote peace and security. The 
SADC Organ has a very ambitious mandate of deploying and strengthening its capacity. 
The success of its work, however, depends firstly, on internal cooperation between 
institutions where the Summit is conducting and carrying out the will of the member 
states and secondly, on cooperation with other international organizations.  
 
SADC is a subsidiary body to and a building block of both the AU and the UN collective 
security system from which it has a legitimate security role in terms of Chapter VIII of UN 
charter. In this context it has developed a good working relationship with the UN and the 
AU. The cooperation is based on the established principles. This cooperation is 
necessary to bring different interests and vision around the table to discuss the best 
possible way forward in tackling conflicts on the SADC region. The cooperation may 
become fruitful in achieving the ambitions of strengthened political partnership. In light of 
this, the division of labour between the UN, the AU and SADC in conflict resolution 
should be clarified. Therefore, the UN, the AU and SADC have complementary roles to 
play in promoting development, peace, and security for the benefit of the peoples of 
Southern Africa. The next chapter will analyse the DRC Conflict of 1998-2003.   
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CHAPTER 4 




Since the end of the Cold War, the African continent has been engulfed in intermittent 
armed and violent intra-state conflict. In most cases, these conflicts assumed 
international dimensions and they have also devastated African countries. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo13conflict is one of those conflicts with an international 
dimension and it also had impact on the neighbouring countries. Since 1996, there have 
been three civil wars and three distinct periods to the conflict, each with its own dynamic 
and complexity (Weiss and Carayannis 2005:145-158). The First Congo war  which saw 
the overthrow of President Mobutu and the coming to power of Laurent-Desire Kabila 
started in 1996 and ended in 1997; the Second Congo war, also known as ‘Africa’s 
world war’ (Prunier 2009), in which armies from at least seven African countries 
participated, erupted in1998 and officially ended in 2003 and the Third Congo war, also 
known as Kivu Conflict exploded in 2003 and despite a formal end to the war in 2003 
and an agreement by the former belligerents to create a government of national unity, 
violence still continues in the eastern region.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the DRC conflict of 1998-2003, also known as 
‘war of occupation’, ‘war of resources’ (Turner 2013) as well as ‘Africa’s world war’ 
(Prunier 2009). The second conflict started in 1998 and it had a devastating effect on the 
country. It is also considered the deadliest war after World War II with 5.4 million people 
dead (International Rescue Committee 2008). Millions more were displaced from their 
homes or sought asylum in neighbouring countries (International Rescue Committee 
2008). Therefore, the conflict was very complex and complicated due to the fact that it 
involved a number of countries on the Congolese soil. This chapter analyses the 
background, the underlying causes of conflict, the actors involved and their interests in 
the conflict. 
                                                            
13  In this study it is abbreviated as the DRC but can also be referred to as DR Congo or the Congo. 
89 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 
 
This section analyses the background of the DRC conflict. It starts by describing briefly 
the socio-economic and political-historic situation in the DRC, which is relevant for 
understanding the origins, causes and context of conflict in the country. It then provides 
a short historic overview of conflict in the DRC and the various contributing factors. 
 
The DRC, former Republic of Zaire, is located in Central Africa and is one of the largest 
countries in Africa, with nine neighbouring states, namely, Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic (CAR), Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia (see figure 1). Its geopolitical position makes the country strategically key to the 
entire Central African region and even beyond (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009:101). Most 
of these countries have witnessed civil conflicts at one time or another during the period 
1960-2002, with the exception of Zambia (Prunier 2009). For example, some recent 
conflicts in countries that border the DRC include the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, 
the Lord’s Resistance Army rebellion in Uganda, and the long-lasting civil war between 
MPLA and UNITA in Angola.  
 
The conflicts in neighbouring countries have provided politicians and rebels with 
potential military allies. In the same way, Congolese rebels were using neighbouring 
states as refuge. For example, Kabila was organising his rebellious project from the 
Tanzanian territory (Prunier 2009:73-99). Therefore, these conflicts had serious adverse 
effects on the DRC and have impacted on the stability of the Great Lakes region 
because the DRC became a combat zone. Reyntjens (2009:6) point out that “the DRC 
shares borders with nine countries, many of which have serious security issues of their 
own, it serves as a critical link between eastern and western components of what is 
referred to as Africa’s war zone”. 
 
With a population of nearly 77.4 million in 2014, the DRC is the fourth most populous 
nation in Africa, as well as the most populous officially Francophone country. The 
population of the DRC is ethnically diverse, containing more than 250 distinct ethnic 
groups from four main cultural categories, namely: the Bantu, the Sudanese, the Nilo-
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Hamitics and the Pygmies. In addition to French, which is the official language, there are 
four national languages namely, Lingala, Kikongo, Kiswahili and Tshiluba. Many 
Congolese have a strong sense of identity based on their ethnic group. Such groups 
exist in every province of the DRC. Rivalry between different ethnic groups was at the 
origin of multiple rebellions that took place in the early 1960s (Marjolein de Ridder 2013: 
29). For example, the Lumumba’s rebellion of the 1960s is an illustrative case. 
 
Economically, the country is endowed with vast natural resources and mineral wealth 
such as cobalt, copper, diamond, gold, uranium, zinc, natural gas, phosphate, 
petroleum, and a range of rare minerals. The Congo River is the second-longest river in 
Africa after the Nile and is also second in the world after the Amazon in terms of hydro-
electric potential. As Kadima and Kabemba (2000:73) point out, the DRC has enough 
hydro-electric potential to meet the continent’s needs, with its territory being completely 
dominated by the Congo River. Therefore, it could be the answer to Southern Africa’s 
water and energy crises.  
 
After its independence, the DRC was the second-most industrialised country in Africa. 
However, it is one of the poorest countries in the world today, characterised by massive 
greed and corruption. The natural resources as mentioned above were brutally exploited 
by the Belgians until its independence in 1960. President Mobutu exploited the sector for 
personal enrichment and political survival. L D. Kabila used it to fund his war efforts. 
Unfortunately, these natural resources have never been harnessed in a way to provide 
much benefit to the majority of its population (Trefon 2011: 40-41).  
 
Despite its economic potential, economic activity declined drastically during the period 
1960-2000. This is as a result of kleptocracy, instability and conflicts that characterised 
the history of the country. Regrettably, much of the conflict (1996-7, 1998-2003) has 
focused on gaining control of substantial natural resources in the country. As the UN 
panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth 
of the DRC has shown in its reports, all the parties to the conflict, including Congolese 
officials and rebels, Congo’s allies and the invaders have taken part in the pillage of the 
natural resources of the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:16). Therefore, with its resources, 
91 
vast territory and strategic location, the DRC has long served as an arena of regional 
and international competition.  
 
Politically, ever since the DRC became independent from Belgium, 30, 1960, it has been 
unstable because of the corrupt leaders, whereby history repeats itself, over again, only 
to experience the rebellions, mutinies and the unconstitutional regimes. A military coup 
d’état in 1965 by colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu backed by the Western nations, 
especially Belgium, France and the US ushered in three decades of autocratic 
government, corrupt rule and the collapse of state institutions.  
 
On 24 April 1990, Mobutu announced the political reforms including the revision of the 
constitution, the multi-party system and a one-year transition period ending in April 1991 
towards the democratisation process. This led to the convening of the National 
Sovereign Conference (CNS- Conference National Souveraine) on 7 August 1991, a 
body of 2,842 delegates taken from political parties, civic and religious organisations 
across the country that produced a widely accepted plan for transition to democracy. 
This national constitutional conference opted for a power-sharing plan with Mobutu and 
elected Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of political opposition Union for Democracy and 
Social Progress (UDPS), as interim prime minister. The ‘Acte Constitutionnel de la 
Transition de la Republique du Zaïre’ (the Transitional Constitutional Act of the Republic 
of Zaïre) was adopted in the CNS and promulgated on 9 April 1994 (Weiss and 
Carayannis 2005:145). However, this democratisation process weakened the Mobutu 
regime.  
 
The weakening of Mobutu’s regime encouraged the emergence of a rebellion in eastern 
Congo in 1995. Consequently, he was ousted by an armed movement led by Laurent 
Desire Kabila with significant support from neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004:13) notes that the fall of Mobutu’s regime 
resulted from a combination of internal weaknesses and the exploitation of these 




4.2.1 The DRC Civil War 
 
Since the overthrowing of Mobutu’s regime, the DRC has witnessed three wars. As 
mentioned earlier, the study focuses on the Second Congo conflict. In order to set the 
background for this conflict, it is important to give a brief overview of the first conflict. 
However, the details of the Third Congo war are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
4.2.1.1 First Civil War, 1996-1997 
 
In 1996, the Democratic Republic of Congo was engulfed in what was called “a war of 
liberation” which toppled the Mobutu regime. As noted above, the conflict in the 
neighbouring countries had serious adverse effects on the DRC, particularly the conflict 
in Rwanda. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004:97) point out that the two Congo wars are in many 
ways the continuation of the civil war in Rwanda, with the same belligerents fighting 
each other in a different land. By 1996, the civil war in neighbouring Rwanda spilled over 
into Zaire. The Rwandan Hutu militia forces, commonly known as Interahamwe, used 
the Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire. The militia forces became allied to the Zairian 
armed forces, which fought against the Congolese (Turner 2007:124). The coalition of 
the Rwandan and Ugandan armies invaded Zaire and fought the Hutu militia. They 
overthrew the government of Mobutu and controlled the mineral resources (Reyntjens 
2010).   
 
The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL Alliance des 
Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo, (AFDL), was led by Laurent-Desire 
Kabila, as well as other political members. The AFDL was created in 1996 and it was a 
collection of four small groups. It consisted of the People’s Democratic Alliance (Alliance 
Democratique des Peoples, (ADP) – a grouping of Congolese Tutsi led by Deogratias 
Bugera); National Council for Resistance and Democracy(Conseil National de 
Resistance et pour la Democratie(CNRD) – a Lumumbist guerrilla group established in 
1993 in eastern Congo by Andre Kisase Ngandu); Revolutionary Movement for the 
Liberation of Zaire( Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la Liberation du Zaire (MRLZ) – a 
South Kivu opposition group led by Anselme Masasu Nindaga) and Kabila’s People’s for 
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Revolutionary Party  (Parti  Revolutionnaire du  Peuple, (PRP). These groups wanted to 
be rid of Mobutu and wanted full control of the running of the country.  
 
The long-term dictatorship of Mobutu’s regime was finally overthrown in1997 by AFDL. It 
is clear that the weakness of the state, accompanied by the external influence such as 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994 laid the foundation to the first conflict. However, the 
ascendancy of Kabila to power led to the end of this conflict.   
 
4.2.1.2 Second Congo War, 1998-2003 
 
Kabila proclaimed himself president and renamed the country the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in May 1997. Once in power, the AFDL disappeared as a political coalition and 
was replaced by the Comites de Pouvoir populaire (CPP). The reason for its 
disappearance was the disunity concerning the agenda of the alliance. Some were 
interested in looting, vengeance or sheer violence and others focused on the political 
agenda, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004:14). President Kabila was challenged to uphold the 
decisions of the CNS for which he refused to do. Consequently he banned the political 
parties in the country. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) led by 
Etienne Tshisekedi was among the banned political parties. Laws were issued by 
presidential decree called the ‘Acte constitutionnel de la transition de la Republique du 
Zaire’(Transitional Constitutional Act of the Republic of Zaire) and vested in the 
president’s absolute control over the executive, military and legislature. Kabila further 
organised new power networks based on his ethnic group, the Baluba.   
 
Due to his dictatorial tendencies, Kabila became increasingly unpopular. Sadiki (2007: 
32) shows that Kabila’s internal political influence had severely decreased before the 
second war began. Firstly, he was in deep disagreement with the unarmed political 
opposition, whose activities he had suspended. Secondly, Kabila faced an ever-
increasing popular dissatisfaction vis-a-vis his defensive attitude toward his Rwandan 
allies, whose presence was no longer tolerated in the country. Thirdly, the Kabila regime 
encountered its own internal resistance as adversarial camps started to develop from 
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within and consisted of ‘authentic Congolese’ on one side and ‘Tutsi’ (Rwandans and 
Banyamulenge) on the other side.  
 
The relations between Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan backers subsequently 
deteriorated because Kabila was not serving their interests. Weiss and Carayannis 
(2005:150) point out that the leaders who had been most responsible for putting Kabila 
into power were dissatisfied with his performance because he acted too independently 
and ignored advice given to him. Eventually, Kabila ended the military cooperation with 
Rwanda in July 1998 and ordered all foreign troops to leave the DRC. This shift severely 
damaged bilateral relations between the DRC and Rwanda. Protesting the measure, two 
units of Congolese Tutsi soldiers mutinied and stationed in the east. Following the 
decision of Kabila, Rwanda’s military units crossed the border to support the 
insubordination (Marjolein de Ridder 2013: 36). 
 
The Second Congo War began in 2 August 1998 when the Rwandans and 
Banyamulenge leaders who brought Kabila to power after ousting Mobutu, decided to 
destroy Kabila as well and supported a new rebel movement Rally of Congolese for 
Democracy (RCD). To counterbalance the power and the influence of Rwanda in DRC, 
another rebel movement, which was backed by Uganda, called the Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo (MLC), came to the scene. Burundi joined the Rwanda-Uganda 
invasion of DRC later and also sponsored the rebels. However, it limited its incursion to 
South Kivu, and especially to Uvira-Baraka-Fizi, which Prunier labels its “back door”, 
Prunier (2009:198). After a short time the rebels controlled eastern and northern parts of 
the country, accounting for over 50% of the national territory (Equipo Argentino de 
Antropologia Forense 2002:57).  
 
Kabila was not coping properly and thus appealed to the SADC for assistance. In 
response to the rebel attack, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe sent troops to support the 
Kabila government at its request. Later, Chad and Sudan also provided Kabila with brief 
military support (Prunier 2009:183-193). The government forces and the troops from 
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe maintained control mainly of the western and southern 
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parts of the country. The ex-FAR and the Mai Mai Congolese nationalist groups seeking 
to expel foreign invaders also sided with Kabila.   
 
At this stage, this conflict thus assumed regional and international dimension. The 
Congolese wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 together constitute one of the most 
severe humanitarian disasters since World War II. These conflicts also led to extreme 
poverty and misery and devastated any hopes of continuing with the democratisation 
process of the DRC which started in 1990. L.D. Kabila became the president of the DRC 
from May 1997 until his assassination in 16 January 2001 by a bodyguard. 
Unfortunately, Kabila’s leadership was similar to Mobutu’s. For example, a few months 
after being president, Kabila followed Mobutu’s steps to the extent that he was called 
Mobutu’s clone. The Mobutu regime was both a military dictatorship and established a 
system of absolute power and personal rule. Kabila also developed his own patronage 
system and networks and appropriated a number of mining operations with his foreign 
backers, such as Zimbabwe (Kisangani 2010:133).  
 
L.D. Kabila was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila in 2001. The rise of Joseph Kabila to 
power marked a period of high hopes for the end of the war. President J. Kabila was 
chosen by consensus among leading domestic and foreign players rather than by any 
constitutional mechanism and was subsequently designated president of the transitional 
government in 2003. Upon assuming the presidency, he continued to exercise autocratic 
authority inherited from his father as stated in Decree Law no. 3 of 1997 granting him full 
executive, legislative and judicial power (Trefon 2011:20). 
 
Clearly, the Kabila’s have been battling numerous rebel groups to maintain their power. 
However, many of these groups are constantly being reconfigured. The internal and 
external factors colluded and pushed the country towards a Second Congo War. 
Therefore, the second conflict was precipitated by President Laurent Kabila’s 
supporters’ dissatisfaction with his performance and his domestic opposition. The 
difference between the first war and the second war is that many Congolese who were 
discontent with the Mobutu regime welcomed the ADFL’s rebellion advance across the 
country and few Congolese, even among Kabila’s enemies, embraced the RCD 
96 
rebellion. Instead, they denounced the rebellion as an aggression of foreign 
governments hostile to the interests of the Congolese population. 
 
4.3 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 
 
Against this background, this section analyses the causes of conflict based on the 
grievance theory and the greed theory in order to fully understand the underlying causes 
and contributory factors of conflicts. The analysis distinguishes between the underlying 
causes which create the conditions under which conflict may occur and the proximate 
causes or triggers which ignite the situation.  
 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that the cause of the DRC conflict must be explained in 
terms of grievance as developed by Azar but also in terms of greed. Azar (1990:7-12) 
focused more on the internal dynamics of societies, especially the relationship between 
communal or identity groups and the state, which he held drive conflict. Azar identified 
the deprivation of human needs as the underlying sources of protracted social conflict, 
and the state’s failure to address those needs as leading to outbreaks of violence. As 
Azar (1990:10) explained, protracted social conflict is most likely to occur in those parts 
of the world characterised by multi-communal compositions and by “incompetent, 
parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. 
Azar’s protracted social conflict theory give a rather secondary role to the external 
dimension of intra-state conflict. 
 
From the perspective of the PSC, much of the violence that continues to cause 
destruction to the eastern Congo were underlying communal problems, which grew up in 
intensity in the years leading up to 1996.  These communal problems spun out of control 
from that point forward and took on a life of their own. However, the long-term causes of 
the conflict can be traced back to the post-independence history of the DRC, which saw 
long periods of autocratic and authoritarian rule, and a failure to establish democracy or 
effective governance14.  
                                                            
14Interviews with informant from the DRC, who shared the same view on the issues, these include Professor Biyoya 
Makutu, Dr Muzong Kodi, Mr Muzungu Diakolo, Mr Mavungu Puati, Mr Ndombi Kamuanza and Mr Koko Sadiki. 
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One of the immediate causes was widely perceived even by some anti-Kabila revolt to 
be failures of governance by the Kabila administration. The perception was that he used 
his position as president to benefit his extensive business interest and had also 
monopolised power. For example, the rebels’ coalitions accused Kabila of 
authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism and tribalism. The Kabila regime was obtaining 
some financial backing from contracts with foreign mining firms such as the American 
Mineral Fields (AMF) and Anglo-American; and Belgian investors such as Texaf, George 
Forrest International, Petrofina and Union Miniere (interview with koko Sadiki15). 
However, he failed to attract the large-scale foreign investment needed by the country. 
In addition, the monopolisation of power and the politics of exclusion are as a result of 
nationality issue and the democratisation process. Once in power, Kabila refused to 
share power with political party like UDPS and adopted exclusionary policies. Afoaku 
(2010:496) pointed a number of weaknesses Kabila had, namely, the lack of political 
skills; his inexperience; autocratic leadership style; reluctance to act on the nationality 
issues; failure to construct a broad domestic constituency by opening up the political 
space; and inability to secure eastern Congolese borders which created the conflict.  For 
example, the Banyamulenge argued that Kabila had not solved their nationality 
concerns. 
 
The marginalisation of other ethnic groups was also identified as a predominant feature 
which has worsened under the Kabila rule. Kisangani (2010:142-143) argues that the 
anti-Kabila war was Kabila’s decision to prevent a coup by excluding the Banyamulenge 
and other Tutsi from power. Besides, their exclusion from the government forced them to 
reassert themselves because exclusion from power also meant the denial of their 
Congolese nationality. For example, the RCD was in fact a coalition of convenience that 
contained major excluded players from the AFDL. The MLC was created by former 
Mobutist clients who became isolated when Kabila took power in May 1997. Kisangani 
(2010:143) also states that the war against Kabila was a war of replacement to help the 
excluded elites reposition themselves while they used nationalistic ideology to justify 
                                                            
15Koko Sadiki is a former researcher at the   University of South Africa, Pretoria, SA, 24 August 2014. 
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their objectives. Therefore, the civil war against Kabila intended to bring the 
Banyamulenge and the Tutsi back into the political system that they had no incentive to 
change.  
 
The most important and immediate cause, however, was simply personal animosity 
between Kabila and his allies (protectors). However, they did not believe that Kabila had 
expected to seize power as he did not have a master-plan for the revolution. He simply 
grabbed the opportunity when it arose as a result of a chain of circumstances. Later, the 
Kabila regime had become an irritation to the United States, North American mining 
interests, and to his Uganda and Rwandan patrons. In fact, international capital has 
since been frustrated by Kabila’s erratic behaviour and his repeated dishonouring of 
contracts he had signed with foreign businessmen (interview with Koko Sadiki). 
 
As a result, as early as January 1998, the intelligence chiefs of Angola, Rwanda and 
Uganda held discussions regarding the desirability of finding an alternative leader for the 
DRC. It was also apparent that a coup against Kabila would be welcomed in certain 
international circles (Weiss 2000:13). L.D Kabila’s big mistake was to annul the deals he 
made with the mining cooperation and to forget that the Cold War had ended (interview 
with Biyoya16). Therefore, the interests of Western powers revolved around the need to 
control those resources. Clark (2002:2-4) argues that the war against Kabila, just like the 
war against Mobutu, was part of a continental trend- the withdrawal of support from 
powerful patrons, the United States, France and from international financial institutions. 
 
Another way of understanding causes of the DRC conflict is through greed. The Collier 
and Hoeffler greed theory observe civil wars as being caused by poor growth, poverty, 
and the abundance of natural resources and other precious minerals that can often be 
the source of much greed. In the DRC, the main driver of conflict is its abundance of 
valuable minerals and resources. Indeed, the Congolese government’s inability to 
                                                            
16Interview with Philippe Biyoya, IPRIS, Director and Professor of university, DRC, 27 September 2013,  
Johannesburg, SA  
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control the entirety of its territory has allowed rebel armed forces to exploit these 
resources and fuel the continuous conflict in the Congo. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have shown that natural resources considerably increase the 
chances of civil conflict because the available rents can be used to finance rebellions. 
Minerals resources such as copper and diamonds have allegedly been used by 
politicians to grease their patronage network. During this conflict, the DRC was divided 
into three administrative parts, each resulting from military occupation. As mentioned 
above, the country was controlled by the Kabila government in the west, including 
Kinshasa; the RCD reigned in the east and the MLC dominated the north. The rebels 
groups had no resources whatsoever. They needed money to finance their military 
activities against the government. Kabamba (2013:129) contends that in the conquered 
territories, the rebels exercised political power and conducted all the affairs of 
administration such as taxes, customs services, police army, judiciary, etc because they 
seemed very profitable to them.  
 
The abundance of natural resources also provides incentives for foreign players to get 
involved in the country, further complicating the security situation. As mentioned above, 
the UN Panel of Experts (2001; 2003) advanced the argument that the illegal 
exploitation of the DRC’s resources directly funded the participation of the neighbouring 
states. For example, in 1999 an estimated 80 % of the expenditure of the Rwandan 
Army (Rwandan Defence Forces, Forces Rwandaises de Défense, RDF) was covered 
by profits from coltan (a mineral used in electronic devices) sales of the DRC. Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi have become a major exporter of diamonds, coltan, gold and other 
natural resources from the DRC.  
 
In the final analysis, it can be deduced that the issue of grievance such as governance 
problem and political exclusion were the dominant factors contributing to the conflict. 
Natural resources have thus, played an important role of sustaining and perpetuating 




4.4 ACTORS AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT 
 
Since all conflict involves participants, understanding who these parties are, is 
fundamental to understanding the conflict. The DRC conflict was characterised by the 
participation of many actors in complex alignments. On the one side there were Angola, 
Chad, the DRC, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Mai Mai aligned forces. On the 
other side were the RCD, the MLC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda aligned forces. Both 
had two opposing objectives. While some group mobilised against the invasions, others 
came to support the rebellion. This section analyses the actors involved and their 
interests. These can be analysed on two levels, namely, internal and external actors.  
 
4.4.1 Internal Actors 
 
There were three main internal actors in the second conflict, namely, the Kinshasa 
government, the RCD and the MLC. 
 
4.4.1.1 Kinshasa government (Kabila regime) 
 
Kinshasa government represented the interests of all Congolese. When Laurent Kabila 
came to power, he created a new national army called the Congolese force (the New 
Force Armees Congolaises FAC). It consisted of four groups. The first group consisted 
of the Katanga Tigers who were the sons of the Katanga gendarmes17 who fled to 
Angola after the Katanga’s attempted secession was defeated by the UN forces in 1962. 
The Katanga Tigers had split into two wings. One was led from Angola by Henri 
Mukatshuing Mwambu and the other was led by Dr Emile Ilunga from Brussels. Later, Dr 
Ilunga fell out with Kabila and joined the RCD, this was at a time when the Katanga 
Tigers became united and chose to support Kabila. The second group consisted of the 
                                                            
17Katanga Gendarmes were also known as Katanga Tigers. Katangan gendarmes originally established by Belgian 
Congo government of Katanga province as Katangan gendarmere force as local internal security and police force in 
July 1960.  Later used as a regular army by the local Katangese leader Moise Tshombe to support the seceding of 
Katanga to form an independent state from July 1960 until January 1963 as Katangan gendarmere national 
(gendarmerie nationale Katangaise). Katanga is one of the eleven provinces of the DRC; they were in rebellion 
against Central power of Kinshasa.  
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former members of the national army, Forces Army of Zaire (Forces Armees Zairoises, 
FAZ), Mobutu’s army, that collapsed after the 1996 rebellion and invasion. The third 
group consisted of Tutsi soldiers who would be vehemently resented by the Kabila 
regime as foreigners. The last group consisted of the so-called Kadogos, the young men 
and boys who had been recruited into the ADFL army (Weiss 2000:7-8).When the 
conflict started in 1998, Tutsi soldiers also fell out with Kabila and joined the Rwandan 
and Ugandan forces. Within two weeks, Kabila’s regime and the new army were 
weakened and faced almost certain military defeat. Afoaku (2010: 496) argues that the 
Kabila regime was politically too isolated and militarily fragile to survive the combined 
firepower of the Congo rebels and their regional backers. 
 
As a consequence, Kabila enrolled into his armed forces Interahamwe militias and Hutu 
soldiers of the former Rwandan army. He also made alliance with Congolese guerrillas, 
the Mai-Mai, particularly in the RCD controlled area and incorporated them in the new 
armed Congolese force. The Mai Mai consists of the Congolese guerrilla troops, in 
ethnically homogeneous groups and they were active in the eastern part of the country. 
However, they became a major source of insecurity. These groups have never managed 
to come together under a central leadership structure but share one common goal, that 
is, to oppose any foreign invasion (Weiss and Carayannis 2005:152).  
 
There are at least thirty distinct Mai Mai groups operating in the DRC. The term Mai Mai 
comes from the Kiswahili word meaning water and has been adopted by a wide range of 
communal militias, emerging at different times across the DRC. Mai Mai groups played a 
key role in fighting the AFDL rebellion during the 1996 and rose to greater distinction 
acting as proxy for the national military forces, opposing RCD-Rwanda during the 
second conflict (Acled 2013:5). The difference between the AFDL and the Mai Mai is 
that the AFDL, although composed of several groups, was under the leadership of one 
person, whereas the Mai Mai operated heterogeneously and did not have one 
leadership.  
In turn, the Mai Mai extended the alliance to Rwandan and Burundian insurgency 
groups, who were consequently provided with arms and political support from Kinshasa 
government (Weiss and Carayannis 2005:152). Firstly, these included the Democratic 
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Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du 
Rwanda) a union of Hutu extremists formerly belonging to the ex-FAR and the 
interahamwe. It has also been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers. As noted 
above, the Kinshasa government supported the FDLR which opposed Rwanda and 
RCD-Goma. 
 
Secondly, the Rwanda Liberation Army (ALIR, Armee de Liberation du Rwanda) a 
collection of Hutu who oppose the Tutsi government in Kigali, but are not associated 
with the genocide of 1994. However, they have joined hands with the FDLR against 
Rwanda. The ALIR began as a guerrilla movement in May 1997 before being pushed 
into the Congo in 1998; 
 
Thirdly, the Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD, Forces de la Defense de la 
Democratie) and National Liberation Forces (FNL Front National de Liberation) are the 
main guerrilla movements that have been fighting the Burundian government from 
Congolese soil. The FDD is a movement that was founded by Leonard Nyagoma, 
following the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993; and FNL is a 
significant militia movement headed by Hutu insurrectionist, Agathon Rwasa, and has 
maintained bases and troops in eastern DRC, though limited in number (Turner 2013: 
68). Therefore, these groups were allied to the Kinshasa government in order to fight the 
RCD-Rwanda-Uganda alliance (Weiss and Carayannis 2005: 152). 
 
4.4.1.2 The RCD 
 
The RCD was established by Rwanda and Uganda to serve their interests and was 
headed by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. The RCD brought the politicians and 
intellectuals together from very different, even opposed backgrounds. However, it soon 
became clear that Rwanda and Uganda did not share the same agenda and interest in 
the Congo conflict. Hence, the RCD had split into two groups, the RCD-Kisangani 
backed by Uganda; and the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda. The RCD alliance was 
weakened by internal division and by armed challenges to its legitimacy in much of 
eastern Congo, particularly in North and South Kivu (Weiss and Carayannis 2005: 152).  
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(a) RCD- Goma 
RCD-Goma is one of the two parties which resulted from the split of the RCD in 
1999. It is called RCD-Goma because its headquarters were in Goma. It has 
been supported by two armed factions, the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC) 
and an auxiliary militia known as the Forces de Defence Locales (FDL). RCD-
Goma was headed by Emile Ilunga and supported by Rwanda. It exercised 
control over parts of South Kivu, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and Katanga, 
and has created an administrative government in order to rule these areas. 
Turner (2007:142) states that the main interests of the RDC-Goma were to retain 
political and military control of its remaining territories and the economic benefits 
accruing from this control. 
 
(b) RCD-K/ML 
This is the second party resulting from the split of the RCD in 1999.Its founder 
was Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and is led by Mbusa Nyamwisi. The 
RCD-K/ML originally allied itself to the MLC and Uganda to oppose the influence 
of RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda within parts of eastern Congo. Its headquarters 
is located in the Beni region of North Kivu. 
 
(c) RCD- N 
This army split off from the RCD-K/ML when the latter abandoned its alliance with 
Uganda to join the Kinshasa government in 2001. The RCD-N has remained 
close to Uganda and is led by Roger Lumbala. RCD-N is also allied to the MLC 
and some viewed it as a proxy force created by the MLC. Clearly, the split of the 
RCD has shown that the rebels were fighting on two different wars. There was the 
original war whose stated objective was to topple J.K Kabila and there was also 
inter-factional fight within the anti-Kabila opposition over political and 
administrative control of rebel territories that were fuelled by narrow economic 




4.4.1.3 The MLC 
 
The MLC, which is an anti-Kabila armed group, was established with Ugandan support 
in northern Equateur Province some months after the founding of the RCD. The MLC 
headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba whose family was closely allied to Mobutu and is 
believed to have included former members of Mobutu’s Presidential grand (Weiss 
2000:18). The RCD and the MLC were the coalition of rebels with the objectives of 
replacing the Kabila dictatorship with a transitional government of national unity. Unlike 
the RCD, the MLC was the only rebel group that could not be linked to any Tutsi group.  
 
4.4.2 External Actors 
 
The external actors are involved in the DRC conflict for different reasons. However, the 
external actors who were involved in the first war are not the same as those in the 
second war.  In the case where one finds the same actors, they do not support the same 
conflicting parties as they did in the past. The case of Angola, Burundi, Uganda and 
Rwanda illustrates the situation in these two wars quite clearly.  Angola helped the 
AFDL (a rebel group) to topple the Mobutu regime but did support the Kabila’s regime 
against rebel groups. By contrast, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi backed the rebel group 
in the two wars but in the second, Rwanda and Uganda diverged with the evolution of 
the war. These are two categories of external actors, namely, those who support the 
Kabila government and those backing the rebels. Both two groups were involved in 
conflict for political ideology, security and economic interests. 
 
The external actors who supported the Kabila government were Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Chad and Sudan. Of the five countries that came to Kabila’s rescue, three 
are members of the SADC, namely, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The responses 
were greatly influenced by their own national interests. The SADC members justified 
their intervention in the Congo as support for a fellow SADC member facing external 
aggression (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:101). Despite such justification, the three states 
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which participated in the intervention each had its own strategic and economic reasons 




Angola was the first of Congo’s neighbours to come to its aid in 1998. However, 
Angola’s interest in the stability of the DRC was related to its strategy of neutralising the 
Savimbi-led rebel UNITA in order to cut off the insurgents’ lines of communication and 
deny them secure rear bases in the Congo (Turner 2002:84). Angola also sought to 
protect its petroleum and diamond resources, especially the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, 
and maintain a compliant regime in the DRC amenable to its interests (Turner 2002:75-
92).  
 
4.4.2.2 Zimbabwe  
 
Zimbabwe does not share a border with DRC, but its interests were driven largely by 
Mugabe’s ambition to assert his leadership as an African statesman and to set himself 
free from the overwhelming shadow of Nelson Mandela in the region. Support for the 
economic interests of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite, rather than larger national interests, 
underpins the country’s involvement in the Congo War (International Crisis Group 2000: 
60). Moreover, the support offered apparently as a matter of principle by Harare to 
protect Congolese territorial integrity and sovereignty was also perceived on the wider 
African support. Zimbabwe’s leaders also benefited from the Congo’s natural resources 




Namibia’s participation in the military intervention in the DRC came in response to a 
request from Angola and Zimbabwe to support LD Kabila, a long-time friend of the then 
Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, and a close ally of both Angola and Zimbabwe 
(Turner 2002:75-92).  The armies of the three SADC allies also were involved in illegal 
exploitation of the DRC’s resources (UN Panel 2003). Besides the three SADC states, 
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other states of the Central Africa region have been trying to be stakeholders on the side 
of the DRC.  
 
4.4.2.4 Chad and Sudan 
 
Chad was encouraged by France to join those supporting Congo as a means of 
regaining influence in Central Africa region where the French had retreated in disgrace 
after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In contrast, Sudan’s involvement in the DRC 
conflict was mainly meant against Uganda for supporting the guerrilla movement in the 
south of Sudan, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).Those backing the 




Rwanda has been more heavily involved in the Congo Wars than any of the other 
neighbouring states. This is due in part to Rwanda’s long history of interaction with DRC 
(Turner 2013:51). Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC was not launched out of sheer 
altruism but it was also motivated by self-interest. According to Longman (2003:130-
138), Rwanda’s intervention reflected complex reasons. Firstly, humanitarian interests 
and ethnic solidarity; Secondly, security threats from the Congo; Thirdly, domestic 
security concerns; Fourthly, economic interests for intervention in DRC and Longman 




Uganda intervened twice in the DRC conflict. Its intervention was not based on altruism 
but included a large measure of self-interest like Rwanda. President Yoweri Museveni 
has tried his best to divide the Congo among rival warlords for the purposes of 
maintaining political influence in the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004:101). However, 
Uganda’s efforts to merge the MLC and the RCD-ML in the DRC failed dismally. Clark 
(2003:148) also considers four more serious explanations for Uganda’s intervention in 
DRC in 1998. Firstly, because of its severe threats to its security emanating from the 
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border region, for example the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front 
(WNBF), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are the three anti-Museveni guerrilla 
movements from Uganda and have maintained bases in the DRC. ADF has existed 
since the mid-1990s. While relatively small, the ADF has also abducted Congolese 
nationals and is known to have the terrorist networks of Al-Qaeda. The ADF’s ultimate 
goal is to establish shari’a law in Uganda. The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, a self-
proclaimed mystic who has conducted a campaign of terror against the population of 
northern Uganda, particularly recruiting child soldiers. These three Ugandan rebels’ 
movements were backed by Sudan in revenge for Ugandan support of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (Prunier 2009:132-133). Secondly, for ideological purposes; 
thirdly, because of its alliance with Rwanda; and Clark (2002: 152-154) notes a fourth 
explanation which he referred to as economic interest.  
 
The division between Rwanda and Uganda was their desire to become regional power 
in the Great Lakes region and each laid claim to its own sphere of influence.A case in 
point is the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan armies on the Congolese territory 
of Kisangani which may only be understood as a fight for leadership and control over 




Burundi was the junior partner in the invasions of the DRC in 1998. It has also sought to 
justify its limited military involvement as arising out of the need to eliminate continuing 
threats to Burundi security posed by Hutu extremists based in the Congo. However, 
Burundi was also involved in Congo to exploit natural resources and to protect its 
commercial interest. The main reason was that Burundi was under regional trade 
embargo after the July 1996 coup through which Buyoya came to power (Turner 2013: 
66-67). 
 
It is clear that the DRC conflict involved several actors and also numerous foreign rebel 
groups allegedly based in the DRC. These actors played active military role because of 
the chronic political instability and the weakness of the government. The military logic of 
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the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ was readily employed in the conflict. According to 
Laremont and Ostergard (2005: 251-252), these actors have played and most likely will 
continue to play active military roles in the DRC for three reasons: firstly, ethnic conflicts 
in border regions between the DRC and many of these states remain unresolved; 
secondly, these states have economic incentives to seize valuable mineral resources 
found in the DRC; and thirdly, the DRC’s government and military forces are 
comparatively weak and foreign governments can emplace themselves with relative 
ease in the DRC. For these reasons, these external actors will continue to play different 
roles in the DRC in the near future. These includes training of insurgents against 





This chapter has analysed the DRC conflict from the period 1998-2003. This second 
conflict illustrates the intra-state dimension of modern warfare in Africa, although with 
international dimension. This conflict was basically a continuation of the first conflict. The 
origins of this conflict can be traced back from the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and the weak state of the Congo which led to the first conflict in the DRC. The 
second civil war was more intense than the first one due to the division within the RCD 
and the concomitant inflation of belligerents, the dominance of foreign armies and 
foreign rebels groups on Congolese soil. The underlying causes of the conflict have 
been identified as greed for natural resources, security of the DRC’s eastern border with 
its neighbours, the problem of nationality of Rwandan immigrants, bad governance, 
hitches in the democratisation process and external aggression of the country. 
Therefore, the nature of this conflict was complex and multidimensional because the 
Congolese conflict was both an internal rebellion against an authoritarian regime and 
also a foreign aggression of the DRC by some of its eastern neighbours.  
 
The chapter has shown that the second conflict was a vicious and complicated conflict. It 
has involved several actors and it can be characterised by several phases, demarcated 
by various shifts in alliances and contradicting interests. Therefore, a solution to the 
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conflict must encompass multiple approaches. This requires international, regional and 
local action before a long-lasting peace can prevail.  Nzongola- Ntalaja (2004:21-22) 
suggests that, any chance for peace in the DRC is dependent on successful political 
culture consisting of the rule of law, a democratically elected and inclusive government 
and national reconciliation. The next chapter will focus on the role of SADC in conflict 










THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IN 





Situated at the heart of Africa, the DRC has been transformed into a battlefield where 
several African states and national armed movements are simultaneously fighting 
various wars. The death toll of the conflict was beyond five million killed, besides millions 
of internally displaced persons. The conflict also affected the country’s economic and 
political development negatively. Bringing peace and security to the DRC would not only 
contribute to SADC sub-regional economic development, it would also create significant 
social, political and other benefits for Southern and Central Africa (Centre for Conflict 
Resolution (CCR) 2010:11).  
 
In order to achieve peace, security, and stability in the DRC, SADC intervened with the 
international collaboration of the UN and AU. However, the entire DRC peace process 
has largely been a SADC-driven initiative and SADC member states have also engaged 
in a joint military operation to safeguard peace and security in the region. Through these 
initiatives SADC has shown its willingness to fill the gap which emerged as a result of 
inaction on the part of the international community (Field and Ebrahim 2000:15). Stefaan 
and Wamu (2002:411) also argue that SADC played the leading role in proposing 
solutions to end the regional conflict in the absence of a clear response by the 
international community which has a responsibility for maintaining peace and security.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to appraise SADC’s role during the second 
Congo war in terms of how it employed dual approach to resolve the DRC conflict 
through the use of military intervention and mediation process. The chapter will also 
consider the role of other regional actors in this conflict. It argues that the DRC has been 
a crucial test of SADC’s conflict resolution capacity.  
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5.2 SADC MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
The purpose of this section is to appraise the successes, but also the difficulties that 
emerged in SADC Allied Armed Forces (AAF) mission called ‘Operation Sovereign 
Legitimacy’. The attempt by the SADC to stop the second civil war in the DRC through 
the use of peacekeeper is now more than sixteen years old. This intervention was not 
designed as strictly a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission, but rather 
represents a new form of intervention with mandate to protect the territorial integrity of 
the country against foreign aggressors. Cedric de Coning (2000:281-286) has referred 
to this new trend as ‘neo-interventionism, whereby the intervening forces do not enter as 
peacemakers but aligned to one side of the conflict with the aims of influencing the 
balance of power. Balance of power is a system of distributing power among two or 
more competing coalitions of nations states intended to prevent a predominance of 
power by any one coalition (Conteh-Morgan 2004:295). 
 
What SADC AAF has done, can be argued from a narrow military perspective that 
‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ was a success in the sense that the military objectives 
of the mission were accomplished. The operation succeeded in shoring up and securing 
the besieged government of President Kabila, when he was assassinated on 16 January 
2001 by one of his body guards. The SADC AAF intervention secured Kinshasa capital 
and its environs from being overtaken by Rwandan, Ugandan and rebel factions. It is 
important to note that Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe had signed a Mutual Defence Pact 
with the DRC, so they were bound by the pact to defend their alliance partner. The 
relative stability led to the re-opening and protection of the international airport for 
commercial and normal business operations. The SADC AAF helped to save lives and 
contributed to human protection activities, for example, facilitating humanitarian relief 
operations. 
 
The SADC AAF created a situation of power balance between belligerents and rendered 
the conflict ripe for resolution. The development of the stalemate on the combat zone 
attests to the fact that both sides have lost so much equipment that a modern 
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conventional war was no longer possible. With the military tool now illuminating its 
limitations, only political negotiations could bring about peace. 
 
The military stalemate led to the new diplomatic and political initiatives by Zimbabwe and 
SA, led by President Mbeki, to encourage mediation and political resolution of the 
Congo crisis. The mutually hurtful stalemate amongst the intervening states and the 
assassination of President L.D Kabila changed the political dynamics in favour of a 
negotiated resolution of the conflict. Joseph Kabila initiated a fundamental foreign policy 
shift that paved the way for the departure of certain foreign forces and the deployment of 
the United Nations Mission to the Congo (MONUC) (Francis 2006:203-204). 
 
In spite of all this significant progress, the deployment of the SADC Allied Armed Forces 
(AAF) in August 1998 has presented many challenges to the SADC. These challenges 
include the regional collective security framework and mandate, question of legitimacy, 
operational problem, media coverage and the financial problem. 
 
5.2.1 Regional collective security framework and mandate 
 
At the time of the intervention, although the SADC OPDS has been created, it was not 
operational. There seemed to be a clash of personalities between Mugabe and Mandela 
as to how the organisation must run. As a result SADC hesitated to intervene decisively 
to end conflict in member states. SADC AAF participated in the DRC operation called 
‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’, which was endorsed at a meeting of SADC defence 
ministers despite the fact that there were political disagreements between SADC leaders 
and a lack of co-ordination in SADC around the intervention.  
 
The Inter-state Defence and Security Committee in Harare on 18 August 1998 and 
stated that SADC had come to a ‘‘unanimous’ decision to defend Kabila’s regime. 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, chose to intervene via their military and deployed the 
SADC Allied Armed forces (SADC-AAF) to protect the regime. Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Angola and the DRC also have signed a Mutual Defence pact amongst themselves. 
113 
According to Mbuende (2001:46), this military intervention was based on the Inter-state 
and Security Committee resolution held in Cape Town, South Africa in 1995. 
 
However, South Africa (the chair of SADC then) supported by Botswana, Mozambique 
and Tanzania espoused the need for dialogue and negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
In this regard, SADC Summit convened a meeting in Mauritius in September 1998 
where SADC leaders reached a consensus and endorsed the positions represented by 
both South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nathan 2006:614). The Summit also “welcomed 
initiatives by SADC and its member states intended to assist in the restoration of peace, 
security and stability in the DRC’’. The SADC Summit was approached as militaristic. 
The SADC leaders commended the government of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for 
providing troops on time to assist the government and the people of the DRC (SADC 
Final Communiqué, 13-14 September 1998). 
 
It is clear that the DRC conflict in particular had the effect of dividing the SADC 
community between those who supported the operations and those who disapproved it. 
The lack of clarity over whether decisions made by the SADC Summit, as the highest 
level decision-making body, take supremacy over decisions made by the SADC OPDS 
caused major disagreement within the community at the begin of the second DRC 
conflict.  
 
5.2.2 The question of legitimacy  
 
The legality of the intervention has been a major issue. During the DRC conflict the anti-
intervention group such as South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania argued 
that the problem was an internal Congolese issue. The UNSC declined to sanction the 
intervention arguing the SADC AAF intervention constituted enforcement action that was 
not supported by Chapter VII of the UN Charter and therefore SADC AAF intervention 
was unlawful. The international community on the other hand also declared that the 
SADC AAF ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ in the DRC was illegitimate because the 
UNSC has not sanctioned the intervention.  
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In response, SADC AAF justified its intervention as an obligatory response to save a 
member state facing foreign aggression that threatened sub-regional peace and 
stability. They also claimed that the intervention was authorised by SADC according to 
Article 4 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 which called for military assistance and collective 
defence against external aggression and Article 6(4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact 
(MDP) which states that the AU and the UN Security Council need to be notified soon 
after a military response by member states. The three countries invoked provisions of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter on collective self-defence, as well as principles of the 
OAU/AU. It further argued that the communication of its decision to intervene to the 
UNSC was sufficient justification of its action. 
 
It is necessary for a regional organisation to get authorisation for any regional 
intervention, but if there is none, and it is taking time, it is the obligation of the regional, 
sub-regional organisation to intervene when there is a very serious crisis. For instance, 
in the DRC, the SADC AAF intervened very early. However, the UNSC decided to 
deploy troops in the DRC later on in 1999 to supervise the ceasefire and monitor 
compliance with human rights standards (Mangu 2003:162).  Many criticised the UN for 
its late intervention in peacekeeping operations after the situation has stabilised. For 
example, the UNSC took time to recognise that DRC was invaded by their neighbours 
and needed peace operation to manage the crisis (Stefaan and Wamu 2002:423). Some 
consider this as a lack of interest of the international community toward African conflicts. 
 
SADC was not the first body that has failed to secure the UNSC authorisation for 
intervention. The NATO, led by US also failed to obtain authorisation of the UNSC for its 
intervention in Kosovo and Yugoslavia between March and July 1999 respectively. The 
same scenario happened in Afghanistan case. The US coalition’s war against terrorism 
in Afghanistan could be instructive for the new coalition paradigm of conflict resolution 
that found it expedient to implement regional security policy frameworks with or without 
appropriate UNSC approval (Aboagye 1999:157,279-80). What the UNSC needs in the 
future is to review its policies of decision making in terms of intervention.  
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5.2.3 Media coverage 
 
In 1998, SADC became the focus of international attention when Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe decided to intervene in the DRC. However, the intervention was criticised by 
the South African media, as reporters claimed that the intervention was motivated by 
national and personal interests.Despite the international interest in the Congo, the 
international media coverage largely ignored the conflict except occasionally reporting 
incidents of massacres and outbreaks of intense fighting (Francis 2006:203-204). 
Rupiya (2003:100) argues that the regional dominant media based in SA, mounted an 
unrelenting campaign, portraying the SADC AAF involvement in the DRC as illegitimate, 
ill-advised and based on personal quests for enrichment from the gold and diamonds in 
the DRC. Therefore, Rupiya (2003:100) concluded that the negative internal media 
coverage of the intervention and the role of external actors “…partly succeeded in 
delegitimising the sterling efforts of the SADC allies to uphold the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity…[A]s a result of the orchestrated international media 
war against the SADC allies, who were in the midst of fending off a determined and 
coordinated military thrust, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia were forced to defend 
themselves against those distortions within SADC, the AU and the UN”. 
 
5.2.4 The Operational problem 
 
SADC AAF also experienced serious problems concerning a lack of extensive 
peacekeeping experience (interoperability, insufficient troops) for the mission. The 
operation was intended to be a joint one. The composition and structure of forces were 
hastily improvised to respond to the DRC conflict. Meanwhile on 17 and 18 August 1998 
the defence ministers of Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe explicitly appealed to 
other members to contribute with contingents in the course of intervention to participate 
in the force’s operation. However, SA did not send troops to support the operation. 
Hough (1998:36) argues that SA would only consider sending troops in the case where 
a peacekeeping force was deployed in accordance with the UN mandate. 
 
The Zimbabwean Defence Forces (ZDF) deployed a preponderant military force 
including tanks, armoured vehicles, helicopters and fighter ground attack aircrafts. In 
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addition, the Zimbabwe military deployment was complemented by Angola and Namibia 
military deployment later (Rupiya 2003:98). When they arrived in the DRC without 
military maps of the city, the SADC Allied Armed force did not have relevant training in 
peace enforcement operations (except ZDF) and there was no inter-operability between 
contingents (telecommunication difficulties). They were attacked by the rebels, who then 
controlled almost some of the western part of Kinshasa, for example, Masina suburb 
particularly Ndjili international airport. This rapid and unexpected degradation of the 
security situation led SADC AAF to shift its mission to that of peace enforcement, 
revised its strategy and began deploying its forces in strategic places in the country. 
Francis (2006:201) notes that SADC AAF was forced by the military situation on the 
ground to change its military strategy from defensive to offensive, hence a hurtful 
stalemate.  
 
The command and control of forces was perhaps the most intractable problem for SADC 
AAF in the DRC. SADC AAF’s command structure was organised in such a manner as 
to accommodate the interests of all contributing countries. According to Rupiya 
(2003:98) the conduct of the initial military deployment has been coordinated with the 
Angola and Namibia defence forces. Key elements among the forces detached from the 
allied countries were the tank and air power squadron formations. However, even these 
contributions did not address the problem that beset the mission.  Without the requisite 
training and discipline, SADC AAF became involved in illicit mining activities. These 
activities compromised the objectives of the mission and its credibility (UN Panel of 
Experts 2001 and 2003). Unfortunately, this was due to the lack of professionalism, 
experience and skill personnel.  
 
The ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ was also limited by the variety of languages 
spoken among them. There were Angolan spoken Portuguese and both Namibian and 
Zimbabwean spoken English. This operation, in particular was hampered by its lack of 
DRC speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population 
and the FAC (Armed Congolese Force). 
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5.2.5 Financial constraints 
 
Despite the financial constraints experienced by most members’ states and the absence 
of mechanism for collective security at the regional level, SADC AAF intervened with its 
own resources. The operation was largely reliant on Zimbabwean funding, and the cost 
to Zimbabwe totaled US$ 30 million per month (Rupiya 2003:101). Many of these costs 
were indirect, as well as direct. The DRC government would also have to carry the 
costs. The costs of the war would be shared from the exploitation of the mineral 
resources of the Congo. According to Koyame and Clark (2003:209), the gains derived 
from the special contracts given to Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe by Congolese state, 
as well as direct payments, must be balanced against the cost of their military activities. 
Clearly, it was the first time the SADC took offensive military action in support of the 
government of a member state. The military objectives defined in the mandate were 
accomplished, despite certain difficulties likely to be faced by any peace operation 
undertaken by regional organisation.  
 
5.3 SADC MEDIATION PROCESS 
 
Besides military involvement, SADC states such as SA, Angola, and Zambia have also 
led peacemaking efforts in the DRC, which resulted in the signing of the DRC’s Global 
and All-Inclusive Agreement in December 2002. It is important to note that the DRC 
conflict resolution initiatives can be categorised into two stages (Mpangala 2004:19). 
The first stage constitutes the period from August 1998 to the signing of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement in July1999. During this first stage, the diplomatic efforts focused 
exclusively on the official belligerents in the war, namely the Kabila government, the 
rebel movements and the external armed forces, leaving little room for the Congolese 
unarmed actors. Even the Mai Mai, an internal armed group, was excluded from formal 
peace talks and ceasefire agreement, despite being party to the conflict (Naidoo 
2000:91). The Lusaka peace Accord was essentially a ceasefire agreement. This peace 
accord produced the beginning of the resolution of the DRC civil war. 
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The second stage of the DRC conflict resolution initiative constitutes the period after the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 to the signing of the Global and 
All-inclusive Agreement. This Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 17 December 2002 
was a transitional power-sharing peace agreement, with election planned for two to 
three years after the establishment of the transitional government (Daley 2006:312). 
Power sharing is now commonly viewed as the only feasible way of promoting peace 
and reconciliation between warring factions.  
 
The objective of this section is to appraise the implication of SADC’s intervention in the 
DRC and the role it played in the mediation process based on the model of Rupesinghe. 
In making this appraisal, each component of his model as briefly discussed in Chapter 2 
will be elaborated here. 
 
5.3.1 Pre-negotiation Stage 
 
The purpose of this stage is to bring the warring parties into the negotiation process and 
realistic goals for the negotiation process should be set up. It is important that the 
parties have the willingness to commit to the peace. “the strategic intent of the pre-
negotiation phase is to reduce intractability, to formulate and design a process that can 
bring parties to the negotiation table and begin the trust and confidence-building 
necessary for a successful negotiating exercise” (Rupensighe 1995:80). It should be 
questioned why the warring parties are coming to the negotiation table and their 
motivations for deciding to come to the negotiation table must be understood. It should 
also be ascertained whether they are ready to negotiate for peace or whether they are 
just trying to buy time whilst they resupply?  
 
The warring parties in the DRC conflict were not willing to go to the negotiating table. In 
the first place, the peace process was perceived more as a route for the various rebels 
group to come to power and securing international recognition rather than representing 
a commitment to peace by the signatories (Fourier and Solomon 2002:15). Mediators 
actually brought pressure to bear upon all the parties to the conflict. The UN, the AU, 
SADC and the Western countries were intensely pressurising the parties to negotiate.  
119 
At the time the Lusaka Agreement was signed, the belligerents went to the negotiating 
table with entrenched position not because they were really ready to talk peace, but 
because the peace negotiation was imposed on them. In fact, they were using the break 
to re-arm themselves. Although all signed the agreement, the belligerents have not 
changed their attitude. For the rebels and most of their backers, their first objective was 
not to force Kabila to democratise, in contrast, their priority was to topple him from 
power. Furthermore, it is important to note that the rebels were not certain that they 
would survive as political movements in the democratic environment as they 
commanded little support (Kabemba 2000:30). 
 
On the other hand, Kabila has visibly advocated two options, neither of which envisaged 
negotiation with the rebels. He has vowed to oblige Rwandan and Ugandan forces out of 
the DRC, either by force or through international pressure. Even after the signing of the 
Lusaka Agreement, this attitude continued. No side of the divided parties has changed 
its vision on how to end the conflict (Kabemba 2000:31). Besides, it was not possible for 
the warring parties to start negotiating since the trust between them was non-existent. In 
violation of the Lusaka agreement, sporadic fighting amongst the combatants and the 
illegal extraction of minerals resources continued. In fact, there was lack of political will 
by the belligerents to honour the Lusaka Peace agreement.  
 
5.3.2 Understanding Root Causes 
 
Settlements which ignore the root causes can lead to further confrontation. Rupesinghe 
(1996:166) claimed that “it is abundantly apparent from recent experiences in Somalia, 
the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere that there is a need for a clear 
conceptual and theoretical understanding of the root causes and the sources of 
intractability of a given conflict”. Therefore, it is imperative that conflict resolution 
facilitators come to grips with how and why a conflict erupted so that the sources, which 




It has been argued that the causes of the DRC conflict had both internal and external 
dimensions. The main internal causes of the conflict were the politics of exclusion and 
dictatorship. The aggression by neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda for 
diversity of reasons including the control of Congo’s natural resources constituted 
external causes. In the DRC peace process, the mediators addressed all the causes of 
the conflict both internal and external. For example, the Lusaka Agreement addressed 
simultaneously both internal (the absence of effective state authority and inclusive 
governance in the DRC) and external factors (such as the continuing threat posed by 
the Rwandan ex-FAR and Interhamwe militia). The LCA also posed the principles of 
internal negotiations in the DRC to resolve the political crisis while simultaneously 
attempting to provide mechanisms to resolve the security concerns of Rwanda and 
Burundi (Kabemba 2000:28). 
 
There were several issues to the war in DRC and most of them were solved. The 
settlement eventually met all of the coalition’s demands for a multiparty state, the end of 
the Marxist political and economic system of Kabila and the inclusion of the population. 
The political settlement itself resolved the major outstanding grievance of access to the 
political system. Thus, the settlement’s resolution of the immediate cause of the conflict 
was sufficient to establish normal politics (interview with Biyoya18). Even though not all 
root causes were solved, the resolution of the war had the support of the people in the 
DRC. Some respondents indicate that Congolese were satisfied with the resolution of 
the grievances. The support of the people is a requisite for peace to last. 
 
One example of an issue which did not get solved was the question of nationality of 
Banyamulenge, which led to question of land distribution. According to Mokolo19, the 
Banyamulenge are Congolese of Tutsi origin who migrated to South Kivu. With regard to 
the Banyamulenge’s citizenship, the Congolese people and their government are not 
opposed to granting of citizenship to this community, in accordance with the law of the 
country. The Banyamulenge issue has simply been politicised at the highest levels to 
                                                            
18Philippe Biyoya, IPRIS, Director and Professor of university, DRC, 27 September 2013,  Johannesburg, SA  
19 Interview with Mokolo, Procurer and lawyer, DRC, 3 December 2014, Pretoria, SA 
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serve as a pretext while hidden agendas are accomplished. The Congolese law 
recommends that citizenship be solicited individually. When Kabila took power, the 
Banyamulenge took most of the key political and military posts in South Kivu. The 
population was never opposed to this policy. For the people, it was a question of 
tolerating the Banyamulenge with whom they have lived for so long, and in the process 
the people of Kivu were ready to support their administrative process for obtaining 
Congolese citizenship. Unfortunately, because of their loyalty lie with Rwanda, the 
Banyamulenge decided to turn against Kinshasa government (Partiel 2000:158). 
Makonero (2000:75) also notes that the problem of nationality was not the original 
reason for the second conflict. The original aggression between the native people of 
Kivu and the Rwandan immigrants centered around land-for agricultural use for the 
former and for grazing of herds for the latter. Furthermore, he writes that this dispute, not 
to mention the claims for citizenship, resulted from the Rwandan immigrants realising 
that, without political power, their ambitions to access the land would remain a dream. 
This is why for some time the Rwandan immigrants and refugees have resorted to 
violence against the Kivu population (Kivu natives) (2000:75). In spite of this, the 
question of nationality was not a problem. However, the question of land remains 
problematic and was not settled by the mediator. 
 
With regard to the external factors of the cause of conflict, the problem of invasion by 
neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda was resolved. There were two 
peace agreements reached on the issue. One was the Pretoria Agreement signed by 
the DRC and Rwanda in July 2002, which committed Rwanda to withdraw its troops 
from the DRC and the Congolese government to support the disarmament, 
demobilisation and repatriation of those groups identified in the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement as “negative forces”. The other was the Luanda Agreement signed between 
the DRC and Uganda in September 2002, which has addressed the security concerns of 
neighbouring countries referred to in the Lusaka Agreement in its preamble and Article 
2. The Luanda Agreement also provided for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the 
DRC within three months, against the establishment of a joint security mechanism at the 
border and a Pacification Commission for Ituri, involving Uganda (Moffett 2009:15). 
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Therefore, the mediators or facilitators of the DRC peace process addressed the internal 
and external factors of the DRC conflict during the process of negotiation. It is clear that 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Pretoria Agreement, the Luanda Agreement and 
the Global and Inclusive agreement peace process took into consideration the root 
causes of the DRC conflict. 
 
5.3.3 Ownership of the peace process 
 
In the negotiation for peace process, it is important to encourage or stimulate ownership 
amongst the different stakeholders as suggested by Rupesinghe (1995:81).  He argues 
that imposed settlements that do not involve representatives of the majority who are in 
favour of a peaceful solution and that gloss over the root causes of conflict are likely to 
postpone further confrontations due to the little support (Rupesinghe 1996:166). 
 
The DRC peace process was in large measure imposed upon the parties. Foreign 
leaders were the actual architects of the peace agreement, not local actors. 
Nevertheless, there was general consensus amongst most of those interviewed20 that 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was accepted and endorsed by all participants in the 
national dialogue ICD. The Lusaka Accord gave equal status to all participants in the 
dialogue. It brought together five components and three entities. The components were 
the DRC government, RCD, MLC, the non- violent opposition, and the “forces vives” or 
civil society. The entities consisted of the RCD-ML, RCD-N, and the Mai Mai (Mangu 
2003: 164). 
 
Rogier (2004:35-36) argues that although the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement deal 
was a necessary step on the road to peace and may eventually mark the beginning of a 
new era in the DRC, the Pretoria II Agreement did not stem from the political will of the 
signatories but was achieved just like the previous ones, after protracted negotiations 
and under intense international pressure exerted in particular by the UN, SA and 
                                                            
20Interviews with informant from the DRC, who shared the same view on the issues, these include Professor  
Mangu Mbata, Biyoya Makutu, Dr Muzong Kodi, Mr Muzungu Diakolo, Mr Mavungu Puati, Mr Ndombi Kamuanza 
and Mr Moise Nyarugabo 
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Western countries. In the end, the parties’ motives for signing were to avoid being 
marginalised and to have their share of power preserved, confirmed or recognised, but 
probably not to offer the DRC an opportunity to rise from its ashes. 
 
As some respondents indicated that in the first phase of the ICD, the Congolese parties 
have been unable to reach a consensus on the agreement on the composition and 
establishment of a new, consensual and inclusive interim government. As result, foreign 
leaders were the architects of the peace process. Therefore, the peace process was 
accepted and endorsed by all participants and so they had an interest in maintaining it. 
 
5.3.4 Identifying all the actors 
 
It is important to identify all the actors involved in the conflict and bring them to the 
negotiating table. According to Rupesinghe (1996:167), there is a need to identify all the 
key players, irrespective of their political weight. It is also important to take into account 
the opinion of each of them. Failure to bring all the actors into the peace process can 
result in a breakdown of the process. Rupesinghe (1996:167) notes that “in situations of 
violent conflict it is imperative that non-military actors be fully involved in the peace 
process because exclusive reliance on highly visible political or military elites has proved 
disastrous in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, to give only few examples.”  
 
The mediator and facilitator worked hard in getting all the warring actors and non-armed 
into the peace process. These actors involved in the DRC process are listed below:  
 
- The DRC government represented by the president of the country is one of the 
main actors to the conflict. 
- Of the foreign countries involved in the conflict, five were on the government’s 
side - Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad and Sudan while three were on the 





Key former rebel movements included the following:  
- RCD- Goma, supported by Rwanda and was in control of large parts of eastern 
provinces; 
- MLC supported by Uganda and headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba. This movement 
was in control of the northern regions; and 
- Breakaway factions of the original RCD, RCD-K/ML and RCD-N in control of 
stretches of the territory in the eastern and north eastern parts of the country.  
- Several Congolese militias including Mai Mai and other non- armed internal 
actors, such as the various Congolese political parties (the opposition), which the 
UDPS is the leading opposition party in the DRC and the forces vives (civil 
society).  
 
Furthermore, all major political actors, together with the SADC, the AU, and the UN 
participated in consultative processes. It is clear that the DRC got a lot of actors into the 
peace process. Therefore, the DRC peace process accurate identification of all 
significant actors was made.  
 
5.3.5 Identifying facilitators 
 
Rupesinghe (1996:167) stresses the importance of identifying all actors, whom appear 
to have the background knowledge as well as the analytical and mediation skills that 
may have a positive role in working towards a durable peace.  
 
As noted above, since the peace process was imposed and the architects were outside 
sponsors, facilitators also came from those sponsoring countries. There was a large and 
experienced pool of facilitators from Libya, the UN, the OAU, the EU, and SADC who 
contributed to the peace process.  
 
The most notable facilitators, who played an active role were the Zambian President 
Frederic Chiluba, who led the peace initiative for the DRC, assisted by the president of 
Tanzania and Mozambique. In July 1999, the heads of state of the DRC, Angola, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the rebel groups (MLC and 
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RCD) signed the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, in an attempt to end the Second Congo 
War. The agreement called for the establishment of a ceasefire; the establishment of a 
Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of representatives of the belligerents under 
a neutral chairperson appointed by the OAU to investigate ceasefire violations, establish 
mechanisms to disarm militias and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops; the 
deployment of an appropriate peacekeeping UN mission to disarm belligerents and 
provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations; the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops within a period of 9 months(270 days); and provided for an all-inclusive process 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) (Rogier 2004:35). An important provision was that 
all parties to the internal dispute, whether armed or not including the Kinshasa 
government were required to participate in this dialogue as equals (Weis and 
Carayannis 2005:153-154). 
 
However, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was criticised for the exclusion of certain 
actors. The Lusaka Agreement was negotiated and signed only by the main actors (DRC 
government, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, RCD and MLC). It did not 
include other rebels groups such as the Ugandan or Burundian rebels, UNITA, and other 
militia groups operating from the DRC, especially the Hutu militia and the Mai Mai. The 
approach taken in the Agreement was to disarm these Hutu militias and to repatriate 
them to Rwanda. 
 
Former President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya held talks at different times with President 
Kabila of the DRC, Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of Rwanda from November 1998 
to June 1999. Arising from such an initiative President Museveni signed a Ceasefire 
agreement with President Muammar Gaddafi in May 1999 in the Libyan town of Sirte 
under personal initiative of President Muammar Gaddafi (Mpangala 2004:19). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Lusaka peace Agreement provided for the ICD. On 14 
November 1999, the OAU/AU mandated Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of 
Botswana to facilitate the ICD after extensive consultations with all the parties 
concerned. However, no agreement was reached on the issue of the establishment of a 
consensual and inclusive interim government. To break the deadlock, Sir Ketumile 
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Masire and Congolese parties asked former President Mbeki of SA to assist in the 
process of reaching an agreement. In December 2002, the Congolese parties signed a 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on transition in the DRC. The Agreement provided 
for a transitional government, drawing on a ‘1+4’ model from the South African 
experience of ‘1+2’. President Joseph Kabila would remain as interim president until the 
election and would have four vice-presidents drawn from the RCD-Goma, the MLC, 
Kabila’s former government, and a coalition of unarmed parties. The Agreement also set 
out objectives for the transitional government to achieve within two years a constitution, 
elections and the formation of a new integrated army. The final part of the ICD was 
signed in April 2003 in Sun City, SA (Moffett 2009:15).  
 
Other SADC states became involved diplomatically in the peace process such as SA 
and Angola. The SA and Angola initiative led to the bilateral agreement such as the 
Pretoria Agreement and the Luanda Agreement as mentioned above. The Luanda 
Agreement provides for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC, the putting into 
place of a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri to govern the district with the assistance 
of the MONUC. These initiatives also paved the way to a continuation of the dialogue 
under SA through the SADC auspices and the eventual establishment in 2003, of a new 
transitional government of national unity (Weis and Carayannis 2005:156). Therefore, 
the required skills and goodwill were available to facilitate the resolution of the conflict 
and to sustain the peace initiative even after reaching an agreement. 
 
5.3.6 Setting a realistic timetable 
 
Rupesinghe (1996:167) notes that another crucial element of a peace building design is 
an understanding of the stages of conflict resolution. He further emphasises the 
importance of writing a timetable with different steps, starting from a deep understanding 
of the root causes of conflict to its resolution. The timetable should not be too long or too 
short. If it is too long and the negotiations go on for a long time then there is a risk that 
the drive for peace gets lost. If it is too short there is a risk that the trustworthiness of the 
peace gets damaged. “Those involved in designing the peace process must also devote 
an adequate amount of their time to the process” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). 
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Chapter Three of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provided the timetable for the 
implementation of the agreement. However, implementation was left to the belligerents 
and thus creating possibilities of sabotaging the process (Mpangala 2004:19). Hence, 
there was little progress in this regard. Repeated ceasefire violations delayed the 
implementation of the Lusaka Accord. Its full implementation had faced a certain number 
of problems that have been ignored during the process of negotiation. First, the 
Agreement recognised Congolese rebel groups as equal partners to the Kabila 
government, while former Rwandan soldiers in sanctuaries in Congo were considered 
“negative forces” and hence to be disarmed by the international community. Second, the 
Agreement not only legitimised the occupation of eastern Congo by Rwanda and 
Uganda, but it also froze the status quo and distinct zones of influence controlled by 
different rebel factions under either Rwanda or Uganda patronage. Third, Congolese 
armed groups in eastern Congo such as the Mai Mai, were neither represented at the 
peace negotiations in Lusaka, nor were they asked to sign the Agreement. They were 
also not   mentioned as participants. The omission of the Mai Mai from the Agreement 
has been particularly serious since they continued to fight and were under no formal 
obligation to respect a ceasefire. This resistance continued despite their close 
relationship with and indeed their incorporation into the FAC. Finally, LCA was signed 
without much debate over the causes of the conflict and, in particular, the eastern 
Congo conflict (Kisangani 2012:151). 
 
Therefore, the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement required commitment and 
good faith from all the parties and sustained pressure from the richest and most powerful 
countries acting individually and collectively through the UN, the EU, the OAU/AU and 
SADC (Mangu 2003:163). The schedule of implementation of the Lusaka Accord from 
the date of signature to the withdrawal of the foreign armies and deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission was only about 9 months. Considering the numerous warring 
factions involved in the DRC conflict, a period of 9 months was very short for the main 
issues in the Accord to be dealt with. The timeframe was just too short for the release of 
hostages, disarmament and demobilization of all the warring factions. Clearly, it was 
impossible to accomplish all these tasks within 9 months. 
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In addition, the Lusaka Accord committed to organize a national dialogue, general 
elections and to form a national government within 9 months. All the tasks agreed upon 
in the negotiation leading up to the Lusaka Accord was supposed to be achieved within 
this time. The Lusaka Peace Accord timetable implementation was highly unrealistic. 
 
5.3.7 Sustaining the effort 
 
In order for a peace process to be successful it is important to invest financial resources, 
patience and sustained commitment from sponsors (Rupesinghe 1995:82).Since the 
second conflict started on 2 August 1998, there have been sustained efforts from 
different actors to end it. Some of these actors include: the UN, the AU, the EU and 
SADC. 
 
5.3.7.1 The United Nations 
 
The UN joined the peace process after the Lusaka peace agreement had been signed in 
1999. On 24 February 2000, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1279, which authorised the 
deployment of 5,537United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC or Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique 
Democratique du Congo) to observe the 1999 Lusaka accord. MONUC costs an 
estimated $142 million per annum.This figure was later reduced to 3,000 numbers that 
have been widely criticised as far too small to monitor a peace agreement effectively 
(Weis and Carayannis 2005:154-155). In 2001, the UN dispatched to the DRC what was 
to become its largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission. It is important to note 
that this mission was not the first in the DRC, between 1960 and 1964 the UNSC 
deployed the mission in the DRC called the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, ONUC) to restore order and to end the Congo 
crisis. In addition, the UN appointed former Senegalese Prime minister, Moustapha 
Niasse as a special representative of the Secretary-general to the Congo crisis in order 




5.3.7.2 The AU 
 
The AU has assisted the peace process in the DRC since its start. The former OAU 
Secretary General invited states in the region to participate in a peaceful solution of the 
crisis based on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC in order to 
coordinate all efforts (Stefaan and Wamu 2002:416). It appointed Sir Ketumile Masire, 
former president of Botswana to facilitate the application of the Lusaka Agreement, 
especially the organisation of the ICD. The AU also set up the Joint Military Commission 
(JMC) to implement the military component of the agreement in 1999. Therefore, due to 
the lack of financial and resources, the AU played a limiting role in supervising the 
dispute settlement, coordinating the various regional and international organisations 
involved in the process. 
 
5.3.7.3 The European Union (EU)  
 
The EU has spent considerable attention to the process and supported it through 
diplomatic initiatives, military and financial missions. The EU appointed Aldo Ajello on 25 
March 1996 as the special representative of the EU for the African Great Lakes regions. 
His mission was to back the different efforts aimed at creating the necessary conditions 
for solving the crisis in the entire Great Lakes region. This includes support to the UN 
and the AU and the maintenance of regular contacts with regional governments 
(Hoebeke et al. 2007:7). In 1999, the EU supported the implementation of the LCA 
financially. The EU further supported the Lusaka Agreement and peace process by 
reviewing its arms embargo policy, and allowing for certain exemptions such as 
equipment for humanitarian use and for the destruction of landmines. In June 2003, the 
UNSC authorised the EU to send 2,000 troops to the DRC in Bunia code-named 
Operation Artemis, to contribute to security stabilisation and improve the humanitarian 







Under Mbeki’s leadership, SA through SADC was playing a role in diplomatic and 
military involvement. Its effort, bilaterally and multilaterally was to bring the warring 
parties to the negotiating table, help the peace process financially and sent 
peacekeepers to support the UN mission in the DRC (Essuman 2009:414). It is clear 
that these joint efforts have been undertaken in order to end the second conflict. 
 
5.3.8 Evaluating success and failure 
 
For Rupesinghe (1996:167), no lasting peaceful solution can be achieved if it does not 
encompass interests of the main protagonists. Such process has to include inter alia 
obstacles, alternatives and openness to other external initiatives that could ultimately 
consolidate the whole process. Failures must be listed and reported and ‘institutional 
memories’ accumulated so that practitioners can learn from past successes as well as 
failures. 
 
The mediation process started in 1998 and was concluded in 2003. During this period,  
SADC had shown success in bringing Congolese together to negotiate and to end their 
differences. The primary goal of the mediation was to find a solution to the conflict. As 
noted above, the main interests of the parties are being addressed through peace 
agreements.  
 
Despite these achievements, SADC encountered the difficulties in mediating and 
facilitating the peace process. These included:  
 
- President Chiluba was rejected as mediator because of his alleged links with the 
Angolan rebel group UNITA; 
- The problem that Chiluba faced on the ground during the mediation process was 
the proliferation of fighting factions. This greatly complicated mediation efforts, 
which in turn complicated SADC mission and made implementing peace 
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agreements more difficult driven by looting and illegal exploitation of natural 
resources; 
- Peace plans were regularly violated. Expectations that the signing of the LCA 
would bring about an end to the war were not met because of continued violations 
of the agreement by all belligerents, which reduced the momentum of the peace 
process; 
- Under ICD, Masire was confronted with a Congolese government that did not 
cooperate as he had expected. Laurent Kabila’s uncooperative behaviour was 
detrimental for the internal dialogue, especially his rejection of Masire’s 
collaboration as facilitator, his opposition to UN deployment and his precondition 
for the withdrawal of Rwanda and Uganda forces from Congo. His stalling tactics 
continually derailed the peace process (Kisangani 2012:151); 
- Masire’s inability to speak French and problem of inadequate funding. At the final 
plenary session in Sun City, Masire was anxious to leave the ICD circus. He had 
been severely criticised for being weak and for lacking the enthusiasm and 
neutrality demanded by the complex Congolese conflict (Boshoff and Rupiya 
2003:31); and 
- The evolution of a war economy in the DRC had become a major obstacle in 
resolving the conflict. The DRC’s immense natural resources, in particular its 
mineral wealth, had been an incentive for the continued occupation of Congolese 
soil by the foreign armies (Naidoo 2000:95-98). 
 
In spite of these difficulties, SADC has continued to play the leading role in the peace 
process until the end of the second conflict and the establishment of a new transitional 
government of national unity in July 2003.There were certain factors that led to the 
progress of DRC peace process. One of the factors was the assassination of President 
Laurent Desire Kabila that has broken the deadlock in the peace negotiations and his 
replacement by his son, Joseph Kabila. Joseph Kabila showed more commitment to the 
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, including the holding of the ICD. He gave 
unreserved support to the facilitator of the ICD, Sir Ketumile Masire. He also allowed the 
deployment of the UN military observer mission required to monitor the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from the DRC (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009:97). 
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The other factor was the international pressure exerted by Moustapha Niasse, the UN 
special envoy to the ICD and Thabo Mbeki, the South African President acting through 
SADC to force parties to the conflict to join the peace process.  Their pressure took 
various forms, exhortations and trade embargoes.  
 
Although the SADC mediators had faced challenges in their attempts at approaching the 
Congolese conflict, the DRC presented the SADC with an opportunity to forge genuine 
partnerships with the international community in order to promote peace and security in 
Africa, which can be explained by the joint efforts in the peace process. However, 
violence continued and peace was fragile because the International community failed to 
condemn the occupation of around half of the Congolese territory by Rwanda and 
Uganda. In other words, they have failed to recognise and address serious issues of the 
problem of eastern Congo and the subsequent exploitation of the national resources of 
the DRC. 
 
5.3.9 Strategic constituencies 
 
According to Rupesinghe (1996:167), strategic constituencies are understood as the 
pillars of any long and sustainable peace settlement. They include a wide range of 
entities like civil society, non-affiliated scholars, businessmen, external donors, religious 
groups, human rights activists, retired members of the military, governmental 
associations as well as the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To maximise their 
impact, various constituencies could form strategic alliances focused on particular 
conflicts, aspects of violent conflict or the overall goal of prevention. 
 
In his view, the role of the strategic groups is crucial in impacting directly on the pre-
negotiation and negotiation stages and helping to form and sustain the linkages between 
parties to conflict, NGOs, the intergovernmental community and between strata within 
the conflicting societies (Rupesinghe 1996:167).  
 
133 
Civil society through representation by NGOs and religious groups are important actors 
if the objective is to attain sustainable peace. In other words, the degree of participation 
of civil society may well determine the future trajectory in any country faced with civil 
war. At the beginning of the second conflict, it is important to note the civil society in the 
DRC has simply been politicised. Some NGOs were behind the government and others 
were behind the non-armed opposition. As a result, they did not play their role of 
watchdog. There were also other NGOs which have kept their independence(which are 
not supporting the government or the non-armed opposition) in the sense that have 
remained consistent in their fight against human rights and other abuses, and who seek 
good governance and democracy, especially those working for the defence of human 
rights (interview with Tunamsifu)21.  
 
Consequently, LD. Kabila banned activities of the NGOs in the country. However, they 
did not falter in the face of this adversity. They were organised and created a space to 
inform the population on dynamics of the DRC crisis by the various conference, 
seminars and dialogues. Papers presented by academics, researchers and respected 
community leaders, revealed information of the conflict which could not have been 
obtained from normal news reports. This has proven that they were active in the DRC 
(Naidoo 2000:98). 
 
At the first stage of the mediation process, the DRC Civil Society groups that 
campaigned for peace were not invited to the Lusaka negotiating table, which was the 
preserve of armed groups and representatives of Mobutu and Kabila regimes (Daley 
2006: 315). After signing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the civil society has been 
involved in initiatives that sought to bring about peace. Civil society delegates 
participated in Pretoria political dialogue of 2002, which paved the way for political 
transition. When the ICD was adjourned on 19 April, after 52 days of negotiations, the 
delegates had not reached any agreement. Mbeki suggested two power-sharing plans 
for the post-war transition. The DRC government, the MLC and their respective allies 
opposed the Mbeki plan and left the dialogue on 22 April 2002. Masire and Mbeki 
                                                            
21 Philippe Tunamsifu Shirambere, Lecturer of law at ULPGL, DRC, 24 September 2014, Pretoria, SA. 
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continued negotiations on the formation of a transitional government of national unity. 
Civil society and NGO’s also met in Sun City and set up the Alliance for the Defence of 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Alliance pour la Sauvegarde du Dialogue Intercongolais). 
The aim of the Alliance according to its constitutive act, was to undertake anything 
possible to bring the DRC government and the MLC back to the negotiating table in 
order to achieve an inclusive and consensual agreement on the transitional government 
(Mangu 2003:164).  It is clear that strategic constituencies were carefully identified and 
allowed to play a role in the peace process. 
 
5.3.10 The Role of outside peacemakers 
 
Rupesinghe (1995:84) considers that outsiders in general have a crucial role to play in 
the peace process. They are not only diplomats but also the representatives of non-
governmental societies. These personalities have a prominent role in mediation and 
finally conflict resolution especially when violence tends to pull everything apart. This is 
illustrated in recent Norwegian intervention on the Palestinian-Israeli stalemate. 
 
The role played by outside peacemakers was enormous. As noted above, the peace 
process involved several outside peacemakers from the UN, AU, Libya, and SADC. 
Again, the DRC experiences underscore the need for outside actors to help in finding 
sustainable peace to the country. The involvement of outside peacemakers in providing 
both financial resources and expertise helped significantly in bringing peace to the war 
ravaged country. For example, the EU and SA spent huge amount of money in the 
peace process. 
 
5.3.11 The Role of local peacemakers 
 
It is important that local peacemakers are involved in the peace process. “Influential 
members of local communities with first-hand knowledge of the conflict, actors, the 
political and economic situation and the cultural background will have a distinct 
‘comparative advantage’ over other potential peacemakers wishing to act as third-party 
mediators. What is more, they will “own the peace” once it is made, and will maintain a 
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stake in ensuring its sustainability” (Rupesinghe 1995:85). Local peacemakers will have 
a deeper understanding of the war taking place in their country than outside actors. 
 
There were no local peacemakers involved in the official peace process, which meant 
that parties were increasingly dependent on the attention of outside sponsors. At the 
beginning of the conflict, local peacemakers such as Etienne Tshisekedi leader of UDPS 
had offered to mediate the parties, however he was rejected due to the mistrust that 
both parties had of potential peacemakers. 
 
It is clear that SADC mediation was characterised by stop-start negotiations. However, 
SADC worked to transform the relationship of the parties by undertaking numerous visits 
to DRC and meet with all key stakeholders to discuss ways of resolving the political 
crisis. SADC also continued to convince the Congolese parties to agree on an inclusive 
transitional government. This initiative led to the outcome of DRC peace processes 
being a success in the sense the all parties signed the peace agreement. The evaluation 
showed that all elements in Rupensighe’s model are of utmost importance in order to 




The conditions in the DRC provided opportunities for SADC, the UN, the AU and others 
to intervene with a view to stop conflict and to build peace. The main purpose of this 
chapter has been to appraise the role of SADC in conflict resolution in the second 
conflict. Despite the fact that SADC was divided on the matter of how to intervene in the 
Congolese conflict, it took a lead in the DRC peace process.  SADC was involved in the 
Congolese conflict through the use of military intervention and mediation process.  
 
With regard to military intervention in the DRC, the SADC AAF had clear military 
objective. This operation was dominated by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe resulting in 
a lack of sub-regional unity and depriving the force of important legitimacy in fulfilling its 
tasks (Francis 2006:204). The SADC AAF’s decision to come to Kabila’s support did not 
absolutely lean the military balance in the government’s favour and it forced both sides 
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into a stalemate. Although SADC was involved diplomatically in the DRC, which helped 
the parties reach a settlement to the political crisis. However, SADC diplomatic action in 
the DRC has shown lack of experience. 
 
Many scholarly opinions are still debating the successes and failures of SADC 
intervention in the DRC.  As Nathan (2006) argues, SADC failed in its intervention in the 
DRC as the war is still continuing in Eastern Congo. Others such as Smis and 
Oyatambwe (2002) have considered the fact that SADC’s intervention was successful 
since the civil war has ended. According to Strachan22, key objective of SADC action on 
the Congolese conflict was to end the conflict (interview with SADC official). From this 
perspective, it is possible to conclude that the SADC military and diplomatic intervention 
was a success in the sense that the objectives of the mandate were accomplished. It is 
true that violence continues and peace remained fragile, but the conflict has ended. 
What SADC needs in the future is to harmonise its intervention policy in member states 
and learn from the challenges and experience of other regional organisations like 




                                                            
22Interview by phone with Ms Janice Strachan, assistant director: Africa Multilateral, SADC desk Department of 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This concluding chapter has a dual purpose. First, it draws together a few threads that 
are running through the discussion and summarises key points. Second, it makes some 
recommendations for future intervention.  
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of SADC in conflict resolution in the 
DRC conflict from 1998 to 2003. In order to achieve this goal the following questions 
guided our investigation: 
 
- What role did SADC play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC? 
- What mechanism(s) and methods did SADC make use of? And with what 
outcomes? 
- What lessons can we draw form SADC intervention in the DRC?   
 
In order to answer the above questions and to fulfill the aim of this study, the dissertation 
was organised into six chapters which are summarised below. 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE KEY POINTS 
 
The first chapter is an introduction and it also presents an overview of the study. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the literature review revealed that the existing works on 
SADC intervention largely focused on SADC military and diplomatic intervention in the 
DRC. However, the literature reviewed failed to demonstrate that the SADC AAF military 
intervention in the DRC by the three members of SADC (Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe) created a situation of power balance that paved the way to the negotiation. 
The understanding of power balance situation brought by the SADC’s intervention in the 
process of conflict resolution in the DRC served as a motivation for the researcher to 




Chapter 2 was concerned with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. 
Various concepts in conflict and conflict resolution were discussed to orientate the 
reader with wider literature related to the study. As discussed in this chapter, SADC 
through SADC Organ played an important role in the area of conflict resolution in the 
SADC region. 
 
It was highlighted that the role of SADC in the conflict can be investigated through 
understanding the nature of the conflict in which it was involved. The discussion showed 
that SADC was involved in two types of conflicts, the interstate and intrastate conflict, 
but the latter was more prominent in the region and was often explained in terms of 
grievance or greed. It is important that a combination of both grievance and greed must 
be taken into account when the causes of conflict are discussed. Interestingly these two 
elements explained the cause of the Congolese conflict.  The key actors in both types of 
conflicts were the governments, rebel groups, the militias, foreign governments and 
multinationals. 
 
In addition, the way in which these conflicts were resolved was determined by the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms used for that purpose. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
SADC Organ has used two- fold strategy to deal with conflict in the region. Emphasis 
and priority were given to peaceful methods, such as negotiation to settle conflicts 
between and within states. This means that when diplomatic efforts fail to resolve 
conflict, the use of military force is seen as a viable option. Members are required to 
reach a consensus on the use of force, which can only be used after it has been 
endorsed in a protocol on peace, security and conflict resolution. This means that the 
use of force is a last resort. 
 
The theories of NIT and Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation were also 
discussed. It was emphasised that the NIT were not a single or coherent body of theory 
as there are three variants of the NIT which have little interchange among them ,namely, 
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. 
These theories were adopted to make it possible to understand the multi-faceted 
functioning of SADC. By adopting these theories, it was possible to show how decision 
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making processes within the SADC affected the work of the organisation in conflict 
resolution.  
 
Another important theoretical framework that helped the study to assess SADC’s role in 
the Congo conflict resolution process from 1998 to 2003 and to draw some lesson from 
this process was the Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation. His model also 
helped to analyse the role of other regional actors in this conflict. The model stresses 
internal conflicts and multi-dimensionality of protracted social conflicts. Rupesinghe 
discussed an approach to the existing conflicts. 
 
The model consists of eleven elements that included: pre-negotiation stage; 
understanding root causes; ownership of the process; identifying all the factors; 
identifying facilitators; setting a realistic timetable; sustaining the effort; evaluating 
success and failure; strategic constituencies; the role of outside peacemakers and the 
role of local peacemakers. The model is important that it adopts eleven elements which 
Rupesinghe claims are necessary in order to achieve a durable peace. 
 
Chapter 3 of the study presented SADC as an institution in relation to the NIT. The 
chapter revealed that the establishment of SADC was an evolutionary process, which 
the FLS and SADCC have undergone. Therefore, the formation of SADC was a result of 
a long process of institutionalisation. This chapter also discussed SADC’s objectives, 
principles, structure, functions and powers of execution in its Treaty in order to 
understand SADC as an institution. It was stressed that SADC is an international 
organisation whose main purpose is the economic, political and security integration of its 
fifteen member states.  
 
SADC is run not by one body but by a series of institutions. The main institutions of 
SADC remain basically the same as those of SADCC. But there are some amendments 
regarding their mode of operation and an addition of a tribunal and troika. The following 
institutions were established: the SADC Summit, Troika, OPDSC, Council of ministers, 
integrated committee of ministers, Standing committee of officials, Secretary, Tribunal 
and SADC national committee. This current SADC framework is not independent of the 
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influence of individual member states. The organisation has been deeply affected by this 
double heritage (the FLS and the SADCC) within the structures of the institution. SADC 
OPDSC still operates more along the lines of the FLS when they had to take certain 
decisions. The requirement of consensus in decision making weakens the organisation. 
SADC is an intergovernmental organisation whose success largely depends on what 
individual member states collectively want it to achieve.  
 
Above all, the study served to present SADC as an actor in conflict resolution. Conflict 
resolution has been one of the major challenges of our time and needs to be urgently 
addressed. SADC did not hesitate to play this role and is engaged in promoting peace, 
security and stability in the region. It has undergone significant transformation to meet 
the challenges presented by security matters and regional political developments.  
 
In 1996, SADC created the SADC OPDSC as cooperative mechanism for collective 
security and peace to deal with conflict. This mechanism has mandate to promote peace 
and security in the region. However, the SADC OPDS was dormant due to among 
others, the political tension between Mandela Chair of SADC body and Mugabe Chair of 
SADC Organ, until 2001 when efforts were undertaken to revitalise the Organ.  
 
As actor in conflict resolution, SADC OPDSC has sufficient capacity to be a decisive 
actor in the area of conflict resolution in the SADC region. However, its past record in 
conflict resolution has been mixed and the Organ faces enormous resource, institutional 
structure, lack of cooperation, experience challenges. This is a problem with the entire 
SADC system, not just the SADC Organ. Several units were created in order to 
strengthen SADC OPDSC capacity. Those were the SADC Regional Early Warning 
System, the SADC Mediation and SADC Standby Brigade.  
 
Finally, SADC cannot be expected to do everything. SADC has developed partnerships 
with other actors and institutions. The central institutions in this regard are the UN and 
the AU. SADC is a subsidiary body to and a building block of both the AU and the UN 
collective security system from which it has a legitimate security role in terms of Chapter 
VIII of UN charter. In this context it has developed a good working relationship with the 
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UN and the AU which is based on the established principles. The cooperation and 
relationship between SADC, the AU and the UN in conflict resolution in the SADC region 
presented opportunities and challenge. This relationship also requires constant 
communication and coordination to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution.  
 
Chapter 4 was devoted to the DRC conflict from 1998 to 2003. When analysing the 
background of the DRC, it was found that the second conflict was the continuation of the 
first. This analysis proved that the conflict occurred due to a number of factors, such as 
security of the DRC’s eastern border with its neighbours, the problem of nationality of 
Rwandan immigrants, bad governance, hitches in the democratisation process and 
external aggression of the DRC. 
 
The conflict has witnessed several actors, ranging from state actors such as Angola, 
Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, to armed groups 
namely the RCD, MLC, Mai Mai and others. Those actors were involved in the 
Congolese conflict for political ideological, security and economic interests. This has 
also extended from grievance to greed.  
 
Chapter 5 discussed the important role played by SADC and its contribution to the return 
of peace and stability in the DRC. The civil war in the DRC has proven to be more 
complex and intractable for the SADC. A two way strategy has been used by the SADC 
to deal with Congolese conflict such as military and mediation process. The SADC 
intervention in the second conflict in the DRC through the use of peacekeeping is now 
more than sixteen years old. SADC AAF intervention was seen as success in the sense 
that it prevented Rwanda and Uganda from occupying the DRC and creating an 
environment for the diplomatic initiative to find a peaceful solution to the political crisis, 
which would not have been possible in its absence. However, the deployment of SADC 
AAF has presented many challenges to the SADC. Those challenges were the regional 
collective security framework and mandate, question of legitimacy, operational problem, 
media coverage and the financial problem. The mission itself was controversial, as some 
SADC leaders would have preferred a political solution to the problem. 
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This leads us to the next strategy of SADC involvement in conflict. This is mediation 
process, whereby SADC appointed mediator in an attempt to facilitate a resolution of the 
perceived incompatibility of interests that divided the parties. The outcome of peace 
negotiations has been the signing of peace agreements and ceasefire agreements and 
their implementations. The analysis has shown that mediators put importance on 
concluding agreements than on searching for option and non-binding outcomes. 
 
The discussion also showed that SADC’s main problem encountered in the 
management and resolution of the Congolese conflict was the absence of an 
organisational structure for security mechanism at the time of the conflict and this has 
led to ad hoc arrangements. This study found that DRC has been a crucial test of 
SADC’s conflict resolution capacity and the DRC conflict caused major rifts within 
SADC. The disagreement among its member states left the SADC being perceived as 
an indecisive, inconsistent and effectively weak international actor. Despite these 
problems, the DRC conflict presented the SADC with an opportunity to build its peace 
and security architecture and also allowed it to forge partnerships with the international 
community in order to promote peace and security in SADC region.  
 
Therefore, SADC’s role in the DRC conflict was found to be more successful and a 
genuine contribution to peace. However, SADC military and diplomatic intervention has 
shown lack of experience. Despite the lack of experience in the field, SADC was always 
determined to respond to regional armed conflicts, to ensure regional stability. In 
addition, there are some Lessons learnt from SADC’s involvement both militarily and 
diplomatically in the long process of conflict resolution in the DRC. Militarily they are as 
follow: 
- The operation was improvised. In the future such mission needs to be planned; 
- the parameters of future possible intervention need to be clarified in terms of 
SADC treaty; 
- a particular attention needs to be given to the challenges of interoperability and at 
all relevant levels; 
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- interaction between local population and the intervening force is more beneficial 
to both entities especially to the intervening force for a good communication of 
motivations for interventions; and 
- political opinions of member states, have to be sought for a better logistic support, 
(Neethling 2000:13). 
 
The lessons learnt from SADC mediation are as follow:  
- SADC diplomatic intervention was improvised.  
- SADC needs to build its own internal capacity for mediation. Opposition groups 
complained that its interventions tended to favour the Kinshasa government.  
 
From the methodological point of view, the results show that the model of Rupesinghe is 
interesting and can be used as a way to build peace in the DRC, but also that it has its 
shortcomings. For example, there are elements within the model which are too similar 
and also the aspect of culture has not been taken into account. 
In the final analysis the three main conclusions drawn from the study are highlighted as 
follow: 
- SADC intervention has achieved its primary objective that of ending the conflict.  
- SADC is better positioned than other international institution to proffer a lasting 
solution to the Congolese conflict.  
- Violence continues and peace remained fragile in the DRC, but the conflict has 
ended. The weakness of the DRC government has allowed continued violence 
and human rights abuses.  
 
The DRC needs to take full responsibility of its own domestic problems. Therefore SADC 
has no right to concern itself with the internal affairs of its member state, unless invited 
to do so by the concerned state. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
On the basis of some of the lessons learned from the SADC intervention and taking into 
account its implications in the DRC as addressed above, this study suggests some 
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recommendation as follow: 
 
- SADC needs to look again at its attitudes on all of these strategic mechanisms 
such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; 
- SADC will need to establish clear policy with regard to the type of intervention; 
- SADC will need to address issues of financial and logistical weakness and the 
lack of political consensus among leaders on collective security norms and 
practices; 
- The division of labour between the UN, the AU and SADC should be clarified. 
- SADC will need to develop capacity to monitor, evaluate and ensure 
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